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Foreword
While a "theme-centered" structure
was already apparent in recent issues
of "Trends", the new approach has
now been firmly established with this
issue.
The secretariat* has chosen, in
close communication with the Euro-
pean Commission and the corre-
spondents, the topic of activation,
which is one of the five action areas
decided on at the Council meeting of
Essen as basic elements of an Europe-
an Employment Strategy.
The idea was to present informa-
tion from each of the 15 Member
States in a comparative manner, to
which end the secretariat developed
a frame of reference for the individu-
al papers. However, just as every
country has its particularities, so do
the country reports, and while they
all discuss the same theme, they
present it from different angles. In
order to provide a comparative over-
view (with all its limitations), the sec-
retariat has drafted a summary paper
on the basis of data collected by the
OECD, the European Commission
and some of the findings of the coun-
try reports. However, the main infor-
mation and analysis is contained in
the country reports, for which theii
respective authors are responsible.
As the French and the British contri-
butions were finalised before the
newly elected governments intro-
duced any changes in activation poli-
cies, such recent developments are
not reported here.
Together, we hope that the sum-
mary and the reports will give a com-
prehensive overview on "activa-
tion", thus establishing "Trends" as
the more analytical of the two jour-
nals of the European Employment
Observatory, complementing "Poli-
cies", the report system of the "Mu-
tual Information System on Employ-
ment Policies" (MISEP).
t The European Commission has awarded the
contract for the management of the Europe-
an Employment Observatory @EO; see back
cover of this issue for explanation of EEO) to
the I.A.S., Institute for Applied Socio-Eco-
nomics, Berlin, from 1997 onwards.
summit in Lille, not to mention na-
tional activities, some of which
marked the implementation of these
proposals.
While all these reports agree on
the necessity of more intervention in
the labour market, they vary consid-
erably in their policy proposals. With
regard to active policies, the Europe-
an Commission takes a clear posi-
tion: the fourth of the five action are-
as agreed upon in the Essen Council
meeting in late 1994 calls for greater
effectiveness and for an activation of
LMP, which is henceforth to consti-
tute a major element of a "European
Employment Strategy".
Active Labour Market Policy in
the European Union
The idea that being "active" is pref-
erable to being "passive" and that
the mere drawing of benefits without
any real possibilities to work might
even render individuals more passive
is now largely accepted. Therefore,
an "activation" of labour market
{ By Peter Auer, acting EEO programme
manager. The auttror would Iike to thank
Stefan Speckesser for his valuable contribu-
tion.
Activation of Labour Market Policy in the European
Union 
- 
Comparative Summary"
The period between the second "oil
shock" in the early 1980s and L990
saw an economic recovery which at
last impacted on the labour market,
creating jobs and reducing unem-
plolment. For an observer posi-
tioned in the late 1980s, it might
therefore have been possible to think
that the policies of deregulation
started in this period would support
market forces and eventually restore
equilibrium even in labour markets.
This belief was, however, quickly
shattered in the ensuing period,
which brought back even higher un-
employment levels and slack eco-
nomic and employment growth in
the European Union.
ln the wake of this renewed dete-
rioration, since about 1993 there has
been a renewed interest in active
policies to combat unemployment,
witnessed by an array of important
reports and policy proposals, among
them the White Paper on "Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment"
of the European Commission, fol-
lowed by the resolutions adopted at
Essen, attempts towards a European
Confidence Pact on Employment,
the OECD "Jobs Study" and the
conclusions of the G7 employment
Figure 1: Labour Market Policy Activity Rate, 1985, 1989 and 1r995t
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Figure 2: Laboul Market Policy Spending 1985, 1989 and 1995*
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policy (LMP) is on the agenda of pol-
icy-makers thrgughout Europe. ln fi-
nancial terms, this entails a shift in
spending from passive LMP towards
active LMP. One of the aims of a
"European Employment Strategy" is
precisely this: an increase in spend-
ing on active LMP as a proportion of
the total spept on LMP, bringing
about a shift in the present two-
thirds for passive and one-third for
active LMP. A second aim in that re-
gard is to adopf more efficient and
cost-effective RI.UP measures.
According torfigures published by
the OECD1, between L985 andL994l
95 the LMP acfivity rate in the EU
(measured as spending on active pol-
icies in total spending on LMP) in-
creased by around 10 percentage
points, rising from around 27% to
36%.
While there was a decline in the
activity rate between 1989 andL995
(due to increased spending on unem-
ployment benefits following a rise in
unemployment), the share of GDP
spent on active labour market policy
(ALMP) has continuously grown
since the middle of the 1980s: aver-
age active LMP spending stood at
0.72% of GDP in 1985, rising to
0.85% in L989 and to approx.
L.1-0%ln1994195.
There are, however, great differ-
ences in activity rates and spending
across the member countries of the
European Union (cf. Figures 1-3).
Besides showing that LMP has be-
come more active since 1985 and
that more is now being spent on ac-
tive LMP, Figure 3 clusters countries
along two dimensions and shows that
in 1995 there are only two countries
exhibiting both high or medium LMP
activity rates and high spending
(Sweden followed by Denmark).
Five countries (Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland and the Nether-
lands) have medium acfivity rates
and medium spending intensity, two
(Greece and Italy) combine low
spending with high LMP activity
rates (which is due largely to the low
wage-replacement rates for the un-
employed there) and four (Austria,
Luxembourg, Spain and the United
Kingdom) low spending and low ac-
tivity rates.
Between 1985 and 1995 many
countries have enhanced their posi-
tion and moved either upwards or to
the left of the graph, indicating an
"activation" of LMP spending. As far
as the distribution across different
spending categories is concerned, a
pattern emerges: between 1985 and
7989 average EU spending (ex-
pressed in GDP percentages) in-
creased on training and declined on
employment subsidies, whereas be-
tween L989 and 1995 subsidised em-
ployment rose again, while training
outlays continued to increase as did
spending on the employment service.
1 In the subsequent pages we rely on figures
on spending and participation reported by
the OECD, the only figures available for
comparisons betreeen countries. Given the
uncertainties regarding the definition of ac-
tivation, such figures must, however, be an-
alysed carefirlly: for exrmple, an "active"
employment service, placing many unem-
ployed in regular work and thus "activat-
ing" them efficiently, might cost less money,
resulting in both low spending and activity
rates. There are also several other difficul-
ties: national and international data such as
the OECD data do not always coincide, as
measures are classified differently, and
sometimes unexplained discrepancies ap-
pear; this is apparent when comparing the
national data reported by ttre correspond-
ents and our OECD data-based analysis.
There is therefore still a need for better data
on LMP. In the absence of a better altema-
tive, then, for this comparative surunary
OECD data will be used.
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Figure 3: Spending on Active Labour Market Policy and Activity Rate in
the EU Countries, 1985 and 1995*
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a* As percentage of GDP,
*** Expenditure on ALMP as percentage of all expenditure on LMP.
Sources: OECD Employment Outlook 7996; OECD labour Force Statistics; own cal-
culations.
This might indicate that after a peri-
od characterised by an emphasis on
supply-side measures, demand-side
(ob-creation) measures are staging a
comeback. This is partially linked to
the growing number of long-term un-
employed for whom employment
prograrnmes are sometimes more ap-
propriate than training programmes.
Again, there is great variation be-
tween countries: subsidised employ-
ment, for example, playlng only a
minor role in the United Kingdom,
accounting for about a third of the
ALMP budget in Sweden and Ger-
many and half of the budget in Bel-
gium and Finland inL994195.
So far the analysis has considered
only the financial dimension and has
been purely input-based. While it
shows the efforts of different coun-
tries in financial terms, it does not al-
low a proper country "benchmark-
ing". In order to do that, not only in-
put indicators, but also results indica-
tors are needed.
Such a "result" indicator is the
number of entries into labour market
programmes. However, this indicator
is limited too: although it tells us
something about the number of per-
sons "activated" through ALMP and
also gives indications as to the rela-
tionship between spending and par-
ticipation in measures, and is there-
fore a crude cost-effectiveness bench-
mark, it is of only limited value for
country rankings and comparisons as
it does not control for duration of
participation, nor for the quality of
prograrnmes. Data on yearly averag-
es of the number of people in pro-
grarnmes in stock terms are more tell-
ing (as they control at least for dura-
tion of measures), but such figures do
not yet exist on a comparative basis.
ln 1995, in 13 member countries
of the EU (no figures are available
for Luxembourg and Austria) an av-
erage of about 6Yo of the labour
force entered ALMP programmes
(Figure 4; not controlling for multiple
entries) over the year. Six countries
are well above this average and sev-
en below, with, at the extremes,
Greece with only around 2o/o and
Denmarkwith around 19%. If we re-
late the flow of entry into pro-
grammes to the stock of the unem-
ployed, we see that a number equiv-
alent to almost three times the pre-
vailing level of unemployment par-
ticipated in ALMP programmes in
Denmark, whereas the number of
Spanish entrants amounted only to
L2.5% of the average stock of the
unemployed (see Figure 5)2.
To sum up at the purely quantita-
tive level, on the basis of OECD data
some of the main features of active
labour market policies can be shown
and a certain trend towards "activa-
tion" as well as a renewed interest in
demand-side schemes identified.
However, this analysis remains very
limited in the absence of indicators
such as programme duration and in-
dicators of programme quality. And
it does not deal at all with the ques-
tion of the impact of ALMP meas-
ures. Evaluation research 
- 
there is
ample documentation of this research
in the different country reports 
-
shows that the impact of programmes
in terms of labour market integration
and earnings is rather weak because
of deadweight, substitution and dis-
placement effects. Thus, it is impor-
tant not only to expand ALMP in
quantitative terms but also to in-
crease the impact of programmes.
Activation policies
Many new efforts are being made in
the Member States to "activate"
2 Agatn, while the ratio of ALMP participants
to the nlmber of unemployed shows better
the magnitude of programmes, the data is
limited by the fact that we have to compare
flow data (ALMP entries) with stock data
(unemployment) and that programmes in
some of the countries also include employed
pe$ons. ln such cases, the value of the ratio
is overestimated.
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Figure 4: Entries to ALMP Programmes as Percentage of Total Labour
Force, 1989 amdL995*
oo!r
€
L
o
-o(l
o
fH
o
C)
b0(l
0)o
0)&
o
20
18
l6
t4
t2
l0
8
6
4
2
0
VU)A oz..l 5a.a-.]VEJ{
* Or last available year.
Sources: OECD Employment Outlook; OECD Labour Force Statistics; own calcula-
tions.
I
tr 1989
t 1995
IT
fl fIe
rt
;t/6-IM rIktr
LMP and the unemployed, as report-
ed by the SYSDEM correspondents
in their respective country studies.
Some of the material and ideas con-
tained in thesd reports are used in the
subsequent section, which deals with
some of the m(re specific aspects of
activation policies in the EU.
The "activation of passive LMP"
implies a financial shift from passive
to active expenditure, but can also be
taken to mean "activating the unem-
ployed" by an array of measures
from intensive placement activities,
incentives to take up work and tradi-
tional "active" labour market policy
programmes to measures restricting
access to transfer payments and ap-
plyrng sanctions against fraudulent
benefit recipients. Basically, one can
distinguish analytically between ap-
proaches based on incentives and
those relying on sanctions, usually
restrictions on access to passive
transfer payments. Both are present
in European employment policies,
whereby the incentive strategy is
prevalent. Yet policies of tightening
access, reducing duration and wage-
replacement rates for passive policies
and enforcing sanctions for fraud and
abuse have been applied to different
degrees in almost all Member States
and are on the increase. Proponents
of these restrictive policies point to
research findings showing, for exam-
ple, that about 10% of benefit recipi-
ents are also in regular work (in Ire-
land) or that those sanctioned take
up work quicker than regular (non-
sanctioned) benefit recipients, as is
suggested by a recent study in the
Netherlands (see the respective arti-
cles in this volume). But mostly these
policies are based on the intuitive be-
lief that a (more or less substantial)
proportion of the unemployed is
shirking and that this needs to be
countered by various means3.
The incentive approach, on the
other hand, is based on the belief
that it is only because of the absence
of economic incentives (or even the
existence of disincentives) that the
unemployed do not take up work.
This is often associated with the con-
cept of an "unemployment traP",
which makes it less beneficial (in fi-
nancial terms) for the unemployed to
take up work than to remain on ben-
efits because of the insignificant dif-
3 A variant of this is fraud and (in some cases
legal) "abuse" of benefits by employers,
which, in the absence of an "experience rat-
ing" system as in the United States (those
using the UI benefit system more often pay
higher contributions), poses problems of eq-
uity. A "borderline" case is seasonal work:
employers dismiss their employees in the
slack season, thus enabling them to &aw
benefits, and rehire them in the following
season, a practice which most probably re-
duces efforts to find work when unem-
ployed.
Figure 5: Enhies to ALMP Programmes as Percentage of All Unem'
ployed, L995*
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ference between the wage-replace-
ment rate for benefit recipients and
(low) wages on the labour market.
An incentive in the form of a top-up
on low incomes from work (e.g. re-
taining benefits temporarily while
working, now possible in the United
Kingdom, France and Ireland) or a
negative income tax or tax system
exempting low income recipients etc.
offer ways of freeing the unem-
ployed from both the unemployment
and the "poverty trap"aand "making
work pay" (OECD L996). Of course,
also a lowering (or increasing) of en-
try wages enlarges the difference and
is thus 
- 
according to some econo-
mists 
- 
an incentive to take up work.
However, to the extent that these in-
centives leave the decision to the in-
dividual and do not at the same time
organise the route into activity, they
are only one of the possible solutions
to this problem.
Another approach by "incentives"
is to offer training and emplolmrent
opportunities through active labour
market policy measures (see above).
While in some of these measures the
incentive is also economic (e.g. by
payrng going wage rates for job-crea-
tion measures or topping up passive
benefits), the more crucial factor here
is organisation. Activation by active
labour market policies requires a suf-
ficient number of activation opportu-
nities (and therefore an organisation-
al capacity to create them, whether in
private firms, in the public service or
in intermediary organisations), an
employment service capable of se-
lecting the unemployed for the right
prograrnmes, and of course efficient
prograrnmes that genuinely "acti-
vate" the unemployed.
While ALMP can be seen as an in-
centive offered to the unemployed,
who are free to choose whether or not
they participate in a programme, this
freedom is now usually constrained
by the fact that refusal to participate
might subsequently lead to the loss of
benefits. Such more or less compulso-
ry participation is more frequent in
youth programmes than in adult pro-
grarnmes, and while the degree of en-
forcement varies between countries,
there is a growing overall trend to-
wards such compulsion.
Thus incentives and sanctions usu-
ally go together: not accepting the
carrot (a temporary job or training
offer) leads to the stick (withdrawal of
benefits), but the carrot is at least of-
fered. In other words, the rights (in-
come protection) and duties (to work
or to be trained) are today more thor-
oughly defined and enforced than in
the past. There are other approaches
in which it is the stick rather than the
carrot which is applied and no job or
training opportunities are offered,
but restrictions on benefit eligibility
imposed. The underlying idea behind
such sanction-based approaches is
that the unemployed are unwilling to
take up work, remain more or less
voluntarily in the unemployment trap
(which is seen by some as a feather
bed) and will only come out of it if
they are obliged to work on the regu-
lar labour market, are severely sanc-
tioned, or if benefits are reduced and
benefit duration shortened.
Clearly, these ideas are basically
supply-side based and skip any refer-
ence to demand-side considerations
such as an insufficient number of reg-
ular jobs available. Attempts to re-
strict qualifying conditions (the con-
ditions which establish eligibility to
benefits), shorten duration and cut
the level of benefits in order to reduce
coverage might be primarily due to fi-
nancial considerations (tight budgets
and deficits), but their political justifi-
cation is linked to such ideas.
Which of the different approaches
(pure incentives, incentives and or-
ganisation 
- 
with or without the stick
- 
or a pure sanctions approach) can
be seen in the different countries in
Europe? ln reading the reports pre-
pared for this issue, it seems that
there is no country applylng a single
approach in its pure form, but rather
that all have opted for a mixed ap-
proach using all three. It is difficult to
rank countries according to whether
they belong more to the incentive or
to the restriction and sanction type.
However, it seems that some of the
countries that previously took a more
"liberal" approach towards benefit
eligibility 
- 
such as the Netherlands 
-
are now tightening access and dura-
tion and are also relying more heavi-
ly than before on sanctions. This also
seems to be the case for the United
Kingdom, while recent developments
in Germany and Austria go at least
partly in this direction. From other
countries, Iike Ireland and Portugal,
no such changes are reported. ln Swe-
den, where former reductions in the
wage-replacement rate for the unem-
ployed have been partially reversed,
there is now a discussion on how to
shorten benefit periods and "meas-
ure careers". Denmark has intro-
duced an obligatory "activation peri-
od" after two years of benefit receipt
and reduced the entire "chain" of
passive and active policy interven-
tion to five years. It is interesting to
note that the ability to counter fraud
(and apply sanctions) seems to be
more limited in systems with separate
placement and benefit administra-
tions than in those where both are
performed by one adminstration. An
extreme case here is Belgium, where
the federal administration is respon-
sible for benefits and the relatively
autonomous regions for placement
and vocational guidance.
Some examples
While the above conclusion remains
impressionistic in the absence of a
stringent comparative analysis of the
developments in unemployment
compensation schemes, we can also
examine our country samples for
best-practice cases of activation.
While Sweden remains a model in
terms of its overall ALMP approach,
there have been innovative develop-
ments in other countries in recent
years: in Greece unemployment ben-
efits are now organised as a sort of
voucher which can be used alterna-
tively for "passive" benefits or for
participation in "active" measures.
However, as is noted by our corre-
4 An unemployed person might be "trapped"
if he/she accepts a paid job in systems with
high marginal tax rates. If secondary bene-
fits such as health insurance etc. are also
withdrawn during employment, income
might fall below the poverty level.
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The Une4ployment Benefit System and Unemployment
It has frequently been claimed that
a positive correlation exists be-
tween the level and duration of un-
employment benefirc and the level
and duration of unemployment,
whereby it is assumed that the "ac-
tivation" of the unemployed is in-
exerts some influence on unemploy-
ment, but the strength of this influence
is controversial. It is important to em-
phasise that proof of a statistical corre-
lation tells us nothing about causality,
and reverse causality relations may
well need to be taken into account:
high unemployment in the context
of a shortage of jobs and a given
benefit system can be expected to
lead to a longer duration of unem-
ployment. When considering this
question from a cross-national per-
spective 
- 
in Figure 6 the wage-re-
placement rates for single benefit
recipients aftersix months and after
24 months of unemployment are
given for the Member States 
- 
it is
important to bear in mind that the
proportion of the unemployed in
receipt of benefits varies considera-
bly across Europe, and on average
(of 11 countries in 1994; no data for
the UK) is less than 50% (cf. Figure
7). Thus, the high rate of unemploy-
ment and especially long-term un-
employment in, say, Spain can
hardly be explained in terms of the
unemployment benefit system,
even though replacement rates are
relatively high and remain constant
over the unemployment period,
given that the coverage rate of the
system is under 30% (cf. European
Commission 1996).
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Figure 6: Wage-Replacement Rates (single person with average in-
come*)
ansr O months of unemplolment After 2 yean of unemplolm.ent
, 
xo 6 r, d-,r2* 5 . xo 8, * d- r r" 5
* Person aged 35 who has contributed to the system for ten years. The estimate for
Italy for two years of unemployment is from Liguria.
Source: Commission (799 6, p. 90).
versely proportional to the level
and duration of benefits. In other
words, high wage-replacement
rates and lolg benefit entitlement
durations teild to deter the unem-
ployed from taking up paid em-
ployment and reduce activation.
Statistical calculations have
shown that such a correlation can
be shown to exist with respect to
certain strucfural components of
unemployrnent 
- 
in particular to
long-term uqemployment, where-
by the duration of benefit entifle-
ment is particularly important 
- 
but
not to the general level of unem-
ployment (cf., for example, OECD
L994,7997). It is no longer serious-
ly disputed that the benefit system
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Figure 7: Unemployment Benefit Recipients as Percentage of All Un-
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H
spondent, only implementation will
show if this c$apge remains just a
good idea or ifi if will contribute to
"activating" the rlnemployed.
Several progrfnms5 which aim to
avoid the unemflloyment (and par-
tially also the pofefty) trap need to
be mentioned: the earned-income
top-up in the United Kingdom (which
is an in-work benefit) is an interesting
pilot programme awaiting evalua-
tion, and the Irish "back-to-work al-
lowance" is another programme that
permits recipients to retain benefits
while in work, which often leads to
the creation of independent employ-
ment. The French "cooperation con-
vention", which transforms unem-
ployment benefits into employer
wage-cost subsidies, is considered to
be a measure which costs little and
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creates jobs. Such a transformation
on a large scale is also achieved in
Germany with the so-called "produc-
tive wage-cost subsidy", which, how-
ever, is sometimes criticised as lead-
ing to displacement. Other interesting
activation approaches include ttre ef-
forts and measures deployed in large-
scale redundancies in Greece or the
"retraining contracts" and the special
reclassification units in France. Such
acfive intervention in these cases ap-
pears relatively efficient in promot-
ing labour market reintegration.
In general, activation policies in-
volve an institutional aspect: either
the employment service is reformed
so as to raise its efficiency, or new or-
ganisational solutions are found
(such as employment companies in
Germany or integration enterprises
in France and Belgium), or "territori-
al pacts" involving all relevant local
actors are signed, as is the case in Ita-
ly. Successful institutional innova-
tions are also the "job pools" (e.g. in
the Netherlands, Denmark and Bel-
grum) which organise temporary
work for the unemployed
Other strands of activation policies
include bonus payments to unem-
ployed persons finding jobs on their
own (United Kingdom and Italy) or
the job-rotation schemes which have
become especially important in Den-
mark, which activate the unemployed
by offering jobs as a replacement for
those on leave, while those on leave
change their status but remain active
as they leave for training or child-care
activities. However, it is worth noting
that a considerable number of the un-
employed take leave and changetheir
stafus, but are not activated in the
sense of taking on a job. In the Span-
ish case, one might ask if the liberali-
sation of flexible employment con-
tracts leads to activation, but also how
permanent this activation is, as the
ending of a short-term contract has
become one of the major reasons for
unemployment spells.
In summary, one canshowthat, de-
spite criticism, there have been many
attempts to "activate" the unem-
ployed and to allocate more money to
active policies, even if, in the wake of
mass unemployment, unemployment
compensation (and social aid benefits
for those no longer qualifying) is still
the number-one response in many
countries. Given the reduced capacity
of the unemployed 
- 
and especially
the long-term unemployed 
- 
to or-
ganise their route "back to work", the
provision of incentives is certainly
not enough: an organisational effort
by a multifude of actors, private
firms, public bodies and voluntary or-
ganisations is needed in order to
achieve an effective "activation" of
those out of work.
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Belgium
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Belgium
According to the OECD methodo-
logy, Belgium spends one-third
(33.4%) of the employment budget
on active policies, which means
L.47% of GDP (cf. Table 1). The av-
erage for the European Union
amounts to L.13"/". ln one decade
(1985-94),the active share increased
from28%o to 33.4Y". About 20% of.
the active budget is spent e1 ftzining
measures, 25% of the passive budget
on early retirement programmes and
7 5 o/" on unemplolmrent benefi ts.
In Belgium, the federal govern-
ment is not the only authority re-
sponsible for labour market policy;
the regions (Flanders, Brussels and
Wallonia) have responsibility for
training and placement. One conse-
quence of this regionalisation is that
the "activation strategy" is to be
found at two political levels (federal
and regional).
Another consequence of the partial
regionalisation of employment policy
in Belgium is that sanctions are not
imposed on claimants turning down
acceptable jobs: the federal govern-
ment is responsible for the payment
of unemployment benefits, whereas
the regions are responsible for the
placement, guidance and training of
the unemployed. The supervision of
the availability for work of the unem-
ployed by the regional employment
services is limited, because they want
to inspire confidence in the unem-
ployed by motivating them to find a
new job, rather than to threaten them
with sanctions and loss of their unem-
ployment benefit.
In this report, we do not discuss
training measures, except vocational
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training within the enterprise, be-
cause it involves a combination of
passive transfer payments and in-
come from work. We focus on meas-
ures concerning Work-sharing (career
break, part-time work), wage subsi-
dies for employers and public works
prograrnmes, the main active meas-
ures in Belgium.
Not all of these measures involve
the acfual tran$fer of passive pay-
ments (unemployment benefits) to
active measures; for example, the
wage subsidy is paid out of the social
security budget. The overview refers
only to those m,easures encouraging
the recruitrnent of unemployed per-
sons (cf Table 2).
Recent lnitiatives in the
Activation Strategy
The guidance plan
A first examplq of a measure per-
forming part of the activation strate-
gy is the guidance plan (plan d'ac-
contp agnement) . T\e social partners
agreed to earmark 0.70% of compa-
nies' payrolls in the 1993-94 collec-
tive bargaining rounds for counsel-
ling and guidance measures (in
L995-96 the contribution was de-
creased to 0.05%). The guidance
plan gives every unemployed person
in receipt of benefit and less than 46
years of age the right, on reaching
the tenth month of unemployment,
to a guidance procedure. Since 1995
only poorly qualified unemployed
persons have been able to apply for
such counselling. This procedure pro-
vides individualised advice and the
offer of a job or training. The guid-
ance plan is implemented by the re-
gional employment services (in Flan-
ders, Brussels and Wallonia). A sec-
ond goal of the plan is to establish
the availability for work of the un-
employed in receipt of benefit.
The LEA system
(local employment agencies)
Another example of the activation
strategy is the LEA system. Each lo-
cal authority in Belgium is obliged to
establish a local employment agency
(LEA). Long-term unemployed per-
sons (three years) can perform a job
through the LEA outside regular la-
bour market activities (for instance:
household work, gardening, care for
sick persons and children and admin-
istrative work). The long-term unem-
ployed have to be registered in the
LEA. The unemployed can work up
to a maximum of 45 hours a month.
They earn BEF 150 per hour (on top
of their unemployment benefit).
Long-term unemployed persons who
refuse this kind of work can tempo-
rarily lose their unemployment bene-
fit, but unemployed people taking on
a LEA activity voluntarily are given
priority.
This measure has no impact on the
federal budget, because the organisa-
tions benefiting from the LEA activi-
ties finance the system. They have to
buy LEA cheques at a value varying
from BEF 200to 300, which they use
to pay the unemployed person per-
forming the LEA activity. In 7995,
13,000 long-term unemployed peo-
ple performed such an activity. This
is equal to 1,500 full-time jobs.
The criticism of this system is that
those performing a LEA activity
maintain their status as unemployed.
Nevertheless, a survey has shown
that the unemployed working in the
LEA system have a positive opinion
about their activities and the organi-
sations benefiting from their labour
services also evaluate the LEA work
positively.
The federal government is work-
ing on a service cheque for the paint-
ing and wall-papering sector. This
new measure implies a better status
for the unemployed participating in
the measure, who would be employ-
ees of an employer recognised by the
LEA to perform services like paint-
ing and putting up wallpaper.
At the end of MarchL997, the fed-
eral government adopted a new
measure under which unemployment
benefit can be used as a wage subsidy
for employers creating jobs no longer
seen as economically profitable. Only
jobseekers claiming full benefit for at
least five years can be hired through
this measure. The government listed
a few examples of these new jobs:
service staff in a filling station or in
warehouses, car-park attendant and
day care in enterprises. Those refus-
ing such jobs are sanctioned by losing
their unemployment benefit.
Work-sharing as an active
strategy: career break and
part-time work
Two kinds of measures involving em-
ployment redistribution and with a
link to the activation strategy can be
distinguished: "career break" and
"part-time work".
The career break gives employees
the opportunity to intemrpt their
career by granting a benefit for the
duration of the intemrption. The
employer replaces the employee
with an unemployed person. Only in
the public sector has the employee a
right to a career break; in the pri-
vate sector, agreement must be
Table 1: Spending on Active and Passive Labour Market Policy (1994)
Public spending
(in BEF billion)
Percentage of
GDP
Active policy L72 7.47 Percentage of
active spending
- 
training
- 
other measures
22.3
89.7
79.9
80.1
Passive policy 223.4 2.93 Percentage of
passive spending
- 
unemployment benefit 770.4
- 
early retirement 53.0
76.3
23.7
Total 33s.4 4.40
Source: Ministerie van Tewerkstelling en Arbeid.
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TTable 2: Overview of the Different Measures Composing the Belgian Activation "Strategy"
Measure Aim Cost Persons
(billion BEF)
7. Recruitment of young unemployeil
1.1 Apprenticeship for young people
7.2 The work-training agreement
1.3 Enterprise reintegration contract
(Wallonia)
1.4 Local employment plan (Wallonia)
Temporary employment of young new entrants in enter-
prises and administrations with a view to promoting their
vocational integration
Schemes linking work and training for young people aged
between 18and25
Integration of young jobseekers into the job market by
granting subsidies to their employers
Inducing the local authorities to create jobs for young long-
term unemployed
0.72
0.12
n.a.
n.a.
15,000
2,000
n.a.
n.a.
2. The guidanceplan Individual and intensive support of unemployed persons
commencing after their tenth month of unemployment in
order that they may be helped out of their situation of
isolation and encouraged to make efforts to find work
7.6 100,000
The local employment agetlcies
(LEA)
Long-term unemployed take part in employment oppor-
tunities that are not covered by the regularjob market
and hence are able to obtain an additional income
No extra cost
on top of
UI benefits
3. 13,000
4. Wage subsidies
4.1 Plus-one plan
4.2 Advantage-job plan
4.3 Recruitment subsidy
@russels and Wallonia)
4.4 Recruitment of unemployed for
SMEs @russels and Wallonia)
Encouraging potential employers to recruit their first
employee by temporarily reducing the employers' social
security contributions
Promotion of employment of the long-term unemployed by
temporarily reducing employers' social security contributions
Promotion of the employment of difficult-to-place jobseekers
by granting subsidies to enterprises recruiting such persons
Combating unemployment and encouraging the economic
expansion of small and medium-sized enterprises
7.4 5,000
7.7 45,000
0.06 450
@russels) @russels)0.8 7s0
5. Work-sharing
5.1 Careerbreak
5.2 Part-time work
5.3 Enterprise plans
Enabling employees to intemrpt their professional activities
from time to time with the double guarantee that they may
retain a certain part of their income and may take up their
job again after the break period has expired
Granting benefits to voluntary part-time workers who subse-
quently lose their part-time employment to compensate them
for loss of benefit income
Establishment of a legal framework for the implementation
of a flexible and effective redistribution of work at enter-
prise level
Surplus
of8
50,000
5,0001.8
6. Loancapital The opportunity for certain unemployed persons wishing to No extra
set up on their own to capitalise their unemployment benefits cost 245
7. Subsidised employment
7.1 Grant-aided contractuals
7 .2 lnter - depantmental Fund
7.3 Third Work Circuit
7.4 Integration enterprises
(Flanders and Wallonia)
7.5 Sheltered workshops @anders)
7.6 PRIME scheme (Wallonia)
Unemployed persons claiming full benefit recruited by local,
provincial and public authorities in order to carry out non-
commercial activities
Creation of jobs for unemployed persons in the non-com-
mercial sector by providing funding for such positions
Creation of jobs in the non-commercial sector to satisfy
community needs that would not otherwise be met
Enterprises and associations subsidised by the regional
authority whose social and organisational purpose is the
vocational integration of difficult-to-place jobseekers by
means of activities in the area of goods production or the
provision of services @anders)
Employing difficult-to-place or unemployable jobseekers
in a sheltered setting
Recruitment of long-term unemployed persons in the non-
commercial sector
18 51,000
1.8 1,800
9.1. 8,300
0.016 100
(Flanders)
n.a. 500
6.8 7,500
Vocational ffaining within the
enterprise
Apprenticeship linking theoretical training and practical train-
ing within an enterprise. The apprentice is subsequently hired
under an employment contract lasting at least as long as the
period of apprenticeship
No extra
cost
7,6008.
Source: Higher Institute of Labour Studies, Louvain, Belgium.
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reached between employer and em-
ployee.
lnL995, this measure cost BEF 5.3
billion in benefits for the career
break. On the otler hand, there was
a saving of BEF 1"4 billion in unem-
ployment benefits. Also taking into
account the lose of social insurance
contributions, the net fiscal gain
amounted to about BEF 8 billion.
About 50,000 persons intemrpted
their career n L995. Most of them
were replaced by an unemployed
person: only 0.7% jobs were not re-
placed.
For several years now the number
of persons intemrpting their career
has been decreasing (58,000 in
7992). Cuts in the level of the benefit
are the main reason for this decrease.
The unempldyment regulations
distinguish between three kinds of
part-time workers:
1. Part-time workers retaining the
right to an Unemployment benefit.
This status applies to unemployed
workers who have lost their full-
time job and are still seeking full-
time work while performing a
part-time jOb. They are entitled to
a limited supplementary income
benefit for this period.
2. Voluntarily part-time workers
keeping their "reference wage": a
full-time worker choosing a part-
time job retains for three years
his/her entiflement to full-time un-
employment benefit.
3.Arry other part-time workers
choosing voluntarily to take a
part-time job.
lr,L995, there were 99,000 part-time
workers who really wanted a full-
time job, a fall from 201,000 in1992
due largely to restrictions concerning
the cumulation of unemployment
benefits and part-time work. Al-
though this measure (part-time work)
was considerefl an important instru-
ment in the eurployment redistribu-
tion strategy, lllegations of fraud led
to these restrictions. The unemploy-
ment benefif i$ to be seen in this con-
text as an "activating passive transfer
payment". 
i
Loan capital for the unem-
ployed wishing to set up
their own business
This measure aims at accommodating
the wishes of unemployed persons to
take up self-employrnent or to estab-
lish a company by creating the op-
portunity for certain unemployed
persons to capitalise their unemploy-
ment benefit entitlements up to a
maximum of BEF 800,000. The un-
employed person has to commit
funds of at least a quarter (before
1997 a half) of the amount of the
capitalised benefit.
The duration of the loan is ten
years. In case the borrower ceases his
activities, the fund responsible will
not demand repayment of the out-
standing loan balance, except where
the cessation occurs more than five
years after the end of the waiting pe-
riod or the borrower is found guilty
of violating certain laws. Principal
repayments begin after a period of
five years.
The measure started in L984.
There was a contribution of BEF 6
million to the Participant Fund. Since
1990, the Fund's own resources,
which are derived from payments on
the capital of loans already granted
and the interest on such loans, enable
the system to finance itself.
16,538 conditional loans were
granted up to the end of 7995. ln
1995, only 245 loans were granted to
unemployed persons. The gradual
decline in numbers was due to tighter
selection criteria. Research has
shown that this screening was effec-
tive in terms of the survival rate of
the projects. In particular, the contin-
ued education of the unemployed de-
creases the chance of a failure of the
independent business activities. Such
conditional loans for the unem-
ployed are obviously one of the most
effective measures to activate pas-
sive transfer payments, given the low
financial cost and their considerable
economic effectiveness. Of course,
the measure may have a deadweight
effect: some would have established
their project without the financial
support of the conditional loan.
Subsidised employment of
unemployed persons
There are several measures involving
subsidised employment of the unem-
ployed. These public works schemes,
financed at federal level, have as a
common feafure the employment of
unemployed persons drawing full
benefits as grant-aided contractual
workers within a regional integration
scheme (which vary in design be-
tween Brussels, Flanders and Wallo-
nia).
Grant-aided "contractuals"
The aim of this measure is to enable
unemployed persons claiming full
benefit to be recruited by local, pro-
vincial or specific public authorities
or non-profit associations in order to
carry out non-commercial activities.
This measure is implemented differ-
ently in the Walloon, Flemish and
Brussels-Capital regions with respect
to the employers who may recruit
grant-aided contractual workers, the
unemployed persons who can apply
for a job as a grant-aided contracfual
(generally those claiming full benefit
for at least six months) and the finan-
cial resources needed to pay the
grant-aided contracfuals.
Other schemes of subsidised em-
ployment in the non-commercial sec-
tor include:
- 
the Inter-departmental Fund for
Employment Promotion (FBI);
- 
the Third Work Circuit (TCT)
(Flanders and Brussels);
- 
the PRIME scheme (Wallonia).
lntegration enterprises in
Flanders and Wallonia
Integration enterprises in the Flan-
ders region aim at employing low-
skill or difficult-to-place unem-
ployed persons through individual
guidance combined with the experi-
ence of regular work. The regional
government offers subsidies to inte-
gration enterprises producing prod-
ucts or services with a social or envi-
ronmental purpose. The workers are
hired under an open-ended employ-
ment contract. The enterprises have
.Trends
to prove their potential financial and
economic independence. The reduc-
tion in social insurance contributions
granted to integration enterprises
employing especially difficult-to-
place jobseekers amounts to 100%
during the first year of employment,
70% duing the second year and
30% during the third year. After this
period the enterprises are presumed
to meet labour costs in full out of the
revenue derived from their own ac-
tivities.
Integration enterprises in the Wal-
loon region are enterprises and asso-
ciations subsidised by the regional
authority whose social or organisa-
tional purpose is the vocational inte-
gration of especially difficult-to-place
jobseekers by means of goods pro-
duction or the provision of services.
Jobseekers considered to be especial-
ly difficult to place are those who
have been registered as unemployed
for at least the previous 12 months
and who do not hold a secondary
school-level leaving certificate. Such
jobseekers must be recruited on a
full-time or part-time contract of
employment. Employers recruiting
these jobseekers are entitled to a re-
duction in their social security contri-
butions: 75% &fing the first year of
employment and 50% during the sec-
ond year if the jobseeker had been
unemployed for one year, and L00%
during the first year and 75% dwing
the second if the jobseeker had been
unemployed for two years.
Vocational training withln the
enterprise
The vocational training within the
enterprise programme has a double
aim, divided into two periods. Ttre
first period is one of apprenticeship,
linking theoretical training and train-
ing within an enterprise. During this
period the remuneration of the ap-
prentice, who retains the status of
jobseeker, is paid by the National
Employment Office. The employer
pays an extra productivity bonus to
the apprentice, which increases pro-
gressively parallel to the increasing
productivity of the apprentice. Dur-
ing the second period the apprentice
is hired by the employer under an
employment contract for at least as
long as the duration of the period of
apprenticeship (minimum one month
to maximum 12 months) and ideally
under an open-ended employment
contract.
In the Walloon region, 10,000 un-
employed a year receive an appren-
ticeship through this programme.
The measure seems to be more suc-
cessful in Wallonia than in Flanders.
The number of unemployed in-
volved in this measure has been
steadily declining. ln response, the
vocational training office in the
Flanders region has begun experi-
menting with alternative measures
like job rotation: after a period of
training, an unemployed person re-
places an employee, performing the
job of the employee while the latter
is engaged in training at a vocational
training centre.
Sanctions or Financial lncen-
tives to Take up Work
The Belgian activation policy is ori-
ented towards financial incentives to
take up work rather than activation
by sanctions. Unemployment benefit
entitlement is virtually open-ended
in Belgium, and attempts to with-
draw benefit entitlement have been
ineffective: while long-term unem-
ployed persons refusing an activity
for a local employment agency
(LEA) can in theory lose their benefit
entitlement, unemployed persons
taking on the LEA activity voluntari-
ly are given priority, and so far the
local employment agencies have had
enough volunteers to perform their
activities.
One of the goals of the guidance
plan is to establish the availability for
work of the unemployed in receipt of
benefit. In a period of three years,
only 10,000 of the 300,000 unem-
ployed called up have been excluded
from further benefit. However, the
government has recently introduced
restrictions, which will have an im-
pact on unemployment duration: af-
ter unemployment lasting more than
one and a half times the average pe-
riod in the region, claimants are no
longer eligible for benefits. This peri-
od has recently (L996) been extend-
ed to twice the regional average.
Heads of household (mostly men)
cannot be excluded from an unem-
ployment benefit, however, so that
this measure effectively discrimi-
nates against women.
The LEA system and vocational
training within the enterprise are two
of the typical measures of giving fi-
nancial incentives to take up work.
These schemes combine passive
transfer payments and income from
work. Other examples of measures
that provide financial incentives are
aimed both at unemployed persons
and employees and at employers.
The conditional loans for the unem-
ployed wishing to set up their own
business are one of the most effective
and cost-efficient measures to acti-
vate passive transfer payments. Em-
ployees are granted an allowance if
they intemtpt their career or choose
part-time work irstead of full-time
work, and are replaced by unem-
ployed persons. Finally, employers
are granted a wage subsidy if they re-
cruit certain categories of unem-
ployed person (youngsters or long-
term unemployed).
Evaluation
Although active policies increased
from 28%" to 33.4% of all labour
market policy spending during the
last decade (L985-1994), Belgian ac-
tivation policy can be criticised in a
number of ways.
First of all, there is a lack of conti-
nuity in the activation policy. Be-
cause of the open-ended duration of
benefit entitlement, unemployment
benefit levels are rather low. As a
consequence, the Belgian govern-
ment does not have a large margin in
activating passive transfer payments.
Cut-backs in the federal budget have
occurred frequently and limit the
scope of activation policy. The meas-
ure restricting the cumulation of un-
employment and part-time work is
an example of this fiscalist approach
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and the lack of continuity in the acti-
vation policy.
Another sxample of fiscal meas-
ures limiting the activation policy is
the recent decision to use the 0.10%
payroll levy to finance early retire-
ment programmes. This 0.70%-
measure originally aimed at financ-
ing job creation, vocational training
and integration initiatives for risk
gloups among jobseekers. In this
case, potentially "active" resources
are used to finance a passive labour
market policy.
A second criticism is the lack of
coherence in the activation policy.
There is a real crlss-cross of measures
aimed at different target grouPs
(young unemployed, long-term un-
employed, difficult-to-place unem-
ployed, elderly unemployed), in-
volving different employers and im-
plemented by different administra-
tions (federal or regional). A harmo-
nisation of these measures is under
discussion.
A third criticism is the enormous
cost to the federal budget of the sub-
sidised employment of unemployed
persons in the public sector (in L994
about BEF 40 billion out of a total
amount of BEF 112 billion). Not-
withstanding the fact that about
70,000 unemployed are employed in
these public works schemes, there is
little outflow to regular employment
by these workers because most of
them have an open-ended employ-
ment contract. For this reason the
federal and regional governments
are to introduce changes such that
workers in subsequent emploYment
are employed under a temporary and
part-time employment contract, the
wage is paid by the federal and the
regional government and by the em-
ployer, and workers are encouraged
to link their job to training and guid-
ance. The latter, together with the
work experience provided, will in-
crease the chance of subsequent tran-
sition to a regular job.
lan Denys & LieaenDenolf
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Denmark
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Denmark
Both active labour market policies
and income support for unemploYed
persons in Denmark are based on an
institutional framework which di-
vides the unemployed into two
groups. The majority (85%) are
members of an unemployment insur-
ance fund, which is a private organi-
sation normally with close links to a
trade union. To qualify for unem-
plolmrent benefits, a member must
have been in Srdinary (unsubsidised)
employment for more than 52 weeks
within the last three years. Benefits
are equal to90% of previous earned
income up to a maximum of DKKti
136,000 a year: the average com-
pensation rate for all unemployed is
65%. While the unemployment in-
surance funds are formally private
organisations, the major part of their
expenditure (in 1996 approx. 80%)
is paid by the state. Unemployment
benefits are not means-tested. The
responsibility for acfivating the in-
sured unemployed lies with the re-
gional Labour Market Boards, which
are funded by the Ministry of La-
bour.
Those unemployed who are n of el-
igible for unemployment benefits are
the responsibility of the municipali-
ties. Subject to means-testing, they
may receive social security at a level
which, for persons with children, will
be about 80% of maximum unem-
ployment benefits. Activating the
group of non-insured unemployed is
the responsibility of the municipali-
ties.
Both for insured and non-insured
unemployed there are special rules
for the young (<25 years) and for the
older age $oups. Typically, young
unemployed receive lower benefits
or social security and are activated
after a shorter period of unemploy-
ment.
This two-tier system sometimes
makes it difficult to obtain a coherent
statistical picture of labour market
politics. However, in recent years a
set of statistics has been developed
which covers both the insured and
uninsured unemployed (AMFORA).
Table l gives some basic information
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from 1995 and1996 (second quarter
of both years).
A number of observations can be
made from Table 1. Firstly, the total
number of full-time persons in active
or passive measures decreased by
4Y" bet:ween the second quarter of
1995 and the second quarter of
1996. This mainly reflects the fa-
vourable labour market trends dur-
ing this period. As a share of the la-
bour force, the total number of per-
sons in active and passive measures
dropped from 19.4 toL8.4%. During
the same period open unemployment
decreasedfrom9.T to8.7% of thela-
bour force.
Measured as a share of the total
number of persons in active and pas-
sive measures, those in active meas-
ures amounted to 73%. A similar
number rffas on leave in the second
quarter of 7996. The most important
instruments of activation are ordi-
nary vocational training, subsidised
employment and ordinary education
(with income support normally equal
to unemployment benefits). Also,
one notes a general decrease in the
number of persons undergoing train-
ing (except for special training target-
ed at persons with poor employment
prospects) and a growth in education-
al programmes. Of the total number
of people in active measures, almost
two-thirds were in the state sector.
The number of persons on paid leave
has decreased somewhat, mainly due
to the reduced numbers taking child-
care and sabbatical leave. Finally,
one notes the huge increase in those
drawing unemployment pensions.
This was mainly caused by a steep
growth in the number of unemployed
above 50 years of age joining a spe-
cial retirement programme, which
has now been abandoned.
Measured in constant prices,
spending on active and passive la-
bour market policies has decreased
in recent years 
- 
from DKK 63.9 bil-
lion in 1994 to DKK 61.5 billion in
7996. Even more significantly, the
spending on passive measures has
decreased from DKK 52.4 billion in
7994 to DKK 45.0 billion in 11996.
This has led to a growth in the share
of expenditure on active measures
from L9"/" in L994 to 27% n L996.
These statistics only cover central
government and not the municipali-
ties. The estimated annual expendi-
ture of the municipalities on activat-
ing the non-insured unemployed is
approx. DKK 4 billion.
Recent Developments in
Labour Market Policy
The main problem for Danish labour
market policy over the last 20 years
has been the gradual increase in
structural unemployment, posing the
risk of inflationary pressure even at
high levels of unemployment.
The latest response to these prob-
lems was a general labour market re-
form that came into force on 1 Janu-
ary L994.Its main characteristics in
relation to activation measures are:
- 
the creation of a two-period sys-
tem for the insured unemployed
with strong emphasis on activa-
tion during the second period (see
below);
- 
a change in the assistance to the
long-term unemployed from a
rule-based system to a system
based on an assessment of the
needs of the individual unem-
ployed person and of the local la-
bour market. The reform also in-
troduced the so-called "individual
action plan" as a mandatory in-
strument to focus the attention of
the unemployed and the labour
market authorities on the actions
necessary to qualify the individual
unemployed for ordinary employ-
ment;
- 
a decentralisation of policy imple-
mentation to regional labour mar-
ket authorities, which were em-
powered to desiga activation pro-
grammes in line with local needs;
- 
the removal of the connection be-
tween vocational training and the
unemployment benefit system,
which meant that participating in
training no longer extends the
right to obtain unemployment
benefits for a person becoming un-
employed once more after the
training period;
Table 1: The Average Number of Persons (Full-time Equivalents) in
Active and Passive Labour Market Measures,2nd Quarter of 1995 and
1996 (rounded figures)
lees (rD 7ee6at) Change from Share of
7995to total
7e96 7ee6 A)(percent) (percent)
26,300
9,300
74,000
500
21.,300
72,800
77,600
400
-79
38
-17
-26
Ordinary training
Special training
Self-employment
Voluntary work
4
2
2
0
SUBSIDISED EMPLOYMENT 5O,1OO 46,700 
-8 8
Education, ordinary
Education, special
7,400 74,200
5,800 5,900 31
92
2
EDUCATION, TOTAL 73,200 2O,7OO 53 4
oTHER ACTTVATION 2,900 3,100 8 1
ACTryATION, TOTAL
of which run by central govt.
of which run by municipalities
13
8
5
66,700 69,300
41,500 47,400
23,900 27,200
5
0
74
Sabbatical leave
Child-care leave
Educational leave
0
6
7
6,100 1,10045,700 32,90031,300 36,100
-8.2
-28
15
LEAVE SCHEMES, TOTAL 83,100 70,000 _L6 13
UNEMPLOYMENT PENSION 133,700 165,600 24 30
I.'NEMPLOYED 285,400 239,L00 
-76 44
TOTAL 568,300 544,000 4 100
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the introduction of a number of
paid leave schemes to encourage
the employed, self-employed and,
in some cases, the unemployed to
take leave.
The common fqature of the schemes
for paid leave is that they enable
wage-earners and the self-employed
to take leave for a limited time peri-
od (up to one year) and then return
to work. Leave can be granted for
three purposes: child care, educa-
tion/training or for non-specified
purposes (sabbatical). The target
groups and the income support dur-
ing the leave period differ between
the three schemes. Thus, two of the
Danish paid leave arrangements also
include the unemployed, who during
the leave are not subject to the usual
requirement to be available for work
and undergo activation. Further-
more, the maximum duration of the
benefit period will be extended for
an unemployefl person taking child-
care leave, but 
- 
from 7996 
- 
not ed-
ucational leave. The amount paid to
persons on leave varies from 100%
of unemployment benefits (educa-
tional leave) to 60Y" (child-care, sab-
batical leave).
One argument behind the intro-
duction of paid leave was the idea of
job rotation, where employed Per-
sons going on leave are substituted by
unemployed people who thus get a
chance to return to ordinary employ-
ment. However, apart from sabbati-
cal leave, the employer is not obliged
to hire a substitute. In many cases,
paid leave for education is part of a
more fomal iob-rotation scheme,
where the firm sets up a plan for train-
ing of the currently employed in co-
operation with the labour market au-
thorities and combines this with spe-
cial training progralnmes for the un-
employed to bd hired as substitutes.
undergone some changes over the
last three years. The current system -
to be implemented from 7997-99 
-is
as follows. During the first period of
two years (the benefit period), the
unemployed person receives unem-
ployment benefits and in some cases
(vulnerable $oups like unskilled
persons, immigrants, young persons,
etc.) is offered various forms of acti-
vation like education or vocational
training. As a rule, however, the un-
employed person is encouraged to
look for ordinary work during the
first period.
If unsuccessful in getting employ-
ment, the unemployed person enters
the next period (the activation peri-
od), which lasts for three years. Dur-
ing this period, the person has both a
right and an obligation to activation
(education and/or training) on a full-
time basis. The aim is still to qualify
for a job on the ordinary labour mar-
ket. If the unemployed person does
not succeed in getting unsubsidised
work by the end of the activation pe-
riod, he or she will lose the right to
unemployment benefits and will
have to apply for means-tested social
security. One year of ordinary em-
ployment is then required for insured
unemployed to re-enter the benefit
system and start a new five-year pe-
riod.
In many cases, the income of un-
employed persons undergoing some
kind of activation is defined in rela-
tion to the level of unemploYment
benefits (at a maximum of approx.
DKK 136,000 per year). This is the
case for most of the people taking
part in educational programmes, in-
cluding those on educational leave.
For persons in vocational training,
wages and working conditions are in
principle determined by collective ag-
greements. A number of important
exceptions to this rule exist, however:
- 
For both insured and uninsured
persons undertaking ordinary vo-
cational training in the public sec-
tor during the first two years of
unemployment, the hourly wage
may not exceed DKK 86/hour.
- 
For persons in individual voca-
tional training (mainly uninsured
unemployed trained in the public
sector), an amount is paid which
equals the social security plus a
small "activafion premium".
- 
In the case of insured unemployed
in training during the activation
period, weekly income is equal to
unemployment benefits. WeeklY
working hours are therefore re-
duced in such a manner as to make
the resulting hourly wage equal to
the wage rates set by collective ag-
greements.
If an unemployed person has an
earned income while receiving un-
employment benefits or social securi-
ty, benefits are reduced correspond-
ingly. For insured unemployed, this
is done on a proportional basis in the
sense that, for instance, one week of
work reduces monthly benefits bY
25%.If. the alternative to unemploy-
ment is temporary low-income jobs,
the incentive to work is therefore
rather limited, when one also takes
account of the high marginal taxation
of supplementary income. Social se-
curity, but not unemployment bene-
fits, will also be reduced in the case
of other forms of supplementary in-
come. All benefits are taxed.
Since health care and other wel-
fare services (e.g. basic pensions) are
universal and financed through gen-
eral taxes, there are no special bene-
fits for the unemployed. On the other
hand, recipients of unemployment
benefits and similar income do not
contribute to the labour market pen-
sion funds and therefore do not in-
crease their future supplementary
pension entitlement.
As a general rule, persons receiv-
ing unemployment benefits or being
activated must be actively seeking
work and accept job offers from the
employment office. This is also the
case for persons undergoing educa-
tion or training. The only exception
to this rule is for the unemployed
taking child-care leave.
For younger persons (less than 25
years of age), special rules apply.
Thus, young unemployed without
vocational training are - after six
As
The RegulFtory Envi-
Activation
one important
labour market re-
to introduce a two-
period the insured unem-
ployed. The of the system has
aspect of
forms has
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months of unemployment 
- 
obliged
to undergo 18 months of vocational
training during which they receive
50% of maximum benefits.
A number of the instruments used
to activate the insured unemployed
can be interpreted as a direct trans-
formation of passive income support
into active measures:
- 
the educational programmes and
the leave scheme for educational
purposes generally pay the partici-
pant the equivalent of unemploy-
ment benefits;
- 
while in vocational training during
the activation period, the income
paid to the participant is also equal
to unemployment benefits;
- 
the income paid to persons taking
child-care and sabbatical leave is
calculated as a fraction of unem-
ployment benefits (60%);
- 
similarly, uninsured persons in in-
dividual training in the public sec-
tor receive an income equal to
their social security benefit plus a
premium.
ln the case of training programmes
for the insured unemployed during
the benefit period, the situation is
less clear, reflecting the conflict be-
tween treating the participants ac-
cording to the rules of collecfive
agreements and as persons in a spe-
cial labour market programme. Usu-
ally, the employer is paid a subsidy
of DKK 46 perhour and then 
- 
in the
private sector 
- 
pays the participant
according to collective agreement. In
the public sector, the maximum
hourly wage is DKK 86.
Finally, in order to give public em-
ployers a stronger incentive to createjob openings for long-tenn unem-
ployed, a new scheme was intro-
duced in 1996 to create so-called
"pool jobs" within almost all public
service activities, including environ-
mental protection, cultural activities,
education, social services, etc. The
individual pool jobs are limited to
three years, and 90%" of the wage
cost is refunded by the state. The
weekly wage is equal to unemploy-
ment benefits and working hours are
adjusted in order to bring the hourly
wage in line with collective agree-
ments.
lmpacts of the Strategy
Numerous evaluations of the instru-
ments of active labour market policy
targeted at the long-term unem-
ployed have been conducted over
the years. Among the consistent re-
sults are:
- 
positive employment effects of
vocational training (with wage
subsidy) in private firms, while
public-sector job training shows
no clear results;
- 
positive employment effects of
various forms of education, with
best results achieved by education
within the ordinary system and
combinations of education and on-
the-job training;
- 
limited employment effects of spe-
cial training programmes for the
long-term unemployed, especially
when the programmes are of short
duration;
- 
a iisk of adverse selection effects
in the sense that programmes for-
mally targeted at the most vulner-
able groups tend to attract a large
number of more resourceful par-
ticipants (creaming);
- 
positive subjective evaluations of
almost all programmes when eval-
uated by the participants them-
selves, even when the employ-
ment effects are limited.
The labour market reform of.7994 is
now under evaluation. Results have
been published from two general
evaluations of the implementation
proqess and from an impact assess-
ment of the paid leave schemes, but
not from evaluations of the other
sub-programmes. The main results
from the studies into the paid leave
arrangements are as follows:
- 
The leave schemes are very popu-
lar, with 727,100 persons taking
leave in 1996. Of. these, 72,700
persons went on educational
leave,46,900 persons took child-
care leave, while only 1,500 per-
sons went on sabbatical. The
number of persons taking leave
has decreased somewhat since the
maximum of 141,000 persons re-
corded inL994.
- 
Measured in full-time equivalents,
the number of persons on leave in
1996 amounted to 62,300, which
can be compared to an open
unemployment figure of. 245,600
(full time).
- 
Half of the persons taking leave
are unemployed and a majority
are women. About 60% of. the
employed taking leave are from
the public sector. The average du-
ration of leave is approx. 200
days.
- 
Educational leave is mostly taken
to improve formal qualifications
in relation to the current employ-
ment situation. Of the employed
taking educational leave, about
50% did so together with col-
leagues. For L2%" the leave was in
relation to a genuine project ofjob
rotation. ln 7995, the total num-
ber of persons taking part in such
job-rotation projects was 29,000.
Both employers and employees
take a very positive view of edu-
cational leave.
- 
Child-care leave is mainly taken
, by women (90%). The attitude of
firms is more critical in this case.
- 
A substitute was hired in approx.
70% of. the cases where an em-
ployedperson went on educational
or child-care leave. When inter-
preting this figure, one should,
however, be aware of the fact that
the Danish labour market has ex-
perienced a strong upswing since
1994. For sabbaticals a substitute is
mandatory. About 50% of the sub-
stifutes were unemployed, but few
were long-term unemployed.
About half of the substitutes con-
tinued working for the firm after
the return of the person on leave.
The results indicate that the leave
schemes exert a strong job-rotation
effect, but that this effect does not
reach the long-term unemployed.
- 
It is estimated that the leave
schemes reduced open unemploy-
ment by 60-70,000 persons in
1995. Between two-thirds and
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three-quarters of this figure is the
result of unemployed taking leave
and therefore not being counted in
the official unemployment statis-
tics, however.
- 
The paid leave schemes imply
both costs and savings for the Pub-
lic sector. The net cost of the
schemes is estimated at between
DKK 0.4 and 1.5 billion in 7995,
depending on the assumptions
concerning ttre share of vacancies
being filled with substitutes. This
amounts to between DKK 5,000
and 20,000 per person on leave
(on an annual basis).
The long-term effects of the paid
leave arrangements are harder to es-
timate, because the schemes induce a
number of contradictory effects:
- 
They tend to reduce the supplY of
labour, but may also 
- 
by reducing
marginalisation 
- 
lead to an in-
crease of effective labour supPlY
. 
in the longer run.
- 
A decline in labour supply may
lead to wage pressure; the risk is
reduced, however, by the fact that
the majority of those taking leave
are public employees, whose wag-
es are less responsive to market
pressures.
- 
Productivity may be reduced
when firrrs have to train substi-
tutes for the jobs becoming vacant
due to employees taking leave. On
the other hand, in the case of edu-
cational leave, productivitY will
probably be increased when the
persons on leave return to the
firm. This argument is supported
by the fact that between 70 and
76% of. employers find that the
persons on educational leave are
of more value to the firm after
having taken educational leave.
For child-care leave this share is
down to between 22 and' 40"/o.
Finally, as indirect indicators of the
overall effects of the labour market
reform, one qan point to the factsthat: lt I
- 
the increase in wage growth was
only moderaten7995-96 in spite
of the st;]oirg increase in employ-
ment over this period;
- 
the number of vacancies has not
increased during the upswing in
line with expectations based on
historical experience.
Whether these, macro-indicators re-
flect strong employment effects for
the unemployed at the individual
level will be revealed when the first
results of the impact assessments are
published later in 7997 .
Conclusion
Danish labour market policy has un-
dergone rather drastic changes in re-
cent years. The share of expenditure
on active measures has increased -
though it is still low compared to
Sweden. For the insured unemployed
the maximum duration of benefits
and participation in activation pro-
grammes has been reduced from ap-
prox. nine years to five years. Em-
phasis is put on an obligation towards
full-time activation after only two
years of unemployment. For some
groups activation takes place at an
even earlier stage. Thus, the trend in
Danish labour market policy points
clearly towards:
- 
a higher priority given to activa-
tion and reducing the duration of
passive benefits;
- 
much stronger emphasis on the
obligation of the long-term unem-
ployed to take part in full-time ac-
tivation, but also on the need to
tailor the activities offered to the
needs of the unemployed and to
integrate them in an individual ac-
tion plan;
- 
leave schemes and job rotation in
order to combine programmes for
improving the skills of the em-
ployed with the creation of more
job openings for the unemployed.
This development is not without
problems or conflicts. Some of the
most important are:
- 
The combined effects of a high
rate of compensation, especially
for unskilled unemployed, and
high marginal tax rates are still a
characteristic feature of the Dan-
ish labour market. This diminishes
the individual economic hardship
caused by unemployment, but on
the other hand reduces the eco-
nomic incentives to voluntarilY
leave unemployment. The in-
creased priority given to the obli-
ogations of the unemployed must
be seen in this light.
- 
In the coming years more insured
unemployed people will probably
have to leave the unemPloYment
insurance system and apply for so-
cial benefits.
- 
The programmes for vocational
training and the new "pool jobs"
create a segment of the labour
market where income levels are
determined by unemploYment
benefits and where working time
and other working conditions are
not determined by collective ag-
greements.
- 
The creation of jobs in training
programmes implies the risk of a
corresponding reduction in the
number of ordinary job openings.
- 
The large number of persons tak-
ing leave has in some cases (e.g.
the nursing profession) caused se-
rious labour shortages and bottle-
necks.
In short, one may interpret the Dan-
ish situation as a dynamic knife-edge
problem. On the one hand, activa-
tion and leave schemes reduce oPen
unemployment and thus increase the
risk of labour shortages and wage
pressure in the short run. On the oth-
er hand, activation and job rotation
will in the longer run lead to less
marginalisation and higher levels of
qualifications of the workforce in
general and the unemployed in par-
ticular. Recent developments in un-
employment and inflation seem to
indicate that the strategy has been
successful so far.
Per KongshoiMadsen
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in the relative weight of active la-
bour market policy (cf. Stein 1995,
p.1,64).In 7970, just L7% of total
spending on labour market policy
larsen, Flemming (ed.) (1996): Implemmte-
ring af regional arb ejilsmarkedspolitih. CAR-
MA, AUC. Aalborg.
Madsen, Per Kongshoj (1996): "Popular ac-
ceptance for Danish leave-schemes 
- 
but do
they work?" ln: N ordic Lab our I oumal, No. 7,
pp.16-20.
Pedersen, Lisbeth (1996): Orlozt, ledighed
og beskeftigelse. Socialforskningsinstituttet,
No.10. Copenhagen.
Arbejdsministeriet & Finansministeriet (1996):
Arbej dsmarkedspolitihken under foranding.
Copenhagen.
Haahr, Jens Erik & Soren Wnter (1996): Den
regionale arbejdsmarhedspolitih. PLS/AU,
Systime.
(including administrafive costs) were
spent on the two forms of unemploy-
ment benefit, whereas ten years later
this figure was 37Y" and another five
years later 59%.
The need for labour market policy
action associated with German unifi-
cation, however, served to raise the
proportion of total spending dedicat-
ed to active labour market policy. In
eastern Germany, around 55% of to-
tal spending by the Federal Labour
Office and central government on
LMP was on active measures in
1991. Given the unfavourable trends
of the labour market in both eastern
and western Germany, this high pro-
portion of active spending could not
be maintained, and wage-compensa-
tion benefits have once again risen
faster than spending on active labour
market policy (see Table 1).
1n1995, around 73% of the funds
spent on active labour market policy
- 
and in east Germany as much as
87% 
- 
were dedicated to support for
vocational training and job-creation
measures 
- 
general measures and
wage-cost subsidies 
- 
whereby the
so-called "productive" wage-cost
subsidies (under paragraphs 249h
and.242s of the LPA) absorbed 11%
of the resources. Differences in the
framework of conditions in east and
west Germany meant that the focus
of active labour market policy dif-
fered between the two regions. In
west Germany, funding was concen-
Table 1: Spending on Labour Market Policy (in million DM)
Expenditure
Germany
1997
West Germany East Germany
7995 7991 !995 1997 1995
Total 82,999.5 129,757.3 49,397.0 77,979.3 33,602.4 50,932.0
Of which on:
- 
wage-compensation benefits"
- 
active labour market policyb
37,691.0
37,290.3
80,718.4
40,020.8
23,397.0
18,905.0
5L,430.2
20,086.2
14,294.0
78,375.4
29,288.2
79,934.9
Spending on active labour market
policy as a percentage of total
expenditure 31.144.9 38.3 25.8 54.7 39.1
Spending on labour market policy
as a percentage of GDP 2.9 3.2 ']...9 2.5 16.3 13.3
a Wage-compensation benefits encomPass: unemployment benefit, unemployment assistance, benefit to. **t ..r *t or" 
"rnptoy"l.goes bankrupt, early retirement benefits and, in east Germany, early retirement benefit, transitional allowance for the elderly un-
employed, social supplement on top of unemployment benefit and assistance and benefits to the formerly self-employed.b Including occupational rehabilitation and short-term working, bad-weather and winter allowances.
Sources: Federal Office; Arbeitsmarkt 1995, p. 68.
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trated more heavily on continuing
and further vocational training,
whereas in eastern Germany it was
job-creation measures that were
most prominent.
According to calculations by the
Institut filr Arbeitsmarkt- und Be-
rufsforschung GAB), the labour mar-
ket policy measures implemented by
the Federal Labour Office (Bundes-
anstalt filr Arbeit - BA) eased the
pressure on the labour market in
L995 to the tune of 1.69 million peo-
ple (cf. Table 2). In east Germany,
short-time working was initially fa-
voured as an employment-maintain-
ing measure, together with early re-
tirement. InL995, it was largely job-
creation mezlsures that served to ease
the pressure on the labour market in
the region, whereas in west Germany
further training and retraining meas-
ures had the greatest effects.
lnitiatives to Activate
Passive Labour Market
Policy Measures
In Germany, employees losing their
job have a staged income-guarantee
system at thelr disposal. First, there
is unemployment benefit (Arbeits-
losengeld), paid by the Federal La-
bour Office and financed by social in-
surance contributions. In order to be
entitled to this benefit, an individual
must be available to the labour mar-
ket, have worked for at least 360
days in socially insured employment
during the past three years and have
claimed benefit at an employment
office. The level of unemployment
benefit depends on the average net
weekly income earned by the claim-
ant during the six months prior to un-
employment. Personal circumstances
also play a role: married unemployed
persons with at least one child re-
ceive 67Yo of net income, unem-
ployed persons without children
60%.T\e normal entitlement period
is 156 days, but this can be extended
to up to 832 days depending on the
age and the prior employment dura-
tion of the claimant.
Once entitlement to unemploy-
ment benefit has expired, or in cases
where no such entitlement exists, an
unemployed person may apply for
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslo-
senhilfe). This tax-financed benefit is
granted subject to a means test and
either prior receipt of unemployment
benefit or employment of at least
150 days during the previous year.
Unemployment assistance amounts
to 57"/" of net income for persons
with at least one child and 53% f.or
childless claimants. In contrast to un-
employment benefit, receipt of un-
employment assistance is generally
not subject to a time limit. Those en-
titled to neither unemployment ben-
efit nor unemployment assistance
must apply to their local authorities
for the means-tested minimum social
benef it (S o zialhilf e) .
In concepfual terms, German la-
bour market policy seeks to accord
priority to active measures over
mere compensatory benefits. As un-
employment has risen and become
more entrenched, however, an in-
creasing proportion of resources has
been tied up by passive benefits. In
order to move away from merely fi
nancing under-employment, policy-
makers have therefore increasingly
sought to apply passive funding in an
ooactive" sense, i.e. in a way that pro-
motes re-employment or constifutes
a "productive" deployment of funds.
An analytical distinction can be
made here between benefits paid to
employees and those offered to em-
ployers.
Table 2: Reduction in Unemployment due to Labour Market Policy Measures (in thousand persons)
West GermanyGermany
7991,
East Germany
7997 19957995 7997 7995
789
63
Short-time working
Bad-weather allowanceu
Job-creation measures of all kinds
- 
General ABIIF
- 
"Productive" wage-cost subsidy
Full-time trainingl
Rehabilitationd
Language courses
Early retirement
Transitional allowance for elderly
unemployed
Support under $ 105c LPA"
32
7!
397
257
140
247
4
7
33
898
2
257
257
0
769
1
0
365
32
29
9t
89
2
245
30
46
1
29
31
105
105
0
210
37
76
23
0
63
64
40
488
346
142
486
34
53
34
972
33
362
362
0
379
38
76
388
2
146
343
153
189
0
347
7
Total 2,455 L,693 574 621, 1,881 1,072
a Full-timeequivalent.
b Generaljob-creation measures.
c Further traiuing and retraining excl. work familiarisation.
d Rehabilitation in vocationally oriented measures.
e Benefit recipients aged 58 years and older no longer required to be available for work.
Source: Autorengemeinschaft: "Der Arbeitsmarkt 1995 wd7996 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." ln: Mitteilungen aus der Ar-
b eit sm arkt- ltnd B eruf sf or s chzzg, No. t, Y ol. 29, pp. 34 f .
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Elements of a policy of "activat-
ing" passive benefits are contained in
the Employment Promotion Law
that came into force in August 1994.
Regarding benefits for employees,
the regulations focus on both voca-
tionaltraining and the productive de-
ployment of social benefits:
- 
Subject to the permission of the
employment office, unemployed
persons are allowed to participate
in a further training measure for
up to twelve weeks, during which
they continue to receive unem-
ployment benefit or assistance.
Such further training courses are
only granted, however, if they are
such as to improve the chances of
the unemployed person being
placed in employment.
- 
Recipients of unemployment as-
sistance were previously enabled
to take up community work on a
voluntary basis. Provided the
community work was performed
not for a wage but for a minor bo-
nus to cover costs incurred, enti-
tlement to unemployment assist-
ance is maintained. Since 1994, re-
cipients of minimum social benefit
have, in contrast, beenrequiredto
perform community work.
- 
Payment of a bridging allowance
on assumption of a self-employed
activity was extended to 26
weeks, whereby the benefit is
equal to the level of unemploy-
ment benefit or assistance previ-
ously drawn.
Thus, the amendments to the regula-
tions governing labour market policy
instruments were aimed at raising in-
vestment in employment rather than
continuing to finance unemploy-
ment. With the same aim in mind,
since 1993 so-called "productive"
wage-cost subsidies (S 249h LPA)
have been granted to employers in
east Germany; in 1994, the measure
was extended to west Germany and
is scheduled to run until the end of
1997. \\e wage-cost subsidies are
available to employers prepared to
recruit benefit recipients meeting
certain restrictive criteria and allo-
cated to them by the employment of-
fice1. The subsidies can be paid for up
to two years in west and three years
in east Germany. They are designed
in such a way that the Federal La-
bour Office can redirect funds that
would otherwise have been spent on
unemployment benefit or assistance
in cost-neutral fashion to this produc-
tive area. The maximum value of the
subsidy is equal to the average bene-
fit level (including social insurance
contributions) for benefit recipients
as a whole (around DM 1,600 in east
and DM 2,200 in west Germany).
The workers concerned must be paid
less than comparable unsubsidised
workers. Restrictions apply to the
fields of activity that may be subsi-
dised. In west Germany, the wage
subsidies can be granted for work in
the environment, social services and
youth aid. In east Germany, in addi-
tion, work in sport, free culfural
work and care of monuments may
also be subsidised in this way.
ln 7989, the federal government
initiated two special programmes for
the long-term unemployed. Under
the " Aktion B e s chiiftigun gshilf en f ilr
Langzeitarbeitslose" (Employment
Aid for the Long-term Unemployed
Action), wage-cost subsidies can be
made available to employers recruit-
ing long-term unemployed persons.
In addition, projects for particularly
disadvantaged unemployed persons
receive support within the frame-
work of a special programme. By the
end of 7994, a total of 130,000 long-
term unemployed had been enabled
to take up employment on the basis
of a wage-cost subsidy (cf . Bundesar-
beitsblatt 1995; Schmid et al. L994).
In March 7997, legtrslative pro-
ceedings for the Labour Promotion
Reform Act were completed. It is to
come into force in 1998, although
some measures will take effect from
April 7997. It contains a number of
changes and amendments which will
serve to put into practice the idea of
activating passive labour market pol-
icy to a greater extent than previous-
ly.
Severer sanctions and stronger
negative incentives aim to accelerate
the reintegration of the unemployed
into the labour market:
- 
By steadily reducing the wage un-
employed persons must be pre-
pared to accept, the acceptability
of job offers will be increased2.
Under the new legislation, an in-
come reduction 
- 
compared with
the net benefit level 
- 
of 20% in
the first three months and 30% in
the following three months will be
considered acceptable. After six
months a job may no longer be re-
jected solely because the resulting
net income from employment is no
higher than unemployment bene-
fit.
- 
An obligation to actively seek
work will make it easier to identi-
fy benefit abuse. The unemployed
person can be required to provide
evidence of active job search. Per-
sonal registration as unemployed
at the employment office is valid
only for three months, after which
it must be renewed by personal at-
tendance.
- 
New and appropriate training
measures are to be deployed in or-
der to test the ability and willing-
ness of the unemployed to work.
On the other hand, the job-search
activities of the unemployed indi-
vidual are to be supported by
means of job-application training
and counselling. Unemployment
benefit and assistance will contin-
ue to be paid. After six months of
unemployment, an "integration
plan" is to be drawn up with the
aim of avoiding long-term unem-
ployment.
- 
Recipients of unemployment as-
sistance taking a job that is limited
to a maximum of three months are
entitled to an allowance (Arbeit-
nehmerhilfe) of DM 25 per day as a
1 In general, the unemployed must be either
difficult to place or have been out of work
for at least three months. They may also be
taken on at the end of a job-creation pro-
gramme or following an extended period on
short-time working.
2 Under the prevailing legislation, an unem-
ployed person is assigned to a qualification
level, so that he or she is able to reject a job
offer that pays less than that appropriate to
this level. With increasing duration of un-
employment, however, the qualification
level of an unemployed person is succes-
sively reduced.
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top-up to low-wage employment.
This raises both the acceptability of
employment 
- 
particularly of sea-
sonal work in agriculture 
- 
and the
pressqre to accept a job offer.
In addition, the reintegration of the
unemployed is to be promoted by
means of positive incentives.
- 
Under the new legislation, unem-
ployed persons taking part-time
employment for up to three and a
half years will retain their full enti-
tlement to unemployment benefit
in the case of renewed unemploY-
ment. By this means the incentive
to take up part-time emPloYment
is not reduced by the fact that so-
cial insurance entitlements are cut
in line with the reduced income
from paid employment.
- 
Support for the unemployed set-
ting up new businesses is im-
proved under the new regulation
in that the bridging allowance -
equal in level to unemployment
benefit or assistance for a Period
of six months 
- 
will be made avail-
able without the condition of an
extended prior period of unem-
ployment.
Evaluation
The central aim of passive labour
market policy is to protect citizens
against serious loss of income due to
unemployment. Yet wage-compen-
sation benefits may exert feedback
effects on the labour market by influ-
encing the frequency and duration of
unemployment. It can be assumed,
for example, that the risk of moral
hazard (benefit abuse) increases as
the level of material compensation
rises. Although the reformed LPA
does not acfually reduce wage-com-
pensation rates, it does indirectly re-
duce the benefits paid by the unem-
ployment insurance fund by means
of the changes in the "acceptability"
of job offers. It remains to be seen
whether the incentives will suffice to
tance accorded to countering benefit
abuse in the new legislation may
mean, however, that scarce resourc-
es can be activated for labour market
and social policy aims.
The interest of evaluation re-
searchers has been attracted by the
productive wage-cost subsidies intro-
duced for the first time in east Ger-
many in 1993, which aimed to imple-
ment the principle of financing work
rather than unemployment (cf., for
example, Wolfinger 1994, 7995).
They have sought to establish wheth-
er or not the new instrument has re-
ally met expectations with respect to
its targets.
The declared aims of active labour
market policy include using resourc-
es for investment rather than con-
sumption, tying in labour market
policy with economic and structural
policy and improving the structure of
financing compared with traditional
job-creation measures. According to
the results of evaluations, the majori-
ty of those supported under the
scheme were employed in measures
to improve local infrastructure: most
important were cleaning up sites for
commercial use and local environ-
mental improvement projects. Given
that the wage-cost subsidies only
cover part of the costs, however, co-
financing by state and local authori-
ties or other organisations is neces-
sary. This ensures, at least in princi-
ple, that the measure is tailored to
actual needs. It is evident that in the
case of measures promoted using
wage-cost subsidies, those benefiting
from the value added were called
upon to participate in financing to a
greater extent than was the case with
traditional job-creation measures (cf.
Autorengemeinschaft 1997).
Active labour market policy was
introduced in 1969 as a pro-active,
anticipatory instrument in the hands
of the unemployment insurance fund
in order to improve labour market
outcomes under more favourable
conditions than prevailed in the fol-
lowing decades. It was certainly not
created in order to effectively coun-
ter mass unemployment. The wide-
ranging aims pursued by active la-
bour market policy include optimis-
ing the structure of employment, in-
tegrating disadvantaged groups of
the population and avoiding employ-
ment below qualification levels. In
the wake of German unification, it
was called upon to perform an addi-
tional task, just as an increasing scep-
ticism about the scope of such policy
was spreading. In response, the re-
formed LPA has scaled down the di-
mension of the targets, dampened all
hopes of the state creating jobs and
laid great emphasis on the special re-
sponsibility borne by employers and
employees. Of the three major
thrusts of active labour market poli-
cy 
- 
improving labour market oppor-
tunities through training, creating
jobs and the imposition of sanctions -
the new law has focused on tighten-
ing sanctions, while at the same time
promoting labour market entry
through integration plans and train-
ing measures.
Conclusions
The relationship between passive and
active labour market policy is both
complementary and competitive.
Given limited resources, spending on
active policies tends to be crowded
out by wage-compensation benefits
as unemployment rises. And this is
occurring precisely at the time that ac-
tion in favour of economic structures
and labour market target grouPs is
most urgently needed. Under such
conditions, it may well prove impossi-
ble to prevent cuts in passive labour
market policy benefits. Yet the need
to deploy resources more efficiently
should not be misused to legitimise
cuts in social security.
A policy of activating passive la-
bour market policy finds itself on the
borderline between reducing insur-
ance benefits and their more produc-
tive use. If there is an overall lack of
job opportunities, sanctions may well
help to avoid benefit abuse, but they
can also cause social hardship, the
prevention of which was the original
aim of the social security system. On
the other hand, the activation of pas-
sive labour market policy would ap-
achieve significant results. Evalua-
tion researgh lhas produced evidence
of only a limltted impact of such in-
centives (c[ $chmid et al. 1996). The
substantial'1 ilrcrease in the impor-ilrl
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pear to constitute a helpful strategy
where it leads directly to job creation
or to bringing demand and supply
into equilibrium in specific labour
market segments. In Germany, this is
true of the productive wage-cost sub-
sidies and the support for those seek-
ing to enter self-employment. The
extent to which the measures to
make job offers more acceptable 
- 
in
a legal sense 
- 
to the unemployed
have an influence on unemployrnent,
on the other hand, remains unclear.
Under the condition of scarce re-
sources, the funds for consumption-
oriented wage-compensation bene-
fits should continue to be redirected
towards active and activating labour
market policies. Their impact, how-
ever, depends centrally on overall
employment trends.
Kurt Vogler-Ludwig
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Greece
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Greece
Active labour market policy (ALMP)
in Greece consists mainly of training,
employment subsidies and self-em-
ployment prograrnmes, and in most
cases covers all unemployed per-
sons, irrespective of whether they
are eligible for unemployment bene-
fits (UB). As unemployment has in-
creased, active interventions in the
labour market have attracted more
attention, but their extent and depth
have remained limited compared to
other EU countries. Table l presents
public expenditure on various active
and passive labour market pro-
grammes and the number of benefi-
ciaries in recent years. Table 2
presents public expenditure on la-
bour market policies (LMPs) as a
percentage of GDP according to na-
tional data (for OECD data refer to
summary chapter).
International comparisons show
that the percentage of GDP spent on
LMP in Greece has been the lowest
of all EU countries: the proportion of
GDP spent on ALMP has been
among the lowest, while that spent
on UB has been by far the lowest. A
similar picture emerges when com-
parisons are made with regard to the
share of the labour force benefiting
from LMP.
The percentages of GDP spent on
LMP and on ALMP are not only rel-
atively low, but have also been de-
clining (Table 2). ALMP spending as
a share of total LMP spending has
decreased in recent years, according
to OECD data. According to the
Greek employment service (OAED),
it has shown considerable variation,
but not a clear tendency to decrease
(Table 2). At the very least, the data
on expenditure indicate that there
has been no trend towards more ac-
tive programmes in recent years.
Vocational training programmes
absorbed the largest part of ALMP
expenditure. A much smaller share
was dedicated to employment subsi-
dies and a relatively small percent-
age to self-employment programmes.
Of the expenditure on training, the
largest part consisted of intra-enter-
prise programmes.
Besides the relatively small and
decreasing percentage of GDP spent
on ALMP, evaluation studies have
shown that, due to various problems,
the effectiveness of the active pro-
grammes implemented has been
rather limited until recently (Harat-
sis, Kottis-Petraki et al. 1993; De-
doussopoulos & Reppas 1994; Kottis,
Kottis-Petraki et al. L994). Accord-
ing to these sfudies, the number of
new jobs created through the em-
ployment-subsidy programmes was
relatively small and the greater part
of the new businesses receiving sub-
sidies would have been created even
without such support. The training
prograrnmes for adult unemployed
individuals suffered from several
weaknesses relating to their content
and orientation, the methods and
materials used, the information on
the schemes made available to em-
ployers, etc.
In the years since the Council
meeting held in Essen, steps have
been taken to activate Greek LMP.
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Table 1: Public Expenditure on Labour Market Policies and Number of Beneficiaries
Expenditure in million GRD
L992 1993 1994 19951991,
Number of beneficiaries
7991 7992 1993 7994 L995
A. Actioe labour market Policies
Technical vocational training
for young people 4,599.2 4,7L4.3 4,921.2 5,827.1 8,740.7
Continuing vocational training !,847.9 7,472.8 2,788.6 2'659.4 2,742.7
Training in private enterprises 27,667.9 1"6,575.0 74,676.'l' 10,012.9 20,860.0
Employment subsidisation
prograrnmes 7,074.4 L2,242.9 12,080.0 9,639.0 L4,287.0
Self-employmetrt programmes 1,958.2 2,200.0 1,600.0 1.,7L4.0 3'200.0
12,805 12,000 13,400 13,992 14,924
6,006 6,300 6,380 6,454 5,467
45,908 49,060 51,955 37,500 46,000
22,407 22,408 20,543 22,456 22,200
5,533 4,840 3,520 4,683 4,395
Total AIMP 43,087.6 37,205.0 35,465.9 29,846.4 49,230.4 92,653 94,608 95,798 85,085 92,986
B. IJnempbymentbenefits and other fiansfen
Unemployment benefits
Supplementary benefits
Family allowances
Other
66,664.0 7L,092.3 77,608.7
17,648.8 12,076.6 L2,502.6
17,720.4 10,868.3 12,717.9
77.4 52.s 32.4
90,331.5 102,737.4
15,708.7 16,838.0
74,249.2 73,75L.1,
65.7 104.8
200,710 272,397 226,732 208,004 236,329
184,446 179,487 136,301 L50,935 136,670
339,690 375,772 372,556 307,883 302,564
3,670 2,327 1,480 2,932 4,104
Totat UB and other transfers 96,704.6 94,029.7 702,261.6 120,355.L 133,431.3
Total expenditure on ALMP,
UB and other transfers 139,L92.2 L37,234.7 137,727.5 150'201.5 182,667.7
Source:Manpower Employment Organisation: OAED Present and Future. Athens, September L996.
A medium-tenn plan for the promo-
tion of employment was formulated
in 1995 and a law was passed inL996
(Law 243411996) introducing a se-
ries of policy changes and measures
aimed at making active intervention
in the labour market more effective
and more generally at increasing ac-
tivation. Certain programmes that
have been implemented for specific
groups of the unemployed in the last
two years have had significant acti-
vating effects on the beneficiaries.
Before presenting these initiatives,
we will discuss certain aspects of the
prevailing UB system affecting acti-
vationl.
Features of the Existing
UB System's lmplications
The main characteristics of the UB
system are the relatively low benefits
(replacement rates of around 55"/"),
their limited duration (5 to L2
months) and the restrictive rules con-
cerning eligibility. These features
create greater pressure for the unem-
ployed to actively search for work
than in countries with more generous
systems. For example, in the past the
restrictions concerning eligibility for
unemployment benefits induced
many unemployed individuals to
participate in subsidised training pro-
grammes which had less strict eligi-
bility requirements. This could be
considered as having led to some
waste, because in certain cases the
unemployed participated passively
in several heterogeneous training
programmes, run by different organi-
sations, just to receive the subsidies.
However, at least in this way the un-
employed maintained contact with
the labour market and became ex-
posed to various kinds of knowledge
1 The new prograrnmes will also benefit un-
employed individuals who, under existing
arrangements, are not entitled to UB (l,a-
yard et al. 1991).
Table 2: Public Expenditure on Labour Market Policies as Percentage of GDP
7992 7993 !994 7995
A. Total actioe measures
- 
Public employment services and administration
- 
Self-employment programmes
- 
Employment subsidisation Progralnmes
- 
Employment programmes for the handicapped
- 
Vocational training programmes
0.36
0.07
0.02
0.06
0.001
0.27
0.33
0.05
0.02
0.06
0.001
0.20
0.29
0.06
0.02
0.05
0.001
0.L6
0.30
0.06
0.02
0.06
0.003
0.16
B. Ilnemployment benefits and family allowances 0.71 0.57 0.61 0.56
Total expenditure on active policies and unem-
ployment benefits 7.07 0.90 0.90 0.86
@ntageof totallMP
spending 33.6 36.7 32.2 34.9
-
Source: Estinptfs based on data from OAED Present and Future (in Greek). Athens, 7995 and7996.
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and skills that could have had a posi-
tive impact on their employability.
Although the ungenerous nature
of the Greek UB system results from
budgetary constraints, it has the
same effects as if it were part of an
activation strategy. On the other
hand, concerns have been expressed
that these features might also create
unfavourable effects on activation. If
the unemployed do not have a suffi-
cient income to enable them to main-
tain a minimum standard of living
and to cover the various costs associ-
ated with job-search efforts, their ac-
tivation may be reduced. On the ba-
sis of this consideration and also for
social reasons, the government in-
creased benefits by 10% inL996 and
by another L0% in 1997. These in-
creases did not significantly affect re-
placement rates, however, because
of parallel increases in nominal mini-
mum wages.
UBs are not subject to income tax,
but neither do wage-earners at the
lower end of the pay scale have to
pay income tax. Therefore, the tax
system cannot be considered as dis-
couraging the activation of the bene-
fit recipients. However, the relafive-
ly large incidence of social security
contributions2 for those regularly
employed may exercise some dis-
couraging effects on activation.
The most serious problem associ-
ated with the UB system is that the
beneficiaries do not have a financial
incentive to accept part-time or casu-
al work because any earnings are de-
ducted in their entirety from unem-
ployment benefits. Since part-time or
casual work may help the unem-
ployed to keep in touch with the la-
bour market and may even lead to
regular employment, the lack of any
incentives for such or any other kind
of work is definitely a deterrent to
their activation.
The unemployed in receipt of ben-
efits are required to look for work,
but do not have an obligation to par-
ticipate in training programmes or to
engage in specific job-search activi-
ties. Benefits are stopped only if an
unemployed person refuses to take a
suitable job offered by the public em-
ployment office. Heavy work loads,
shortage of staff and organisational
problems have limited the scope of
the public employment offices to
take adequate action in this regard.
The lack of a clear definition of what
constifutes a "suitable job" is an ad-
ditional problem. All in all, beyond
the effects resulting from the parsi-
monious nafure of the system as a
whole there has been no activation
by sanctions or disincentives.
Recent lnitiatives to
Activate Labour Market
Policy
In view of rising unemployment, the
pressures to reduce public deficits
and the relatively heavy burden of
contributions on employers and em-
ployees, the activation of LMP seems
to be the most promising way to deal
with the problems associated with
unemployment. Since public expend-
iture on UB is relatively small, the
possibilities for achieving more acti-
vation are limited. However, within
existing limits there is room for ac-
tion in this regard. Below, we present
the main steps that have been taken
in the last two years.
Activation of labour market
policies through a new Iaw
Law 243411996 introduced a series
of policy changes and measures
aimed at increasing activation3. The
cost of implementing them was esti-
mated to be around GRD 220 billion
or 0.8Yo of GDP; this is expected to
be covered by the transfer of funds
from passive and other labour mar-
ket programmes. One of the most im-
portant innovations of the new law
was the introduction of the system of
"employment cards", which will in-
corporate vouchers that can be used
by the unemployed for participation
in training or subsidised employment
programmes or for receiving UBs. Fi-
nancial incentives will exist for the
unemployed to use their vouchers
for training or subsidised employ-
ment. The vouchers cannot be used
to take up work in the regular labour
market, remaining limited to public
projects. Provisions will be added in
the new arrangements for exerting
pressure on UB recipients to search
for work or participate in training
prograrnmes. The aim will be to con-
vert UBs into employment or train-
ing subsidies. Eligibility for employ-
ment cards and vouchers will be ex-
tended to those unemployed people
who were not eligible for benefits
under the previous system (long-
term unemployed, new entrants into
the labour market, etc.).
Employment cards will be a pre-
requisite for receiving UBs. They will
indicate the frequency, the amount
and the periods of benefit receipt.
This information will facilitate con-
trols and is likely to reduce expendi-
ture by limiting benefit abuse. The
cards will also include information
about certified professional qualifi-
cations, the skills obtained from par-
ticipation in training programmes
and any other kind of information
that could be helpful in finding jobs
for the card-holders.
The regulations concerning the ap-
plication of the above system will be
specified through ministerial decrees
which are expected to be issued dur-
ing1997. The above system can be a
powerful means of activating LMP.
However, several questions have
been raised with regard to its appli-
cation. Its success will depend to a
large extent upon the specific ar-
rangements made for its operation.
Another provision in the new law
that is expected to contribute signifi-
cantly to the activation of LMP con-
cerns the collection and processing of
labour market data: the computerisa-
tion and reorganisation of the OAED
and its employment offices. This will
considerably upgrade the ability of
these offices to match UB recipients
with vacancies and is expected to re-
duce the need for payrng benefits.
Also, the new subsidised training
programmes 
- 
that will be tailored to
2 For workers, social security contributions
constitute around 16% of their earnings.
3 For an analysis of these policies and meas-
ures see Kottis-Petraki & Kottis (1996).
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the specific needs of particular
groups of the unemployed and will
involve employment in private firms
- 
are likely to enhance activation
since they will offer an attractive al-
ternative for individuals eligible to
receive UBs.
The employment subsidisation and
the self-employment programmes in-
troduced under the new law in the
first months of 1997 provide financial
incentives to the unemployed to be
"active" instead of passively receiv-
ing UBs. The new programmes are ex-
pected to create 40,000 new jobs in
L9974 atacostof GRD 40 billion. This
cost is high compared to the cost of the
programmes that will be replaced, but
savings are expected from a reduced
take-up of tlBs.
Subsidisation of non-wage costs
for firms employing young people is
another policy introduced by the
new law that aims to create jobs and
thus reduce unemployment and the
number of those eligible for UB.
Special packages of measures
for particular groups of the
unemployed
To activate workers who became un-
employed because of privatisation or
the reorganisation or closure of
firms, special packages of measures
have been introduced to provide
those eligible for UBs with the alter-
natives of self-employment, subsi-
dised employment, or training. The
options included in each package dif-
fer depending upon the particular
case. However, in all cases these op-
tions are designed in such a way as to
create incentives for the unemployed
to choose active alternatives.
Studies have shown that those laid
off have mostly chosen an active al-
ternative (e.g.95% of workers in a
closed shipyard). Generally, it can be
shown that good results can be
achieved if suffidient personnel and
financial resoqrdes are devoted to
the activation cif the unemployed.
Such packages hay be considered
too costly on the basis of a short-term
cost-benefit analysis, but when long-
term considerations are taken into
account the benefits are likely to out-
weigh the costs, even on purely eco-
nomic grounds.
Gonclusions
Because of the parsimonious nature
of the UB system in Greece and the
relatively small percentage of GDP
spent on passive transfers, the scope
for activating LMP in the sense of
transferring resources from passive
to active measures is limited. How-
ever, within existing limits there is
considerable room for action. Acti-
vation may also be increased by
transferring resources from less to
more effective active labour market
prograrnmes.
The employment law introduced
inL996 opened new avenues for ac-
tivating LMP. However, the main in-
novation, which is the system of em-
ployment cards, has not yet been ap-
plied. Since the application of this
system is expected to be associated
with certain problems that could en-
danger its viability, special attention
should be paid to its implementation.
The various packages of measures
for workers who lost their jobs be-
cause of privatisations, reorganisa-
tion etc. and the programmes intro-
duced recently under the new law
have all been steps in the right direc-
tion. However, there is a need for
faster and more extensive action and
also for greater innovation. Careful
examinafion of certain initiatives
that have been applied in other
countries (e.g. job rotation, job
pools, work trials, community pro-
grammes, etc.) and pilot applications
of a selection of such measures could
provide useful indications about new
possibilities for increasing activa-
tion.
Reforming certain aspects of the
existing UB system to increase incen-
tives to work is another area that
needs examination. Particular con-
sideration should be given to the in-
corporation of provisions that will al-
low UB recipients to earn money
from paid employment without los-
ing an equivalent amount of benefits.
Moreover, in addition to the positive
incentives for work or training,
mechanisms should be considered for
exerting greater pressure on the UB
recipients to actively improve their
employability or enter (subsidised)
employment or self-employment.
Before concluding this paper, it
should be mentioned that discussions
have recently been initiated by the
government on the introduction of
special agreements between the so-
cial partners, local governments and
all parties concerned in areas of high
unemployment, in order to increase
employment. Such agreements could
expand employment opportunities
and lead to greater activation of the
unemployed. However, the discus-
sions are at a very early stage and the
outcome is uncertain.
Athena Petraki-Kottis
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Trends
Spain
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Spain
Table 1 presents the distribution of
expenditure on labour market policy
(LMP) in Spain over the recent peri-
od L997-L995, distinguishing be-
tween its "active" and "passive"
components. The most striking fea-
ture of this table is the high relative
proportion of resources devoted to
passive policies, which reached al-
most 90% inL993. However, the re-
cent trend has been towards a sub-
stantial reduction in the relative
weight of passive measures, which
currently represent some 80% of to-
tal expenditure. As the downward
trend of the proportion of GDP de-
voted to labour market policies as a
whole suggests, the more active
stance of LMP in Spain is to be ex-
plained by the restrictions on passive
expenditures, rather than by a direct
shift from passive to active measures:
expenditure on the latter increased,
but very moderately. We shall come
back to these issues later on.
Following the OECD classifica-
tion, four main elements can be iden-
tified within active measures in
Spain:
- 
labour market training, financed
by the European Social Fund and
the vocational training levy (a
payroll tax), which covers both
the unemployed (training provid-
ed by central and regional govern-
ment agencies) and employed
workers (under a recent system es-
tablished h L993 whereby a pri-
vate foundation, managed by the
social partners, is responsible for
running the system);
- 
subsidised employment (including
youth measures), whereby wage
subsidies are provided to firms
giving permanent contracts to spe-
cific groups of workers, such as
youngsters or women in occupa-
tions where they are under-repre-
sented; the scope of these subsi-
dies was reduced n 1992; the
number of contracts involved has
been relatively small;
- 
other programmes to support en-
trepreneurial activities and job
creation: these are mostly pro-
grammes to promote self-employ-
ment, employment in coopera-
tives, local employment initiatives
and measures in favour of the dis-
abled (specific social insurance
contribution exemptions and
wage subsidies are provided to
firms hiring disabled people); the
number of participants in these
programmes has been small;
- 
public employment services and
administration: the Spanish em-
ployment service is reported to
have one of the largest ratios of
unemployed people per staff
member; the reputation of the
service as a job broker has never
been particularly good, and most
people see it as the "unemploy-
ment office" rather than the "em-
ployment office"; there have been
recent efforts to enhance the job-
broking role of the service.
It should be noted, however, that the
notion of active labour market poli-
cies adopted by the OECD, and dis-
cussed so far, may not be appropriate
in the case of Spain. Two main rea-
sons may be put forward:
- 
first, one of the main labour mar-
ket policies followed by successive
governments since the early 1980s
has been related to the introduc-
tion of special "employment pro-
motion" labour contracts which
do not offer any direct wage subsi-
Table 1: Total Expenditure on Labour Market Policies as a Proportion of
GDP and Number of New Participants in Active Measures as a Propor-
tion of the Labour Force, L99l-1995
7997 7992 7993 7994 7995
Expenditure as aproportion of GDP
Public employment services and
administration
Labour market training
Youth measures
Subsidised employment
Measures for the disabled
0.72
0.18
0.05
0.40
0.01
0.11
0.10
0.07
0.28
0.01
0.11 0.10 0.09
0.72 0.23 0.35
0.10 0.09 0.08
0.20 0.77 0.19
0.01 0.01 0.01
TotaI active policies 0.76 0.58 0.53 0.60 0.72
Unemployment compensation 2.85 3.77 3.59 3.26 2.60
Early retirement for labour market
reasons 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total passive policies 2.85 3.L7 3.59 3.26 2.60
TOTAL 3.60 3.75 4.12 3.86 3.32
Passive measures as % of total
expenditure 79.2 84.5 87.L 84.5 78.3
New participants in actioe measures as a proportion of the labour force
Labour market training
Youth measures
Subsidised employment
Measures for the disabled
0:;
4.7
0.1
0.;
2.9
0.1
0:;
1.5
0.1
0.8
0.3
L.2
0.L
0.7
0.3
7.2
0.1
Source: OECD: Employment Outlooh, 1996.
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dy, but which do imply substan-
tially lower labour costs in terms
of the much lower (in some cases,
zero) costs of separation which
they involve; these contracts in-
clude "apprenticeship", "prac-
tice" and "employment promo-
tion fixed-term" contracts, the lat-
ter being the most widely used be-
fore their use was restricted in
7992 andagann7994.
- 
second, the unemployment bene-
fit system contains elements that
may be considered "active" rather
than "passive":
a) the "benefit capitalisation" pro-
gramme initiated in 1985,
whereby recipients of unem-
ployment benefits may receive
their potential benefits as a lump
sum on presentation of a self-
employment project; since !992
this programme has been sub-
stantially reduced (the number
of participants decreased from
around 80,000 per year on aver-
age to 10,000), and currently
only cooperatives and worker-
owned firms are eligible; the
reasons behind the restrictions
were the supposed existence of
substantial fraud (no evaluation
studies on this were published)
and the need to cut expenditure.
At any rate, this is a clear "acti-
vation" policy which is consid-
ered very important; the possi-
bility of expanding the pro-
gramme again is always under
consideration, subject to stricter
controls on fraud, but no specific
proposals have been put for-
ward so far.
b) unemployment benefits may be
considered in various instances
as employment-protecting de-
vices. For example, temporarily
laid-off workers and workers
on short-time working have the
right to unemployment com-
pensation. Such cases represent
some 10% of total unemploy-
ment benefit expenditure. This
applies to flrms with (presuma-
bly tempor0ry) economic prob-
lems, as I r{ell as to seasonal
workers, who receive benefits
during the period of inactivity.
The same applies to unemploy-
ment-benefit recipients who are
allowed to take part-time work
(with a pro rata reduction in
their benefits)l.
Recent Activation
Initiatives
There is a clear feeling that expendi
tures on passive policies should be re-
duced in favour of active policies. But
it should also be borne in mind that
the overall budget deficit in Spain has
been very high in recent years, thus
making it necessary for the govern-
ment to exert downward pressures on
all the components of spending, even
considering the contribution of the
European Social Fund to active pro-
grarnmes. In this context, the recent
initiatives to "activate" labour mar-
ket policies have, as already men-
tioned, come more from restrictions
on passive expenditures than from
expanding active measures.
The most significant changes began
inL992, when unemployment bene-
fits were reduced. Access to unem-
ployment insurance (for which the
amount of benefit is related to past
wages) was restricted, but this was
offset by a wider access to unemploy-
ment assistance (for which the benefit
is paid at a flat rate per month). This
change translated, however, into a
smaller replacement ratio, which was
accentuated by the reduction of the
compensation rate for unemploy-
ment insurance (from 80% in the first
six months, 70% in the next 6 months
and 60%" in the remain ng 72 months,
to 70% in the first 12 months, and
60Y" thercafter). Although this is be-
lieved to have reducedthe duration of
unemployment, the fact is that the
maximum potential duration of un-
employment insur ance b enefits, gen-
erally identified as the most signifi-
cant variable affecting search behav-
iour by the unemployed, was left un-
changed.
Further measures along the same
lines were adopted n 7993. Unem-
ployment benefits became liable for
income taxes, t}te minimum benefit
level was lowered (from L00% to
75% of the statutory minimum
wage), and the access requirements
for assistance benefits were restrict-
ed by a narrower definition of the
notion of "family responsibilty" (a
necessary condition in many instanc-
es to get access to these benefits) as
well as a tightening of the means test.
All of these measures again reduced
the replacement ratio and, to the ex-
tent that assistance benefits follow
exhaustion of entitlement to insur-
ance benefits, shortened potential
oaerallbenefit duration. At the same
time, the coverage of the system,
however defined, tended to narrow
substantially.
Regarding the obligations of the
unemployed, Spanish law and actual
practice are somewhat confusing. To
many people, unemplolmrent bene-
fits are a right stemming from the con-
tributions made to the system while
working, independent of the search
attitude of the unemployed and only
conditional on the fact that the bene-
ficiary is out of work. However, the
law clearly states that unemployment
benefits are conditional upon accept-
ance of suitable job offers2 as well as
participation in the promotion, train-
ing and retraining measures mediated
by the employment service. It ap-
pears that, since circa 1992, the serv-
ice has tended to apply these criteria
more stringently. For example, the
share of unemployment-benefit re-
cipients in thenumber of unemployed
receiving training has dramatically in-
creased, from L'l,Yo in 1990 to a high
of 39% in1994 (although this figure
dropped to 3 2% in 799 5). In addition,
a better identification of the charac-
teristics of the recipients, together
with a closer follow-up of their job-
search activities, are also considered
1 The reduction in benefits is, in principle, pro-
portional to the amount of time worked, in-
dependent of any means-tested criterion,
with one exception: in the case of assistance
benefits such a criterion exists on a general
basis; thus, it could be that working part time
no longer implies meeting the income criteri-
on and hence losing benefis altogether.
2 A notion at present on-ly loosely defined and
therefore a matter of interpretation by the
courts. A legal initiative is under way to ar-
rive at a more stringent definition.
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fundamental, and internal organisa-
tional steps have been taken within
the employment service to enhance
these activities, although no specific
evaluations have yet been made. It is
to be mentioned, in this connection,
that some of the regions (most nota-
bly Catalonia) are requesting that em-
ployment service activities be trans-
ferred to the regional level. It is un-
clear how this would affect the effec-
tiveness of the service as a placement
agency.
On the whole, direct activation
measures have been rather limited in
Spain. Beyond the programme of
benefit capitalisation, most of the
measures adopted have tended to act
upon benefit recipients in such a way
as to increase their participation in
search and training activities as well
as to reduce the economic incentives
to remain unemployed. The effec-
tiveness of these measures is difficult
to assess. It is clear that expenditure
on unemployment benefits has been
curtailed and the coverage of the
benefit system reduced. Unemploy-
ment remains very high, however,
and this should also be taken into
consideration when adopting "acti-
vation" policies which might deprive
the jobless of the necessary means of
subsistence.
Evaluation
What has been the success of active
labour market policies in Spain? We
shall concentrate here on the two
main policies in terms of size, namely
labour market training and employ-
ment contract policy.
As for labour market training, var-
ious periods need to be distin-
guished. Its inception as a substantial
policy coincided with, and v/as
linked to, the accession of Spain into
the European Community in 1986.
This entailed the provision of re-
sources by the European Social Fund
which were to be spent on training.
Start-up problems were substantial
during the first three years, mostly
due to the lack of adequate training
structures to handle the large amount
of funds from the ESF. Starting in
L988, the government began to pro-
mote higher quality in vocational
training programmes, as well as an
evaluation study consisting of a fol-
low-up of trainees at the end of the
year after receiving their training. By
comparison with a small sample of
non-trainees, the study found that
training exerted a positive influence
on the rate of labour market integra-
tion, a conclusion confirmed recently
by more sophisticated, econometric
studies. Still, the problem with these
evaluations is to what extent un-
measured characteristics of the un-
employed themselves explain train-
ing participation and entry into em-
ployment ("selection effects"). On
the whole, therefore, training poli-
cies for the unemployed suffer from
a lack of sufficient evaluation.
As for employment contract poli-
cy, the legal reform introduced in
L984 that eliminated restrictions on
fixed-tenn contracts gave rise to a
massive use of such contracts by em-
ployers during the recovery period of
1986-L990. While some government
officials claimed at the time that the
rise in employment (the fastest in
Spanish history) was entirely due to
this legal change, the generally ac-
cepted opinion of experts is that the
elimination of restrictions on the use
of fixed-term contracts exerted a
small, though non-negligible, influ-
ence on employment growth, thereby
increasing the employnent intensity
of economic growth. At the same
time, however, the change created a
significant cleavage in the labour
market between permanent workers,
well protected against dismissals, and
temporary, fixed-term workers with
no employment protection and sub-
ject to a significant labour turnover.
TheL994labour law reform aimed at
reversing this situation, but it has
clearly failed: although, as already
mentioned, the use of "employment
promotion fixed-term contracts" was
heavily restricted, employers have
found ways (through other contracts,
designed to be used for activities of a
temporary nature) to maintain their
frequent use of fixed-term contracts.
On the whole, therefore, employ-
ment contract policy exerted a posi-
tive influence, especially in its early
stages, but this turned out to have un-
expected negative influences on the
operation of the labour market.
Conclusions
Spain spends a substantial amount of
money on passive measures and only
a little on purely active policies. Al-
though this situation generates con-
cern among policy-makers, who
agree that more emphasis should be
given to active measures, the path to
this end of activating labour market
policies remains unclear. Firstly, pas-
sive policies are seen as playing a role
in terms of preventing job losses. Sec-
ondly, it is unclear whether merely
shifting from passive to active expen-
ditures would create stable j obs which
would prevent workers from falling
back to the state of need in one way or
the other. Any (desirable) shift to-
wards more active policies should not
forget this last aspect, as the results
may be the opposite of those intend-
ed. The need to activate policies is
clearly perceived in Spain, but any
change should be undertaken with
care. There is room to adopt a more
indirect approach aiming at "activat-
ing the unemployed" so that their rate
of job-finding is increased without
prejudicing the social protection pro-
vided by unemployment benefits.
Luis Toharia
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Trends
France
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policy
in Francel
The proportion of GDP spent on la-
bour market policy 
-3.87% in7994
- 
has more than quadrupled since
1973. Relatively speaking, its growth
has outpaced that of the economy
over the last 20 years.
The total figure for public LMP ex-
penditure can be classified under dif-
ferent headings according to the na-
fure of their contribution to correct-
ing labour market imbalances. These
headings make it possible to differen-
tiate between passive and active ex-
penditure.
Passive expenditure, comprising
unemployment benefit and incen-
tives for early retirement, grew stead-
ily over the period from 1973 to
1994. Although its share of the total
has fallen since 1985, it still accounted
for 51.5 % of public LMP expenditure
inL993. According to the OECD, in
1993 France was in an intermediate
position compared with other leading
industrialised countries2.
Active spending exceeded passive
spending for the first time in 1994;
the latter made up 49.8% of all pub-
lic employment expenditure. This
relative downward trend of passive
spending appears to have been con-
firmed in1995.
Some analysts downplay this in-
crease in the share of active spending
as a proportion of total public LMP
expenditure because the area cov-
ered by such spending cannot be seen
entirely in terms of direct economic
incentives. For example, they consid-
er that, in the case of vocational
training, the objective of upgrading
the skills and qualifications of the
worMorce co-exists, for the young
and long-term unemployed at least,
with that of social insertion. Voca-
tional training remains the most im-
1 The scope of public expenditure on employ-
ment includes spending on employment,
training and unemployment benefit bome
by central government, regional authorities,
companies and UNEDIC. It should be noted
that this definition is incomplete, since it
only partially covers funds allocated by re-
gional authorities (for example, regional
training expenditure directed at those in
work and jobseekers is not included) and
excludes the RM (guaranteed minimum in-
come), although this benefit provides for en-
try into the labour market.
2 [n7993, on a comparative basis, passive ex-
penditure accounted Lor 2.!OY. of GDP; ac-
tive expenditure,T.2lYo of GDP.
Table 1: Growth in Labour Market Policy Spending since 1973
7973 1980 1985 7993 79947990
LMP expenditure L0.2 64.8 770.L 278.3 286.3 285.7
(current FRF rnillion)
Annual change +4.9 +5 +4.5 +7.2 -1.8
(constant FRF, %)
LMP expenditure/GDP (%) 0.9 2.37 3.62 3.35 4.04 3.87
TJSMl(thousand) 394 1,451 2,458 2,505 3,777 3,329
(annual average)
Annual change (%) +5 -7.7 +8.9 +5
1 TJSM = Total jobseekers at end of month.
Source: DARES 
- 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs.
Table 2: Publlc Spending on Labour Market Policy, 1973-1995 (milliea5 of FRF)
\973 1980 1990 7990
o,lo
1985 7993 7993 7994 7995
/o/o
Passive spending
- 
unemployment benefits 1,890
- 
incentives for labour market with-
drawal !,577
26,753
L\,L79
56,350 87,374
58,056 37,709
723,287
27,987
].,18,239
28,972
Total passive spending 3,467 37,332 7L4,406 124,483 56.7 157,274 51.5 747,1.57 49.8
Active spending
- 
Vocational training
- 
Job creation and promotion
- 
Reductions irt social insurance
contributions
- 
Employmentmaintenance
- 
Incentives to take up employment
- 
Labour mar\et functioning
L9,816 37,304
2,667 8,458
00
2,577 3,937
L,387 3,420
7,064 2,564
88,639
30,796
7,2L9
87,722
34,779
9,363
5,730
5,009
5,399
6,224
4,929
5,010
5,779
501
0
L39
79
265
67,377
74,675
7,048
3,467
4,504
3,785
Total active spehding 6,703 27,445 55,683 94,850 43.3 742,2\7 48.5 747,942 50.2
Total labour market policy spending 70,770 64,777 770,089 279,333 100 293,497 100 295,093 100
Source: DARES.
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portant component of active policies
(L994: 59% of. all active spending,
29.7% of all public LMP expendi-
ture). However, its share has been
declining since 1993. Similarly, Soli-
darity-Employment Contracts (con-
ffats emploi-solidaritd) constitute
the main measure for assisting the
creation of new jobs included under
the heading "job promotion and cre-
ation", whose relative share in active
expenditure has risen. Also these
contracts are considered to have a so-
cial function.
Other observers feel that widen-
ing the definition of public employ-
ment expenditure reveals the true
cost of unemployment. This includes,
in addition to such public expendi-
ture, loss of revenue from income tax
and national insurance contributions.
Such observers put this cost at more
than FRF 400 billion.
When public employment ex-
penditure is broken down by "finan-
cial agent", the share of state funding
is seen to have grown. Central gov-
ernment became the main contribu-
tor n L994. accounting for 40Y" of.
the total and paying out FRF 1-L9 bil-
lion. This increase is particularly re-
lated to the development of active
policies implemented by the state.
UNEDIC, which bears the cost of
90"/" of unemployment benefit, has
seen its share of public employment
expenditure diminish; it has not been
the principal contributor since 1994
(36% of. the total, or FRF 106 bil-
lion). There is one key reason for
this: the reduction of unemployment
insurance as a share of expendifure
on benefits for jobseekers.
The explanation for this reduction
can be found in a combination of
events occurring in recent years:
- 
firstly, the reduction followed a
period in the early 1990s during
which the number of adult unem-
ployed persons entitled to high
levels of benefit rose sharply; in
L994, their entitlement was com-
ing to an end;
- 
the implementation of a new regu-
latory framework for unemploy-
ment insurance in the face of a
growing deficit in the existing
structure; this reform, intended to
ensure healthier UNEDIC financ-
es, had as one notable conse-
quence a reduction in the number
of unemployed receiving benefit
under the scheme.
Although the main thrust of "active
policy" is borne by central govern-
ment, we will consider here the poli-
cies pursued by UNEDIC, as they are
"active" in the narrower sense of ac-
tivating passive benefits.
Recent lnitiatives:
UNEDIC's Employment
Promotion Policy
Although UNEDIC began to make its
expenditure more active as early as
1986, with its retraining contracts
(conoention de conaersion) and, in
1988, with the training/career change
benefits (Allocation de Formation
Reclassemenf), sharply rising unem-
ployment in the early 1990s did not
permit it to continue with such inter-
ventionist policies. Once the reforms
introduced n L992-93 had restored
its financial equilibrium, ne\p pros-
pects opened up for greater efforts to
promote employment. In terms of ex-
penditure, however, these efforts
were very limited (active spending
barely totalled 5% of. total expendi-
ture).
Since 1994, unemployment insur-
ance scheme resources have been
mobilised to implement employment
promotion measures that overlap
with those initiated by central gov-
ernment policies. The efforts of the
employer and employee associations
thus led to the creation of two new
contractual schemes: cooperation
conhacts (conaention de coopdra-
tion) andthe FPE 
- 
Bipartite Fund to
Promote Employment (Fonils pari-
taire d'interoention dans le domaine
de I'emploi). The creation of this
fund is a genuine sign of the deterrni-
nation of the social partners to
strengthen their action to promote
employment and marks a radical
change. Since 1995, the fund has fi-
nanced a new early retirement
scheme, the Job Replacement Bene-
fit Allocation (ARPE 
- 
Allocation de
retnplacement pour I' emplofi, creat-
ed as an experiment by a cross-secto-
ral agreement signed on 6 September
1995, considered "historic" at the
time. This scheme was therefore add-
ed to the two other early retirement
programmes, involving complete or
gradual withdrawal from employ-
ment, financed by the FNE (central
government).
The surpluses likely to be regis-
tered in 1996 and7997 by UNEDIC
should allow it to go further. Finan-
cial responsibility for the AFR
scheme, 85% of which has hitherto
been funded by central government
due to the persistent UNEDIC defi-
cit, is gradually to be taken over by
the unemployment insurance scheme
(at least half of its costs).
New measures financed by FPE
may also be introduced. There is al-
ready agreement in principle on re-
newing the ARPE and extending it to
L999.
Table 3: UNEDIC's LMP Spending,l973-7994 (milli6as of FRF)
7973 1980 1985 1990 7993 7994
Passive spending
- 
Unemployment benefits
- 
Early retirement benefits
76,852 48,398 74,347 707,039 94,503
6,078 27,028 74,426 5,430 7,020
'L,279
608
Total passive spending 7,887 22,930 69,426 88,773 772,469 L07,523
Active spending
- 
Vocational training
- 
Job creation and promotion
48
0
763
29
69L
2
909 4,818
50
4,837
0
Total active spending 48 792 693 974 4,818 4,83I
Total spending by UNEDIC 1,935 23,722 70,179 89,687 717,287 706,354
Source: DARES.
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In L996, active measures should
represent more than FRF 12 billion
(compared with FRF 4.8 billion in
L994), or more than 70"/" of the ex-
penditure funded by UNEDIC (com-
pared with 4.5"/" in7994).
New Programmes and
their Evaluation
We will now look in turn at each of
the four schemes introduced by UN-
EDIC to make ih benefit expenditure
more pro-active. Two fall into the
category of reclassification training
(conaention de comtersion and AFR)
and are the oldest programmes. The
two new schemes (conoention de
coopdration and ARPE), in place
since 1994, fall into the category of
direct promotion of employment.
This is indicative of a trend in em-
ployment policy in France, whereby
priority has increasingly been given
to direct assistance to promote em-
ployment rather than to measures for
workforce qualification and training.
Retraining contracts
The retraining contract scheme is in
place since 1"986 and was initiated by
an inter-professional agreement to
offset the abolition of the need for
official authorisation of redundan-
cies. An agreement signed on 19 De-
cember 7996 e><tended the scheme
for a further three years with effect
from 1 January L997. Companies,
whatever their size, must now offer
all employees affected by any redun-
dancy programme the possibility of
signing a retraining contact intended
to assist them in finding new jobs.
Such a contract is a right enjoyed by
all employees and is enshrined in the
French Labour Code.
Designed to prevent long-term un-
employment, this programme, fund-
ed by UNEDIC, employers and gov-
ernment, involves individualised and
immediate help for redundant em-
ployees over a period of six months
with a maximUm of 300 hours of
training. Acces$ !o the scheme is re-
stricted to thosei under 57 with at
least two years' employment in the
company concerned. The employee's
contract of employment is then ter-
minated, but he/she is not registered
as a jobseeker. For a maximum of six
months, the former employee re-
ceives a special benefit equal initially
to 83%" and subsequently to 70% of.
the former salary.
Employee reclassification teams
(Unitds Techniques de Reclassement
or UTRs) having the aim of quick
placement have also been set up in
ANPE offices.
In L995, 120,000 employees
signed retraining contracts. For the
second year in a row, the numbers of
such signatories declined significant-
ly (down 20% in 7995 and L4% in
7994). This fall can be attributed
largely to a reduction in the number
of redundancies since 7994, despite a
further rise in unemployment since
mid-1995.
The scheme is used mainly by
small companies: in 1995, three-
quarters of the intake came from
firms with fewer than 50 employees.
The re-employment rate3 im-
proved markedly in 1995 (48%),
while re-employment stability was
maintained (as in 1994, 63Yo were
placed in jobs with open-ended em-
ployment contracts). It should be
stressed that the creation of new com-
panies remains a significant source of
employment for those in the scheme:
eight months after their entry into the
retraining scheme, 8.5% of those re-
employed had chosen this option, es-
pecially executiveJevel employees.
This programme, created in the
1980s, took on its full importance in
the early 7990s, when redundancy
levels were particularly high. It is
nevertheless the case that use of the
scheme has been relatively limited
compared with the numbers of job-
seekers, although its effectiveness is
not in doubt.
Training/career change benefit
(Allocation de formation-
reclassement 
- 
AFR)
The AFR, introduced by an agree-
ment dated 6 July 1988, provides for
government and UNEDIC funding of
the cost of supporting jobseekers un-
dergoing training. This benefit (plus
the training completion benefit [allo-
cation de formation de fin de stagel
that accompanies it if course dura-
tion exceeds the duration of entitle-
ment to unemployment benefit) is
paid as a wage. The training offered
to AFR recipients is dispensed by
bodies approved by central govern-
ment or regional authorities.
Priority targets for AFR are the
following:
- 
the unskilled or low-skill unem-
ployed, notably those whose age
makes re-employment especially
problematic;
- 
those needing a further qualifica-
tion and, within this category,
those whose applications have
been submitted most rapidly.
Since the scheme was initiated, a
number of changes have been made
to it by the social partners (UNEDIC)
with a view to widening its applica-
tion, notably by extending access
throughout the entire period of enti-
tlement to unemployment benefit
and beyond expiry of entitlement up
to the end of the training period.
The number of people entering
fell sigaificantly in L994 and 1995
for a variety of reasons: in addition
to the improvement 
- 
albeit tempo-
rary 
- 
in the job market, a decline in
the attractiveness of this training-
based scheme is evident, notably in
the face of "competition" from job-
creation programmes.
On average, those entering the
AFR programme follow a training
course of medium length of the order
of 580 hours. The initial objective is
to add to the person's skills or, in one
third of cases, to obtain a qualifica-
tion.
The re-employment rate deterio-
rated markedly in the early 1990s
along with the situation on the la-
bour market. It has, however, been
improving sinceL994, when the rate
of return to employment, one year
3 Aggregate reclassification for the ten co-
horts which joined the scheme between Jan-
uary 1995 and October 1995, monitored be-
tween September L995 and June 1996.
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after leaving the scheme, was 55%
(compared Yrith52% in 1993).
The state contribution to the AFR
amounted to more than FRF 5 billion
in 1995, spread over 200,000 benefi-
ciaries. This makes it a relatively
costly prograrnme.
Cooperation contracts
(Conventions de cooperation)
These were initiated in July 1994
and pay companies hiring unem-
ployed workers in receipt of benefit
for more than eight months an allow-
ance equal to the unemployment
benefit that the employees would
have been entitled to receive if they
had remained unemployed for up to
one year.
The manner in which this payment
is calculated is particularly favoura-
ble, since it does not take account of
progressive reductions in benefit and
is therefore higher than the total that
would otherwise have been payable.
The employer must hire the unem-
ployed worker under a fixed-term or
open-ended employment contract. In
practice, the young and the long-
term unemployed, as well as all those
who had previously held short-tenn
"stop-gap" jobs, seem to be denied
access to this scheme.
UNEDIC has allocated FRF l-.25
billion (FRF 250 million in 1994, FRF
500 million in both L995 and, !996)
to this programme.
The programme got off to an un-
promising start (60 jobs found in four
months). In July 1995, the procedure
was simplified, generating 5,550 em-
ployment contracts by the end of
June 7996, mostly with SMEs (fewer
than 50 employees). The service sec-
tor provided 64% of. the jobs. Of the
5,550 jobs, more than 64% involved
open-ended contracts. Ttre benefici-
aies, 49Y" of whom were between
25 and 40 years old, were mainly
men(77%). The average gross salary
was fairly high, at FRF 11,450 per
month, as compared with the aver-
age reference income of FRF 8,300
for those on unemployment benefit.
The scheme was expected to gener-
ate 15,000 jobs in 1996, although
this target is not very realistic given
the number of employment contracts
at the end of June 1996.
In theory, the programme was to
have remained in force until 31 De-
cember L996, but the agreement of
19 December7996 extended cooper-
ation contracts through L997 and
1998. The maximum number of hir-
ings under the scheme will be 18,000
it 1997 and as many again n 1998
(representing a maximum monthly
intake of 1,500). Total funding com-
mitments may not exceed FRF 1.5
billion for the intake in each of the
two fiscal years7997 and 1998.
Overall, this is considered to be a
measure which costs little and cre-
ates substantial numbers of jobs.
Job replacement benefit
(Allocation de remplacement
pour l'emploi 
- 
ARPE)4
ARPE was initiated by an agreement
signed on 6 September 1995 by em-
ployers' associations, employees' or-
ganisations and officials from UN-
EDIC, the unemployment benefit
body. ARPE benefits were in force
from 1 October L995 to 31 Decem-
ber L996 for payment to salaried em-
ployees under 60 years of age with at
least 40 years' accumulated contribu-
tions to national insurance in return
for early retirement where the com-
pany has undertaken to hire a job-
seeker as replacement.
For the period 1 October L995 to
31 December 7995, the agreement
covered employees born in 7936 or
7937. ln !996, employees born in
L936,7937 or 1938 were entitled to
seek early retirement under the
agreement of 6 September 1995.
These employees must be able to
produce evidence of 160 officially
confirmed quarters of contributions
to the national pension fund.
Any employee whose retirement
has been accepted is entitled to an
ARPE benefit guaranteeing him or
her an income equal to 65% of the
reference salary up to his/her sixtieth
birthday. Termination of the contract
of employment under the scheme en-
titles the beneficiary to receive re-
tirement compensation from the em-
ployer to an amount equal to that of
the retirement benefit payable when
an employee takes the initiative to
retire.
The employer must hire a replace-
ment under an open-ended employ-
ment contract, or a fixed-term one if
the person retiring was employed un-
der such a contract (the intention is
to maintain the same number of
hours of work), and must do so with-
in three months following acceptance
by the employer of the employee's
retirement application. Job applica-
tions from young people under 26
years old must be given special con-
sideration.
The FPE, the bipartite fund for
promoting jobs, legally instituted by
the law of 21 February 7996, and fi-
nanced by unemployment benefit
funds, although not to the exclusion
of other sources of finance, was
topped up for this purpose with FRF
4 billion from UNEDIC surpluses for
the years 1995 and7996.By the end
of the fiscal year, the total cost is
likely to be rather more than FRF 8
billion.
The objective was to achieve
80,000 to 90,000 beneficiaries by the
end of 7996. But at the end of the
year, only about 60,000 ARPE recip-
ients had signed on, at a cost of FRF
8.4 billion. Employment contracts in
compensation tended to involve
young people (less than 30 years old)
and men. ln95% of the cases, the re-
placement was under an open-ended
employment contract.
Even if the quantitative targets
were not met, this scheme clearly
helps to create jobs for young peo-
ple, and usually leads to open-ended
employment contracts.
The social partners are quite posi-
tive about the the overall assessment
of the scheme, and under a special
draft agreement dated 19 December
7996 the partners agreed to open up
ARPE to employees born n 7939.
For employees born in1940, there is
4 Fnnded by the FPE (Fonds paritaire pour
I'emploi).
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an explicit budget-related condition:
the scheme's results, as assessed dur-
ing the third quarter of 1997, must
fall within the limits set by a total
budget of FRF 9.3 billion. In any
event, the agreement lays down that
no new beneficiaries will be allowed
into the ARPE programme after 1
January L999.ln order to meet the
resulting extra commitnents, a spe-
cial FPE fund allocation (FF 1.6 bil-
lion for 1997, FRF 3.6 billion for
1998) has been made. Yet UNEDIC
is still very cautious about an exten-
sion of the scheme because of the
costs it fears may be incurred.
The implementation of the above
scheme does, however, confirm the
French preference for managing la-
bour supply by removing older
workers from the labour market
rather than actually seeking to create
additional new jobs.
Conclusions
Making expenditure on unemploy-
ment more active remains an em-
ployment policy priority in France,
where employers and employees
alike wish to increase their commit-
ment. However, greater commitment
presupposes a choice on the part of
UNEDIC to refrain from lowering
the contributions payable by em-
ployers and employees. Currently,
there is debate as to whether an
across-the-board reduction in the na-
tional insurance contributions paid
by employers and employees, which
raise the cost of labour and thus ad-
versely affect employment, might
not also be effective in some degree.
UNEDIC officials therefore re-
main guarded on whether unemploy-
ment expenditure should be made
even more active. For example, the
agreement signed on 19 December
7996 on the system of unemploy-
ment benefit made no changes to ac-
tivation policy, but increased benefit
from FRF 2,085 to FRF 3,100 and re-
duced the contributions of both em-
ployers and employees.
Alongside this, comparative con-
sideration of the interventionist phi-
losophies of central government and
UNEDIC and the schemes imple-
mented have led some elected repre-
sentatives to raise questions as to the
best way of arriving at a new rela-
tionship between these two major
players, with the goal of a more ra-
tional, clearer and more effective
employment policy.
To avoid the overlapping of differ-
ent schemes typical of employment
policy in France, there is a need for
better policy coordination and more
effective role allocation for the two
players. Most notably, it has been
suggested that UNEDIC should be
made responsible for managing all
early retirement schemes.
Greater coordination of employ-
ment policy is currently seen as being
particularly desirable, since the ef-
fectiveness of that policy is currently
a subject of some debate. The Com-
mission of Inquiry into employment
assistance schemes (cf. Commission
of Inquiry 1996) set up by the As-
semblde Nationale concluded that
they were not of any great efficacy in
stemming the growth of unemploy-
ment in Frances.
The Commission of Inquiry put
forward, on the basis of its findings,
four possible options for the future:
simplification of schemes and stake-
holders, a refocusing of support
through closer targeting of recipi-
ents, making benefit payments more
active, and redirecting employment
support to encourage initiative.
Sandine Gineste
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5 "As it does every year, in 1-995 DARES esti-
mated the impact on unemployment of the
entire range of measures specifically includ-
ed in the category of employment support.
The number of 27,000 people who would
otfierwise have been unemployed is less than
in previous years. Support for employment
creation in the market sector has, however,
been a driving force in reducing unemploy-
ment, reducing the potential nrmber of un-
employed by some 77,000. However, cut-
backs in training progftunmes, re-employ-
ment schemes and, above all, early retire-
ment, reflecting the downward trend in re-
dundancies, automatically lead to a negative
impact on unemployment levels."
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Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in lreland
Overall expenditure on the totality
of all of the measures listed in Table
1 (both passive and active) amounted
to IEP 1,715 billion in !995, which
was equivalent to 4.44% of GDP.
The largest of the individual catego-
ries in terms of expenditure was un-
employment compensation, which
accounted for 2.55% of GDP in
L995. lf this is combined with ex-
penditure on measures related to
early retirement, the figures indicate
that the outlay on "passive" meas-
ures as a whole accounted for over
2.7% of. GDP. This leaves a balance
of almost 7.75% of GDP expended
on the other "active" measures indi-
cated.
Among the different active meas-
ures listed, the largest in terms of ex-
penditure in L995 was direct em-
ployment creation (public or non-
profit), which accounted for over
0.7% of GDP. The broad area of
training, covering both adult training
and measures for youth, accounted
for about a further 0.5% of domestic
output, followed by labour market
administration with a proportion of
nearly 0.28%. Schemes involving
subsidised work in the private sector
were also of significance, for which
the related GDP proportion was just
under 0.78%.
Changing patterns in labour
market expenditures
Table 1 shows that the public outlay
on passive activities declined be-
tween 799'J, and 1995, from 2.88 to
2.70% of GDP, while overall ex-
penditure on active prograrnmes rose
from just over 1.3 to L.75%o. The
former reduction arose mainly as a
result of the fall in unemployment
which occurred during this period.
The increase in expendifure on ac-
tive measures can be attributed to
categories covering direct employ-
ment creation and private-sector em-
ployment subsidies. Expenditure for
the former category increased three-
fold from 0.24% of GDP to over
0.7Yo. The relative expenditures on
employment subsidies, even though
smaller, rose at a similar pace from
0.06 to 0.78o/o of GDP. In contrast,
expenditure on training (both for
adults and youths) declined some-
what relative to GDP between 1991
and7995, as did expenditure on vo-
cational rehabilitation for the disa-
bled, which decreased markedly,
from 0.15 to 0.09% of GDP.
Activation
Returning to the question of activa-
tion, in Ireland compulsion or sanc-
tions are not normally used to "acti-
vate" measures by effecting the trans-
fer of persons from the unemploy-
ment register to other manpower pro-
grammes. Such transfers are invaria-
bly voluntary, although there may be
financial incentives, such as training
allowances set at a higher level than
unemployment compensation.
The system of unemployment
compensation does, of course, in-
volve legal sanctions. The basic sys-
tem, as in most other EU countries,
involves two elements 
- 
insurance-
based Unemployment Benefit (UB)
and a means-tested system of Unem-
ployment Assistance (UA), which is
funded out of general taxation. UB
lasts for up to fifteen months for
those aged between 18 and 66 years
and for up to six months for persons
aged less than 18 years. To qualify
one must, in terms of the regulations,
be unemployed, capable of, available
for and actively seeking work, and
satisfy the Social Insurance contribu-
tion conditions. The latter stipulate
that one must have paid SI contribu-
tions for 39 weeks to establish initial
entitlement, and must have either
paid or have had credited 39 weeks'
contributions in the last complete tax
year (April-March) before the calen-
dar year in which one is claiming. If
benefit is exhausted, it is re-estab-
lished by working and paying contri-
butions for a further 13 weeks.
Persons who do not qualify for UB,
or have exhausted their entitlement
to same, may receive Unemployment
Assistance (UA), for which the bene-
fits are somewhat less than those for
UB. The job-search and other condi-
tions under which UA may be ob-
tained are similar to those which ap-
ply for UB. The UA means test applies
to anyincome which the individual or
spouse/partner has, and takes assets
into account, except the family home.
Both the basic UA payments and al-
lowances for dependants are subject
to means-related limits. UA is paya-
ble for as long as the individual satis-
fies the necessary conditions.
In addition to UA, there are a
number of other support systems
which fall under the general heading
of "social assistance". These include
both general purpose supports (Sup-
plementary Welfare Allowances)
and others which are specific to cer-
tain groups, such as single parents or
carers. None of these can be regard-
ed as falling within the scope of la-
bour market measures.
One recent development in Ire-
land which is of relevance to the acti-
vation issue concerns the application
of the regulations governing the re-
ceipt of unemployment compensa-
tion. This goes back to controversies
related to abuses of the system fol-
lowing the publication of a Central
Statistics Office (7996) report which
revealed that over L0% of those on
the unemplolmrent register were in
full-time employment. Arising from
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Table 1: Public Expenditure on Active and Passive Labour Market Programmes (in milliea IEP and as percentage
of GDP)
7997
in million
IEP
in%
of GDP
7995
in million
IEP
in%
of GDP
7.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Administration (including the Employment Service)
Labour market training
of which:
(a) training for unemployed adults
(b) training for employed adults
Youth measures
of which:
(a) measures for unemployed and disadvantaged youth
(b) support for apprenticeships and related forms of
general youth training
Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector
Support for unemployed persons starting enterprises
Direct employment creation (public or non-profit)
Vocational rehabilitation for the disabled
86.3
69.7
47.3
27.8
83.4
35.0
48.4
76.7
4.5
68.9
47.2
0.305
0.244
0.146
0.098
0.295
0.724
0.L77
0.059
0.015
0.244
0.\46
108.0
86.9
62.2
24.7
98.0
42.8
55.2
67.9
6.0
270.6
35.0
0.280
0.225
0.L67
0.064
0.254
0.111
0.L43
0.L76
0.015
0.707
0.091
Active labour market programmes, total 370.7 1.309 672.40 1.742
8. Unemploymentcompensation
9. Earlv retirement for labour market purposes
789.6
27.0
2.789
0.096
985.7
57.3
2.553
0.1.48
Passive labour market programmes, total 816.6 2.885 7,043.0 2.707
Total (active and passive labour market programmes) 1,186.8 4.794 7,7L5.2 4.443
GDP 28,309.5 38,616.0
Source: Department of Enterprise and Employment. Dublin.
this, the Government initiated proce-
dures to rectify the position, which
would appear to have resulted in
sizeable numbers quitting the regis-
ter. In the yearto February L997,the
unemployment register fell by
23,000 (a drop of 8%), an outcome
which has been widely accepted as
being attributable to the more strin-
gent application of the regulations
rather than to the buoyant state of
the economyl.
Another relevant development
concerns the numbers receiving un-
employment compensation and in-
volved in part-time work. Until rela-
tively recently this was not a signifi-
cant phenomelron, but the number
has now risen to nearly 30,000, or
over 70Yo of those on the unemploy-
ment register. Financial reductions to
benefit are applied pro rata on the
basis of the number of days worked
in the week.
Labour Market Measures
and Activation
Many labour market programmes in-
volve "activatiod" to some degree,
and it is clearly not possible to de-
scribe or assess all of these activities.
Let us therefore consider in more de-
tail those active labour market pro-
grammes which have increased sub-
stantially in size in recent years and
try to assess the extent to which
these measures can be regarded as
promoting "activation". This text
gives an insight into recent changes
in labour market policy with an em-
phasis on activation rather than pre-
senting a complete description of all
activation measures.
Turning first to the category of di-
rect employment creation, virtually
all of the expansion recorded in Ta-
ble 1 relates to the Community Em-
ployment programme operated by
FAS, the National Employment and
Training Authority. Between 1991
andL995, expenditure on this meas-
ure rose from IEP 69 million to IEP
271- million and the annual inflow of
participants (participant starts) rose
from 17,000 to 55,000. The scheme,
which involves the provision of part-
time work and a training module
over a 12-month period, is restricted
to persons who have been in receipt
of UB, UA or Lone Parents Allow-
ance for at least a year; these condi-
tions are somewhat less restrictive
for disabled persons and members of
the Travelling Community. If the ap-
plicant is 35 years or over and has
been in receipt of these allowances
for at least three years, then the em-
ployment duration can be extended
to up to three years. The projects are
usually carried out by public agen-
cies or non-profit organisations (such
as community groups) and generally
relate to areas such as the environ-
ment, community advice and sup-
port, community recreation, tourism,
health and social services. The par-
ticipants are allowed to hold other
part-time jobs, in fact they are en-
couraged to seek such employment.
The amounts paid to participants on
an equivalent daily basis are normal-
ly greater than the payments they
would receive as unemployment
compensation: they can also retain
1 Prior to this, even though economic condi-
tions were broadly comparable, the num-
bers on the register were rising, while the
unemployment estimates derived from the
Labour Force Survey were falling.
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their secondary benefits (such as
medical entitlements) during their in-
volvement in the scheme. This meas-
ure evolved from a previous one, the
Social Employment Scheme (SES),
which did not involve training and
did not allow participants to retain
their secondary benefits.
The scheme can be broadly re-
garded as fulfilling the "activation"
requirement in the sense that the
great majority of the participants
were previously on the unemploy-
ment register and were induced to
leave it by participating in the meas-
ure. This does not apply in quite the
same way to persons who were pre-
viously in receipt of Disablement Al-
lowances or Lone Parent Allowanc-
es. However, in these circumstances
participation does represent a differ-
ent, but still desirable, form of acti-
vation in the sense that persons re-
ceiving these supports were induced
to relinquish involvement in a more
passive state of dependency outside
of the labour force and transfer to an
active prograrnme.
With regard to private-sector em-
ployment subsidies, a significant de-
velopment underlying the expansion
in this area has been the introduction
in 7993 of the Back-to-Work Allow-
ance (BTW) operated by the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare. This measure
involves the retention, following re-
employment, of a decreasing propor-
tion of benefit by a person who was
previously on UB, UA or Lone Par-
ents Allowance for at least a year.
Participants, who must must satisfy a
means test and be aged 23 years or
over, can retan 75Yo of benefit in
the first year of employment,50"/o in
the second year and 25%" in the
third. They can also retain their sec-
ondary benefits. Public expenditure
on this measure was in excess of tEP
25 million in 1995;the related inflow
of participants in that year was about
L0,000.
There were other employment
subsidy-type measures for which sig-
nificant increases are recorded in the
799L-L995 period. However, not all
of these can be regarded as fulfilling
the "activation" requirement as stip-
ulated. For example, employment
grants paid to development agencies2,
which accounted for some IEP 16 mil-
lion of the overall increase of IEP 51
million in expenditure on employ-
ment subsidies between L99L and
1995, are not necessarily required to
relate to persons who were previous-
ly unemployed and the schemes do
not, therefore, promote "activation"
in the sense used in this Report.
Finally, in the context of employ-
ment subsidies, it is worth referring
briefly to two very recent develop-
ments. In 7996, FAS initiated the
JOBSTART scheme, targeted at those
unemployed for a very long time. This
measure involves the payment of a
weekly subsidy (IEP 80) to private
employers who engage persons who
have been on the unemployment reg-
ister or in receipt of Lone Parents Al-
lowance for at least three years. Mem-
bers of the Travelling Community
and disabled persons recommended
by the National Rehabilitation Board
(NRB) are also eligible.
A second relevant measure is
WORKPLACE, again initiated by
FAS in L996.ltinvolves the arrange-
ment of spells of employment (up to
five weeks) for persons who have
been receiving unemployment pay-
ments or Lone Parents Allowance for
at least six months. During this peri-
od the participants retain their unem-
ployment benefits. There are few ad-
ministrative formalities for the em-
ployer, who is not obliged to provide
a guarantee of continued employ-
ment beyond the original spell of
work. However, it is hoped that a
reasonable proportion of participants
will be so retained, and even if they
are not, it is expected that the experi-
ence should be beneficial in obtain-
ing other employment.
In relation to training activities,
even though public expenditure in
this area (when taken as a proportion
of GDP) declined slightly over the
period L99Lto 1995, there were ele-
ments within it which can be deemed
to involve "activation" and which
did undergo significant expansion.
The most notable of these is the
Vocational Training Opportunities
Scheme (VTOS), for which expendi-
ture increased from less than IEP 4
million in 1997 to over IEP 25 mil-
Iion in 1995 (the number of partici-
pants rose from less than 700 to near-
ly 3,500). The Scheme, which is run
by the Department of Education, is
primarily targeted at persons who
have been on the unemployment
register for at least a yeff and who
are over 25 years of age, although it
does include some younger persons.
Many of the participants sit for Sec-
ond-Level School Certificates (or
parts thereofl.The duration tends to
be between six months and a year,
but it can be longer, depending on
the individual objective involved.
One might summarise recent de-
velopments in regard to activation
by describing them as principally di-
rected at countering long-term un-
employment, either through induce-
ments to employers to recruit the
LTU or by attempting to enhance the
capabilities of long-term unem-
ployed persons through either train-
ing or work experience. The fact that
the most recent measures have tend-
ed to be targeted at the very long-
term unemployed is indicative of just
how intractable this problem has
proved to be. This applies especially
in Irish labour market circumstances
where the potential for labour force
growth is substantial and where, pri-
or to the recent employment growth,
oversupply was a serious problem
and could become so again in the
event of a downturn in the economy.
In these circumstances the LTU, who
are mainly in the older age groups,
tend to get pushed further down the
queue of jobseekers, as employers
tend to prefer persons with more ad-
vantageous employment profiles, or
younger persons with higher levels
of educational attainment.
2 These grants are given in respect of new
jobs created through new overseas invest-
ment in manufacturing and internationally
traded services or through expansion in in-
digenous manufacfu ring services.
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Evaluations
It is not possible to present substan-
tive results of evaluations in the con-
text of activation procedures because
few have been carried out. However,
an evaluation3 of the BTW with the
activation aspdct in mind was con-
ducted in 1995, summary results of
which were presented at the MISEP
meeting in Dublin on 3 and 4 Octo-
ber 1996. These results indicate that
some two-thirds of participants were
in self-employment with the remain-
der as paid employees, an outcome
that had not been foreseen. Even
though the evaluation did not cover
the full period over which (diminish-
ing) benefits continued to be paid,
the results indicated that 90% of the
self-employed and some 66% of em-
ployees had survived to the b"g-
ning of the third year. It was estimat-
ed that 40% of. employees and about
50% of. persons in self-employed ac-
tivities would be in sustainable em-
ployment at the end of the pro-
grarnme.
More broadly based evaluations
of other active labour market pro-
grarnmes have been conducted in
Ireland, however, and it is appropri-
ate to comment on some of these.
A substantive evaluation covering
a range of different programmes was
carried out by Sexton and O'Connell
(1-995) on behalf of the EU Commis-
sion (DGV) and the Department of
Enterprise and Employment. This
study involved analysing the post-
programme perforrnance of a sample
of over 3,200 participants who exit-
ed from nineteen different training
and employment schemes between
April and JdyL992.The results indi-
cated significant variations between
the schemes involved. Programmes
with more direct links to the labour
market, such as skill training, pri-
vate-sector employment subsidies
paid to employers and aids to enter
self-employment, yielded more posi-
tive results in terms of the likelihood
of obtaining a job than employment-
creation schemes or prograrnmes tar-
geted specifically at the long-term
unemployed. For example, over
60% of. persons who attended skill-
training courses were in employment
18 months after the termination of
the scheme; in contrast, the corre-
sponding proportion for programmes
targeted on the long-term unem-
ployed, whether these were in the
form of sponsored employment or
training, was as low as 20% or less,
although an additional30% of these
clients were engaged in further train-
ing or education activities. An evalu-
ation of the WOS measure for the
long-term unemployed was carried
out for the Department of Education
in1994 (cf. WRC Consultants L994),
the results of which were broadly
simils to those indicated above,
even though this evaluation placed
considerable emphasis on clients
transferring to further education and
training as criteria in assessing the
success of programmes.
These results must, however, be
regarded as somewhat crude in the
sense that they do not take account
of relevant aspects such as variations
in the characteristics of participants
in different schemes, deadweight (i.e.
what would have happened to partic-
ipants in the absence of the various
supports) and issues such as selection
bias (whether the schemes attracted
better-motivated clients). Further
studies carried out in the wake of the
above-mentioned survey have in-
cluded provisions designed to take
such considerations into account.
While these latter analyses could not
be carried out for individual meas-
ures, they did involve broad classifi-
cations by programme type. Thus, a
recent paper by O'Connell and
McGinnity (7996), which took ac-
count of aspects such as those re-
ferred to, analysed the post-pro-
gramme performance of young peo-
ple aged less than 23 years and reaf-
firmed the finding that programmes
with strong linkages to the labour
market (such as skill training and em-
ployment subsidies) were more suc-
cessful in raising the job prospects of
participants and increasing their
earnings potential over the longer
term.
lerry Sexton
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Italy
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in ltaly
According to OECD data, among Eu-
ropean countries Italy has the lowest
level of expenditure on labour mar-
ket programmes (1,.8% of GDP,
compared to a European average of
2.9% in!992t). Active measures, on
the other hand, have a weight only a
little lower than the European aver-
age (0.90% of GDP, compared with
7.08y,).
Income-support measures repre-
sented only 0.87% of GDP in L992,
compared to the European average
of.1.85%. This is due mainly to the
fact that the level of ordinary unem-
ployment benefit is very low and a
relatively low percentage of the
working population has the right to
income support during unemploy-
ment spells (only 20% of the unem-
ployed, compared with an average of
40% in the European Union, accord-
ing to Eurostat Labour Force data).
Passive measures are character-
ised by the large number of benefits
available and the very different
treatment accorded to workers of
different categories (see Table 1)2.
Income support does not depend on
the labour market position of unem-
ployed workers, but on the charac-
teristics of the job lost (sector, size of
firms, type of employment relation)
and on the modality of job loss (ei-
ther collective or individual dismiss-
als). Workers coming from medium-
sized or large industrial and commer-
cial firms3 and dismissed temporarily
or permanently due to restructuring
or crisis, and building-sector workers
are the most favoured by the Italian
system, while workers in small firms
and in most service firms are eligible
only for the much less generous ordi-
nary unemployment benefits. Those
with no prior employment experi-
ence and the self-employed are not
eligible for any benefit at all. Moreo-
ver, Italian measures favour workers
at risk of losing their jobs with vari-
ous generous measures (CIG 
- 
Cassa
integrazione guadagni [short-time
work scheme, either regular CIGO
or special CIGS, early retirement
schemes, solidarity contracts]), rath-
er than all those who have lost their
job.
More recent data derived from dif-
ferent national sources (Labour Min-
istry, INPS, Istat and Budget Minis-
try) and presented by a Technical
Commission on the Reform of the
Welfare State in Italy (the Onofri
Commission) show that income-sup-
port measures in 1995 accounted for
about 0.94% of GDP (see Table 2b,
p.4s).
Intervention in the area of active
policies is scarce and often ineffec-
tive, due in part to the absence of a
clear definition of roles for the differ-
ent institutions involved in labour
market policies. Active measures are
centred around recruitment subsidies
through the reduction of social secu-
rity contributions, measures for the
young (vocational training and work-
training contracts, support for busi-
ness start-ups) and, since 1991, tem-
porary work schemes for the long-
term unemployed. There is very little
use of active policies aimed at helping
the unemployed to find a new job in
the private sector. Job-creation
measures and placement seryices are
virtually non-existent due to the inef-
fectiveness of public employment
services and the legal prohibition of
private agencies. The main active
measures (placement services, hiring
subsidies for the young, vocational
training and temporary work
schemes) accounted for only 0.39%
of GDP (see Table 2a ,p.45); if gener-
al hiring subsidies in Southern Italy
are included, this percentage goes up
to 1.08% of GDPa.
The Activation of Passive
Policies
Total public expenditure for income-
support measures as a percentage of
GDP declined in the last recession
relative to the previous one. This is
due to an increase in the contribution
from the private sector (for CIGO
and ordinary unemployment bene-
fits) and a lower use of the most gen-
erous assistance measures. While in
the 1980s CIGS and early retirement
schemes accounted for up to 70Y" of.
total income-support expenditures,
since 1991 the incidence of insurance
benefits has increased to 50%. Dif-
ferences in income support during
unemployment have also been re-
duced since 1991 by the stricter regu-
lations governing CIG, the gradual
extension of CIG and mobility proce-
dures (i.e. the "mobility lists" intro-
duced to "activate" those on CIG) to
service sectors, and the increase in
the level of ordinary unemployment
benefits.
In addition, in the 1990s, the atten-
tion given to active policies for the
unemployed has increased. Especial-
ly at the local level, regional employ-
ment agencies and local institutions
have developed employment servic-
L 1992 is the last year for which data are
available for Italy in the OECD statistics.
2 For this reason the Italian position in inter-
national comparisons depends largely on
which benefit is considered. Average bene-
fit indicators are also misleading due to the
major differences in benefit levels and dura-
tion among different segments of the labour
force.
3 Large commercial firms were included only
in 7997. During the 7992-94 recession, ben-
efits were temporarily extended to workers
in some other service sectors and to com-
mercial firms with at least 50 employees. A
detailed description of income-support
measures in Italy, and their evolution in the
1980s, may be found in Franco (1993),
Tronti (1990) and De Luca & Bruni (1993).
4 Since 7996, the importance of these incen-
tives has been declining due to EU opposi-
tion.
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es for those on CIG or on the mobility
list. Government has promoted this
trend by legislation that favours the
diffusion of temporary jobs aimed at
providing a temporary placement to
those whose benefit is expiring. With
the reform of the CIG in 1991, some
measures of "activation" to help
those on the CIGS and the mobility
lists have been introduced, but are lit-
tle used. The unemployment benefit
may be used as a "re-employment
bonus" if the unemployed person
starts a new job before benefit expi-
ry. In addition, the benefit may be
used as a start-up sum by those choos-
ing self-employment or as a wage-
cost subsidy for firms that employ
workers from the mobility lists. Peo-
ple on mobility benefits who accept
part-time or fixed-term jobs are tem-
porarily suspended from mobility al-
lowances but are re-eligible on the
termination of their contract.
The tripartite agreements of.1992
and7993, besides dealing with wage-
bargaining issues, represented an im-
portant step in providing a reference
model for the development and the
realisation of reforms in the area of
labour and welfare policies. This
agreement called for efforts to acti-
vate new labour market instruments,
a generally more effective operation
of the labour market as well as a new
approach to action in the disadvan-
taged and crisis areas (Temitorial
Pacts 
- 
P atti Territoiali).
Not many improvements have
been achieved in the area of active
labour market policies, however:
employment services are still under-
developed; training and retraining
activities suffer from institutional
confusion, with no clear definition of
roles and competences among the
different institutions involved; terri-
torial pacts are still to be implement-
ed. The programmes most frequently
used are recruitment subsidies, tem-
porary work schemes and incentives
to self-employment, programmes
which are usually not carefully de-
signed and often involve large dis-
placement effdcts (Gui 1994). The
absence of monitoring and evalua-
tion makes it difficult to determine
the measures that are most effective
for the Italian labour market and to
refine current intervention.
There is, moreover, a regional du-
alism in the effectiveness of labour
market policies. While active labour
market policies are more effective in
the most developed areas (Centre-
North), passive measures predomi-
nate in less developed Southern Ita-
ly. However, since the most gener-
ous schemes are related to past earn-
ings, it is the North that receives the
highest levels of average per capita
assistance (De Luca & Bruni L993).
The less efficient functioning of local
institutions in Southern regions hin-
ders the potential effectiveness of ac-
tive policies. Works-sharing pro-
grarnmes are less frequently used in
the South because of the low levels
of family income (CLES 7995).
Employment services
The management of the Italian pub-
lic employment service is character-
ised by a highly centralised and for-
mal organisation, with little involve-
ment of the social partners at the lo-
cal level. This bureaucratic manage-
ment is more concerned with apply-
ing formal procedures than with sup-
plying effective services. Further-
more, there are often conflicts over
competences between the different
administration levels (central, re-
gional and local), which cause long
delays and inefficiencies. For all the
above-mentioned reasons, the place-
ment market share of the public em-
ployment service is not more than
L0-L5%. The failure of these servic-
es is also due to the very limited cen-
tral resources available. Public ex-
penditure on placement and voca-
tional services represents only 0.L%
of GDP (Eurostat 1994), and public
spending on the placement of unem-
ployed workers represented only
0.02% of GDP in 7994 (OECD
L995). According to Ministry of La-
bour data, in199690% of. public ex-
penditure on the public employment
service was used to pay the wages
and salaries of the people employed
by these services.
In recent years, many different lo-
cal initiatives have developed (above
all in the North and Centre of Italy),
often supported by local administra-
tions and/or the social partners, with
the aim of developing a well-func-
tioning placement and vocational
counselling service. It is not possible,
however, to measure the dimension
of the diffusion (and the results) of
local prograrnmes, due to the lack of
data and of monitoring and evalua-
tion systems.
Vocational training
Italy invests very few resources in
training, and only L2% of the popu-
lation over 15 years old is involved
in training activities. In 1995, esti-
mated spending in this area account-
ed for 0.L5% of GDP; EU funds ac-
count for about 55% of regional
spending on vocational training
measures. The inefficiency of the sys-
tem of vocational training in Italy is
also shown by the large difference
between "planned" and "actually
used" financial resources: in particu-
lar, Italian regions are not able to use
all the European funds earmarked
for Italy (ISFOL 1996). For example,
according to the Ministry of Labour,
between L994 and 1996 Italian Re-
gions spent only 42% of the "en-
gaged" European funds (this corre-
sponds to L7o/" of the "planned" re-
sources).
The Italian vocational training sys-
tem is mainly targeted at those who
have dropped out ofcompulsory edu-
cation. For this reason, it consists
mainly of initial or basic training ori-
ented largely towards young people.
Few resources are geared towards
adults, especially if they are already
employed, or towards lifelong train-
ing.
Furthermore, vocational training is
the responsibility of the Regions,
while employment services are pro-
vided by the Labour Ministry. The
lack of coordination and mutual in-
formation between regional adminis-
trations and local employment servic-
es has often meant that training pro-
grammes are not linked to the needs
No.28.Sumnrer 1997 41,
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Measures for the Unemployed: Non-agricultural Sector
Contribution from
firrns and workers
(in percentage of
gross eamings)
Number of Expenditure Contri-
workers in ltr:,1994' bution/
7994 (billions of Expendi-
mL) ture (%)
Temporary lay-offs
Workers temporarily laid
off by industrial and con-
struction firms
80% of last wage for
first 6 months
12 months;24 months
in EU Obj. l and Obj.2
areas
Ordinary contribution:
2.20% for firms with
more than 50 employees;
1.907" for smaller firms;
additional contribution of
8 and 4Y" respectively in
case of use. Construction
fi rms: ordinary contribu-
tion 5.2"/", additional 5 %
69,267" L,717
Special Wage-com-
pensation Fund (CIGS)
CIG Straordinaia
Workers laid off by indus-
trial firms with more than
15 workers and by com-
mercial firms with more
than 200 workers, due to
restrucfu ring, reorganisa-
tion or crisis
80"/" of last wage up to
a maximum of ITL 1.5
million in 1995
24 months; renewable
twice for 12 months in
cases of restructuring or
reorganisation; once in
cases of crisis
Ordinary contribution: 775,2t5"
0.6"/" fuom the firm,
0.3% from the worker.
Additional contribution:
4.5% for firms with
more than 50 employees
and.3Y" for smaller firms.
This contribution doubles
after 24 months of CIGS
Workers in industrial firms
and in some service firms
with at least 50 employ-
ees until Dec. 1995. It
must be used to prevent
lay-offs
75"/" olwage loss due to
reduction of working time
up to 1995. Then 50% in
Northem Italy, 60"/" n
the South
24 months, renewable
for another 24 months in
the North and 36 months
in the South
Part-time and early Older workers in firms Transformation of full- No time limits. Benefits None n.a. n.a. 0
retirement that are eligible for CIGS time into part-time and end when worker goes
retirement benefits to back to full time or is
compensate dismissed
Collective dismissals
Redundant workers either
dismissed from induskial
firms with more than 15
employees or from com-
mercial firrrs with more
than 200 employees,
or coming from CIGS.
In 1993-95 mobility
benefits were temporar-
ily extended to otler ser-
vice sectors
Workers dismissed by
construction firms
80% of last wage up to
to a max. of ITL 1-.5 mil-
lion in the first 12 months.
80% of CIGS benefits
from 13th month
12 months, renewable
once for workers over 40
years; twice for workers
over 50 at a level2o"/"
lower
Ordinary contribution:
0.37" of total wages.
Additional contribution:
6 times the monthly
benefit paid to each
worker. In case of collec-
tive agreements, this sum
is halved. If no use of
CIGS, it goes up to 9
monthly instalments
Ordinary contribution
from firm: 0.8Y" of.
wages corresponding
to insured workers
80% of last wage, maxi-
mum: ITL L,122,0O0
From 3 to 18 months.
Up to 27 months in the
South
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of local labour demand and other la-
bour policies. In the long run, this has
generated a waste of resources.
In order to overcome the lack of
coordination between training poli-
cies and labour demand, since 1993
new schemes have been developed
that offer young people and unem-
ployed involved in training courses
the possibility of work experience of
a few months (usually four) in local
firms (tirocinio). T\e usual delays in
the practical definition of such
schemes have, up to now, con-
strained their development and they
are still in an experimental phase.
Work-training contracts for
young people
Employers who temporarily hire
people aged under 32 (in the case of
work-training contracts, contratti di
formazione e laaoro - CFL) or under
24 (in the case of apprenticeships)
are entitled to reductions in social se-
curity contributions which differ ac-
cording to the location, the sector of
economic activity and the type of
contract involved. The aim is to im-
prove the professional skills of young
people. These contracts should in-
clude both practical work ("learning
by doing") and formal training, the
amount of which may vary with the
type of contract. Subsidies have been
reduced in the 1990s.
Monitoring and evaluation re-
search has shown that CFL have low-
ered the age of entry into employ-
ment, the effect has been greater for
men than for women and was also
greater in the early years of imple-
mentation, the mid-1980s.
These contracts have many short-
comings. Monitoring shows a very
small incidence of real vocational
training: employers hire young peo-
ple under this kind of contract to save
money and to meet temporary
changes in demand rather than to
contribute to their professional train-
ing @ulgarelli-Giovine 1988; Scan-
dizzo 1997). Secondly, the lack of a
clear targeting besides age (which has
been increasedto 32 years) increases
the probability of deadweight and
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substitution effects. In fact, recent
monitoring of CFL shows a pro-cycli-
cal pattern, with sharp declines dur-
ing downturns and a greater use of
such contracts in the low unemploy-
ment regions of the North. The re-
strictions in the use of these contracts
have also reduced the number of
low-skilled young people hired under
such contracts (-33% between 1987
and 1-995) and increased that of high-
ly educated people (young people
with university degrees have in-
creased by 77%) (ISFOL L996).
Thirdly, the lack of an official certifi-
cation of the training received is not
conducive to take-up. Finally, the
two schemes for young people com-
pete with each other: since the intro-
duction of CFL, the use of appren-
ticeship contracts has declined.
Temporary jobs schemes
(lavori socialmente utili 
- 
LSU)
LSU are one of the main instruments
of active labour policy used by the
Italian government in recent years.
Under these schemes, workers on
CIGS, those on mobility lists and the
long-term unemployed may be em-
ployed for up to two years in social
works by public administrations,
public enterprises or other institu-
tions authorised by the Ministry of
Labour. Workers who refuse to par-
ticipate without justification risk los-
ing their benefits for the duration of
the project. In fact, up to now, these
measures have been organised on a
voluntary basis and are not used to
test for benefit abuse. It is no coinci-
dence that these measures have
failed in Northern Italy, where many
unemployed workers find an occu-
pation in the black economy and
wait for the end of the subsidy be-
fore regularising their position. On
the other hand, in Southern Italy
they are used as a way to extend in-
come support for the long-term un-
employed and risk creating a pres-
sure for permanent jobs in the public
sector.
Non-official estimates by the Min-
istry of Labour show that in L996
about ITL 1-,170 billions were spent
on these kind of jobs (equivalent to
0.06% of GDP). The new "Labour
Agreement" signed by the govern-
ment, the unions and employers' as-
sociations in September 7996 estab-
lishes that another ITL 1,000 billion
will be used to sustain socially useful
projects. During 1995, 65,570 unem-
ployed were involved in such
schemes. Most schemes were in fact
largely passive measures with little
training content.
Support for business start-
ups
The most important measure at na-
tional level is the promotion of busi-
ness start-ups by young people in de-
pressed areas. In Italy, this policy is
considered one of the most innova-
tive and efficient measures for the
development and the employment
growth of Southern Italy. In fact, this
policy, activated in 1986 only for
Southern Italy, has since then been
re-financed and in 1994 extended to
other depressed areas of the Centre
and North (Objective 2 and 5b areas
of the European Social Fund). In the
absence of an impact evaluation
study, it is difficult to assess the net
impact of such a policy. Monitoring
data on enterprises created and their
survival rates show, however, good
performances, even if the cost per
person employed is rather high.
This success has been followed at
the local level by many Italian Re-
gions.
The Current Debate
The characteristics of "social shock
absorbers" in the form of employ-
ment-maintenance schemes in Italy,
together with the rigidity of hiring
and firing regulations and constraints
on employment contracts, have led
to major distortions in the Italian la-
bour market. The Italian literature
(see selected bibliography) has ex-
tensively discussed the effects of the
unemployment compensation sys-
tem, with special attention given to
the CIG scheme, on the Italian la-
bour market.
On the other hand, income-sup-
port measures during unemployment
have also had positive effects:
- 
Th"y reduced adjustment costs
during recessions and the costs of
industrial restructuring both for
the workers and for the firm.
Firms are able to keep their labour
force during downturns (labour
hoarding) and have access to high
working-time flexibility, without
bearing the full costs (either finan-
cial and"/or social) associated with
it. Up to the mid-1980s, such costs
were largely externalised to socie-
ty at large. According to some
authors (Giavazzi & Spaventa
L989), CIG and other income-sup-
port schemes have been a way to
transfer resources to profits; in this
way they have financed industrial
reorganisation and helped to im-
prove the long-term performance
of the Italian industrial sector.
- 
These measures have also greatly
helped to reduce industrial and so-
cial conflict, especially in South-
ern Italy, where income support
may last for many years (some-
times more than ten), and during
extended industrial restructuring
phases.
- 
They have encouraged the decen-
tralisation of collective bargaining
at firm level on more flexible
working time and working condi-
tions.
- 
The costs for public finances have
been lower than in other countries
due to the low degree of benefit
coverage (it must be noted, how-
ever, that there is no clear meas-
ure of the total costs of this sys-
tem).
On the negative side, the main costs
connected with the use of the CIGS,
mobility benefits and early retire-
ment schemes have been:
- 
"Freezing" employment and re-
ducing labour turnover (Tronti
1990). According to Tronti's esti-
mates, a 1 percentage point in-
crease in the number of hours cov-
ered by the CIG resulted, in the
L972-88 period, in a 0.75% slow-
down in industrial hiring. This
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worsened the segmentation of the
Italian labour market, discourag-
ing labour mobility for protected
workers and increasing the difficul-
ties in finding "secure jobs" for
workers with little or no work ex-
perience (in particular those in
search of a first job). In addition,
the lower risk of income loss has in-
creased the power of insider work-
ers in the highly unionised sectors
by reducing competition from un-
employed outsiders. This has in-
creased real wage rigidity.
- 
These measures have also contrib-
uted to the expansion of the black
economy: workers on CIG or on
mobility and early retirement
schemes have no interest in grving
up their generous benefits by find-
ing a regular job: it is more con-
venient and rational both for the
firm and the worker to work irreg-
ularly at least for the period dur-
ing which there is a right to a ben-
efit. This is also due to the ineffi-
cient system of control.
- 
The long duration of CIG and mo-
bility benefits has increased work-
ers' dependence on the subsidy
and thus promoted long-term un-
employment.
- 
The greater generosity of mobility
benefits Qinked to collective dis-
missals) in relation to unemploy-
ment benefits (linked to individual
dismissals), together with the low-
er costs and risks of collective dis-
missals in relation to individual
dismissals, has induced firms (in
agreement with trade unions) to
favour employment adjustment
patterns based on mass dismissals,
rather than individual adjust-
ments.
The debate on labour policies, unem-
ployment benefits and income-sup-
port measures shows a wide agree-
ment on the need for a rapid reform
of the entire Italian system. The in-
come agreement of July 1993 includ-
ed a provision on the necessity of
raising the level of ordinary benefits
to 40% of previous earnings and to
revise the entire income-support sys-
tem in order to extend insurance
benefits to areas not covered (e.g.
the service sector and small firms). In
addition, the stricter regulation of
CIG and other welfare benefits since
the early 1990s, in the presence of
reduced resources for the develop-
ment of Southern Regionss, is creat-
ing social conflict in the less devel-
oped areas of Southern Italy. Finally,
the privatisation of public-sector en-
terprises currently under way re-
quires the extension of unemploy-
ment benefits and policies to former
public-sector workers.
The aim, as in other countries, is to
design a system that adequately sup-
ports the unemployed, without, how-
ever, reducing the incentive to
search actively for a new job and to
accept existing employment oppor-
tunities. An additional element is the
need to restrain public expenditure.
The debate is, however, at an initial
stage, and it is not at all clear how the
system will be reformed, either
through minor adjushnents of exist-
ing measures, or by a more radical
reform. A major issue is, however,
the capacity of the public administra-
tive strucfure to become more effec-
tive and efficient in the management
of labour market policies.
The most recent proposals come
from a technical commission created
by the government (known as the
"Onofri Commission") to study the
Italian welfare system and put for-
ward reform proposals. As far as la-
bour market policies are concerned,
the Commission makes three main
demands:
1. Radically reduce the number of
benefits now available, extend the
insurance benefit to all those out of
work and introduce strong incentives
for active job search and skill acquisi-
tion:
A new three-level system is pro-
posed: an unemployment benefit to
insure against the risk of losing one's
job, an allowance for temporary lay-
off or reductions in working hours
and an assistance benefit for low-in-
come groups.
The benefits for workers who are
temporarily suspended should be en-
tirely financed by social security con-
tributions paid by employers and
workers and should represent, on av-
erage, 70% of. gross wages. The rate
of coverage should decrease over
time and the benefit should last no
longer than 72-78 months.
5 Development policies for Southem Italy
were radically revised in the early 1990s
due to tight budget constraints, EU direc-
tives on regional and industrial policies and
the changed attitude towards extraordinary
intervention in Southem Italy.
Table2a: Public Expenditure on Active Labour Policies (% of GDP)
Employment services 0.03
Vocational training
- 
national funds
- 
European funds
0.15
0.07
0.08
Work-training contracts (CFL) 0.07
Apprenticeship 0.07
Socially usetul jobs (LSU) 0.06
Total 0.39
Table 2b: Social Shock Absorbers (% of GDP)
Spending Contributions Total
7990
7997
7992
7993
7994
7995
0.63
0.65
0.7
0.8
0.77
0.6
0.27
0.23
0.33
0.36
0.35
0.34
0.84
0.88
1.03
1.76
7.72
0.94
Source: Onofri Commission (1997).
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The general unemployment bene-
fits for workers who have lost their
jobs should be financed mainly by
social security contributions and only
partly by taxes. Job-search require-
ments should be tightened: unem-
ployed people will be eligible only if
they participate in employment serv-
ice schemes and if they are prepared
to accept any other new job, even if
it is a fixed-terrn one.
With the rise of long-term unem-
ployment, a new measure ought to
be created for those whose insurance
benefit has expired and who are in
difficult conditions (assistance bene-
fit). This should reduce the improper
use of other instruments (invalidity
pensions, maternity leave, unem-
ployment benefits in the agricultural
sector, long mobility allowances,
etc.). Assistance benefits may be dif-
ferentiated according to personal and
family conditions and be linked to all
those active measures that increase
the employment probabilities of the
long-term unemployed.
Early retirement schemes should
be abolished, and part-time contracts
for older workers should be promot-
ed instead.
First-time jobseekers should be
supported by measures other than
unemplolmrent benefits. For exam-
ple, their employment opportunities
may be promoted by greater wage
flexibility and by active policies
linked to the vocational training and
education systems.
2. Improve the vocational training
system and reform work-training
contracts:
The reform should involve the fol-
lowing aspects:
- 
the improvement of post-college
training;
- 
the introduction of an effective
training period for young people
hired under particular contractual
forms (mainly the work-training
contract (CFL) and apprentice-
ship);
- 
the reform of temporary work
schemes (LSU): the benefit paid to
the unemployed adults involved
must really be used to train (or re-
train) them in order to promote
their re-employment as soon as
possible;
- 
the design of a continuous training
system for employed workers in
order to improve their skills and to
promote their professional mobili-
ty.
Firms must be actively involved in
the financing of training. ln addition,
the public funds currently used to un-
conditionally reduce social security
contributions should be converted
into a new system rewarding those
firms involved in training pro-
grammes. With regard to apprentice-
ship contracts, a recent government
proposal calls for a minimum com-
mitment to training by firms (140
hours/year).
3. Improve the effectiveness of la-
bour market intervention by creating
new employment services:
A prerequisite for improving the
effectiveness of labour market inter-
vention is a more efficient adminis-
tration and a transparent structure of
intervention, with a clear distinction
of roles and responsibilities among
the different institutions involved
and incentives for the coordination
of passive and active measures, the
diffusion of experiences in the area
of active policies and their monitor-
ing and evaluation.
The decentralisation of labour
market policies at the local level, the
integration between passive and ac-
tive measures and the possibility of
private and public coordination at
the local level may promote a greater
responsibility and efficacy in the use
of the available funds.
This issue is particularly important
in Italy, and the Commission stresses
the need to decentralise employment
services to the local level (regions
and provinces) and to integrate pas-
sive and active measures within the
new employment services, which
should supply an extended range of
services: information, training, coun-
selling and placement. The public
monopoly on placement should be
abolished.
One relevant aspect in this respect
is the revision of the tax-collection
mechanism: if local authorities (re-
gions) have competence in the man-
agement of labour policies, they
should also have a greater fiscal au-
tonomy (Geroldi 1995). Here, the
problem is how to define the areas of
local competence and the distributive
mechanism necessary in order not to
penalise less-developed regions.
The recent (March L997) parlia-
mentary approval of the decentrali-
sation of the Labour Ministry's pe-
ripheral placement offices and re-
gional employment agencies repre-
sents one important step in this direc-
tion, even if the more delicate issue
of the public monopoly on placement
is still under discussion.
Manuela Samek
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Luxembourg
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Luxembourg
According to the OECD methodolo-
gy, Luxembourg spends only 0.24%
of GDP on active labour market poli-
cy, while the European Union aver-
age is about 110%. However, Lux-
embourg also has the lowest unem-
ployment figure of all the Member
States. ln L996, just 5,300 persons
were registered unemployed, only
3% of the active population against
an average of alnost LL% for the
Union. There has also been uninter-
rupted employment growth, even
during the recession. Even so, unem-
ployment has risen in recent years. In
response, in 1995 the Luxembourg
government announced a "national
pact for employment", which is an
attempt to increase the efficiency of
the existing employment policy in-
struments.
Unlike in Belgium, where unem-
ployment benefit is nearly open-end-
ed, in Luxembourg benefit duration
is in principle limited to only 12
months. This period can only be ex-
tended for certain reasons (e.g. plus
six months for persons who are diffi-
cult to place). At the end of this peri-
od, persons who are still unemployed
receive assistance from the income-
guarantee scheme for an indefinite
period, subject to means-testing. Spe-
cial conditions apply to older work-
ers in respect of unemployment in-
surance and early retirement. The la-
bour market administration (ADEM)
is responsible for the public employ-
ment service in Luxembourg. It has a
monopoly on placement activities
and employers are obliged to declare
vacancies to the authorities. It offers
vocational guidance services and vo-
cational training. The ADEM is also
responsible for managing the unem-
ployment insurance fund, including
benefit payments and eligibility
checks.
In the next chapter we give a brief
overview of active labour market
policy measures. So far no major
evaluation of their impact has been
carried out.
Active Measures
Luxembourg has a series of measures
for activating unemployment. For
example, jobseekers are induced to
take up jobs which are more than 15
kilometres away from their home by
a mobility allowance. A measure for
vocational training within the enter-
prise combines an activation commit-
ment by an enterprise (by providing
an opportunity for on-the-job train-
ing) and an activation obligation on
young people registered at the Em-
ployment Office: those younger than
30 can undergo training alternating
between practical and theoretical
ScAndizzo, P. L. (ed.) (1997): Disoccupazione
meidionale eil "enterprise oeation" lSolth-
em unemployment and enterprise creation].
Venice: Marsilio.
Tronti, L. (1990): "Protezione dell'occupazio-
ne e segmentazione del mercato del lavoro: i
cinquant'anni della Cassa lntegrazione" Bm-
ployment Protection and Labour Market Seg-
mentation: Fifty Years of Cassa Integrazione
Guadagni]. ln: Economia e Laooro,no,3.
training for a maximum of L2
months. Unemployed persons claim-
ing full benefit keep their unemploy-
ment benefit during the training peri-
od. The employer pays 50% of this
benefit to the unemployment insur-
ance fund. The employer may pay a
supplementary bonus in accordance
with the capacities of the apprentice.
ln 1996,65 jobseekers undertook
such vocational training within the
enterprise.
There is also a wage-subsidy sys-
tem for employers hiring special cat-
egories of the unemployed. For the
recruitment of an unemployed per-
son aged 50 or over, the employment
fund covers the employer's social
insurance contributions for seven
years. There is also an exemption
from such contributions for the re-
cruitment of the very long-tenn un-
employed (two years for those up to
the age of 30 and three years up to
the age of 40).
Another measure combines pas-
sive transfer payments and income
from work. Unemployed persons can
be recruited by local authorities to
perform various activities. Those
performing these activities retain the
status of jobseeker and receive un-
employment benefit and an extra
monthly allowance of LFR 6,000.
The maximum duration of this activi-
ty is one year. In L996, abotst 200
jobseekers performed an activity in
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the public sector under this employ-
ment programme.
The Luxembourg government re-
cently tried to increase the efficiency
of placement services. To this end, a
series of decisions were taken:
- 
notification of every vacancy;
- 
reassessment of job-brokering and
placement activity;
- 
consolidation of structures needed
to accommodate people with la-
bour market difficulties;
- 
an information and publicity cam-
paign to promote the take-up of
existing measures.
ln addition, a pennanent employ-
ment committee was created in order
to ensure that the labour market is
properly monitored. It examines all
issues concerning labour and unem-
ployment and proposes adjustments
to the labour market where neces-
sary.
Recent Measures
Recent measures most clearly linked
to activation are:
- 
the capitalisation of unemploy-
ment benefits for enterprise crea-
tion;
- 
the employment guarantee for
school-leavers.
Benefit capitalisation for the
unemployed setting up their
own business
The capitalisation of unemployment
benefits for enterprise creation was
introduced in 1988 and enlarged in
7994 and 1995. After six months
(those over 40 after three months)
full benefit recipients can receive up
to six months of their remaining ben-
efit as start-up capital in order to es-
tablish a new business. Only 14 de-
mands were made and ll capitalised
benefits granted in 1995, however.
Measures facilitating the
recruitment of youth un-
employed
A second important measure in the
activation strategy is the employ-
ment guarantee for school-leavers
who are still unemployed three
months after having left school. They
are offered a temporary job by the
Employment Office. If they refuse
the job offer, they are excluded from
further unemployment benefit. This
measure involves an activation com-
mitment from the authorities and an
activation obligation on young peo-
ple. The measure differs somewhat in
the private and the public sector. In
the priaate sector, young unem-
ployed persons (aged less than 30)
can perform an apprenticeship in an
enterprise for up to one year. The
employee is hired under an employ-
ment contract and receives a wage of
85% of the minimum wage for un-
skilled work. The employer has to
draw up an apprenticeship pro-
gramme containing a brief descrip-
tion of the tasks and a training plan.
The employer's social contributions
on the wage of the apprentice are
paid by the employment fund. In
L996, L80 persons were hired as ap-
prentices.
h the public sector, jobseekers
aged less than 30 can be employed
under a fixed-term employment con-
tract for up to 18 months. They earn
a wage corresponding to the mini-
mum wage. The social contributions
for the employer are also paid by the
employment fund. In 1996, there
were about 600 temporary jobs for
youngsters available in the public
sector.
In addition, private-sector em-
ployers can be obliged to take on
young apprentices in such numbers
that they constitute 7%" of the work
force (in firms with more than 100
employees).
Conclusions
Part of the budget on active meas-
ures is dedicated to the young,
among whom the unemployment
rate is relatively high (7.4% in
L996). Unemployed persons recruit-
ed through such measures are usually
paid at a level roughly equal to the
minimum wage.
Unemployed persons refusing an
offer by the Employment Office
within the framework of the active
measure are excluded from further
unemployment benefit. As a conse-
quence, there is a growing element of
sanctions and workfare in Luxem-
bourg. However, in most of the
measures sanctions are subordinate
to incentives. Compulsory vacancy
notification, the public monopoly on
placement and other obligations
(such as theL% quotas for apprentic-
es) extend this "compulsion" ele-
ment to employers. As tripartism is
an important element in labour mar-
ket policy in Luxembourg, it can be
assumed that this policy linking
rights and duties is accepted by the
social partners.
The functioning of the public
placement services has improved:
rapid placement of unemployed in
vacant jobs is still the best way to ac-
tivate unemployed persoirs.
lan Denys & Liezten Denolf
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Netherlands
The Activation of Labour
Market Policies in the
Netherlands
During the 1990s, a major reorienta-
tion of the Dutch welfare state has
occurred. The main concerns behind
this reorientation have been similar
to those in other European countries.
Specific problems for the Netherlands
are a relatively low participation rate
and an extremely large number of dis-
ability pension recipients.
The scope of the reform was wide,
encompassing a policy for labour-in-
tensive growth, a more dynamic and
flexible labour market, introducing
so-called "activating elements" in
regulations, including social security
regulations, and a more "frugal" so-
cial security system itself. Related
trends in Dutch policies that also im-
pregnated labour market and social
policy were deregulation, decentrali-
sation and a closer involvement of
the social partners.
In this report, four dimensions of
Dutch activation policy will be dis-
cussed:
- 
the quantitative dimension: in-
cluding the policy to reduce the
number of beneficiaries and ex-
penditure on social protection;
- 
the regulatory dimension: incen-
tives and sanctions in social securi-
ty regulations to stimulate the re-
integration of the unemployed;
the gap between income from
work and income from benefits or
allowances;
- 
the integration dimension: em-
ployment measures;
- 
the organisational dimension: re-
organisation of relevant instifu-
tions and cooperation between
them.
This article concludes with an assess-
ment of the effects of the policies im-
plemented in the Netherlands.
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
\\e 7992 OECD Employment Out-
look showed the Netherlands to be
one of the countries with a high level
of income maintenance, both in com-
parison with other countries and
with expenditure on active pro-
grarnmes. Moreover, according to
the 1996 Employment Outlook, be-
tween t992 and 1995 the ratio be-
tween expendifure on passive and
active measures increased further.
And, in fact, the OECD data under-
estimate the expenditure on benefits,
because the hidden unemployment
under disability benefits is not con-
sidered. Since most social assistance
(ABW, National Assistance Act) re-
cipients have now been given the ob-
ligation to look for work, they will in
future need to be considered also.
On the other hand, a rigorous poli-
cy towards reducing the level of so-
cial security, notably with regard to
disability benefits, has led to a de-
cline in expenditure on benefits in re-
cent years (Figure 1).
At the same time, expenditure on
a number of acfive measures in-
creased: the Youth Employment
Guarantee scheme (JWG)I and, in
particular, the job pools2 and the
funds provided by the government to
certain social security bodies for buy-
ing services from the employment
1 The local or municipal authorities are re-
sponsible for the execution of the JWG, the
Youth Employment Guarantee Act. Young
people who are not able to find work after
between one and one and a half years of un-
employment are obliged to accept a so-
called JWG job. These are jobs in the public
and, since 1995 also, under certain condi-
tions, in the private sector for which they re-
ceive the statutory minimum wage and in
principle work 32 hours. The introduction of
the law is taking place gradually by age
group. Besides a large part of the adminis-
trative costs, the state reimburses all the la-
bour costs to the local authorities.
2 Very difficult-to-place persons, unemployed
for more than three years, can be offered
work through one of the so-calledjob pools.
They are then hired by thejob pool and lent
out to an institution in the public sector, a
system similar to that of temporary agen-
cies. Participants receive the minimum
wage. The job pools are administered and fi-
nanced by the local authorities. Selection
for admission takes place in the employ-
ment offices.
Figure 1: Development of Expenditure on Passive Labour Market Meas-
ures (in % of GDP)
* disablement
<- unemployment
0
t99t 1992 1993 1994 1995
Soerrce: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1995. 
- 
Unemployment in-
cludes WW, risk funds and social assistance for the unemployed (RWW). Disablement
includes WAO/AAW. Not included: expenditure on additional allowance (fW), disa-
bility benefits for older workers and self-employed (IOAW andIOAZ), and schemes
for civil servants.
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Figure 2: Budgets for Active Labour Market Policies (x NLG 1,000)
1994 1995 t996 1997
Source: Rijksbegrotingen Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, !994-
7997. 
- 
Other includes: the JWG, job pools and the local governments' purchases of
services from the employment service (as of 1996). Not included: expenditure on so-
called Melkert jobs (roughly NLG 800 million in total for the entire project).
service. This increase was, however,
offset by a sharp decrease in the state
contribution to the Employment
Service (Figure 2).
Recent lnitiatives
The regulatory dimension
Social security regulations have been
altered considerably in the Nether-
lands. Changes include more strin-
gent qualifying criteria and the ex-
tension of job-search obligations, and
have been accompanied by a more
severe sanction policy in the case of
abuse or fraud and by incentives for
reintegration, in particular for the
disabled. The main new laws and
amendments are summarised below.
A debate has been going on for
some time already as to whether the
minimum wage can be maintained.
In the Netherlands, the difference
between the net minimum allowance
and net minimum wage is small, in
particular for couples and single par-
ents. As yet, a majority of the popu-
lation and Parliament remain op-
posed to abolition. In order to pro-
mote employment of the difficult-to-
place unemployed, the possibility for
temporary exemption is under dis-
cussion. This would apply if an em-
ployer recruits such a person under a
temporary employment contract,
which includes agreements on train-
ing and counselling.
More stringent regulatlons
S o cial insur ance (emp loy e e
schemes)
Employees with a sufficiently long
work history qualify for unemploy-
ment benefits under the WW (Unem-
ployment Benefits Act). Their level
and duration depend on previous in-
come. As of 1 March 1995, the entry
criteria were tightened. A reduction
of the inflow amounting to 45 to
50% was expected. It also became
more difficult to qualify for longer-
term benefits.
Employees becoming disabled
qualify after one year for disability
benefit under the WAO @isability
Benefits Act),level and duration also
being related to previous employ-
ment. This used to be a lifelong bene-
fit, at least until retirement age, but
this changed with the introduction of
a law on claims under disability regu-
lations (WTBA) in August 1993.
Under the new regulations, the dis-
ability criteria also changed: the con-
cept of suitable work was replaced
by the concept of accepted or com-
mon work. This implied that it
should be possible to determine that
the disability was directly and objec-
tively due to illness or infirmity. In
addition, education and previous oc-
cupation are no longer taken into ac-
count when the degree of disability is
determined. The question as to what
type of work can be performed by
someone, given his or her capabili-
ties, is now decisive.
Previously, employees becoming
ill or disabled received a sickness
benefit under the ZW (Sickness Ben-
efits Act). This benefit was, however,
privatised in March 1996. Employers
are obliged to continue to pay their
employees for, in principle, 52
weeks. They can, of course, take out
private insurance to cover this risk.
The Ttl sickness benefit now acts as
a safety net. An important category
still covered by it are workers hired
through a temporary work agency.
In addition, the Tl,l still applies for
pregnant women.
Minimum s o cial as sist ance
People of working age who do not or
no longer qualify for the above bene-
fits generally depend on minimum
social assistance under the ABW. On
1 January L996, the new National
Assistance Act (ABW) came into
force. One of the important changes
was the disappearance of the specific
regulation for the unemployed
(RWW, State group regulations for
unemployed persons). This meant
that from then onwards all benefici-
aries of social assistance are in princi-
ple obliged to look for work. This af-
fected in particular single parents,
who are now obliged to seek em-
ployment as soon as their children
reach the age of five.
S anctions and incentia es
Social insurance institutions have al-
ways been at liberty to impose sanc-
tions in cases of benefit abuse. From
the beginning of this year onwards,
they are required to impose fines on
3 [.aw on driving back the appeal on disability
regulations.
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benefit recipients providing incorrect
or incomplete information when ap-
plying for or drawing benefit. Bene-
fits can be reduced or withdrawn en-
tirely if the recipient refuses a "rea-
sonable" employment or training of-
fer. All benefits paid out under false
pretences have to be claimed back by
the institutions. They now also have
greater means at their disposal to do
so. They can, for example, put a
claim on the benefit in question or on
other benefits, including the mini-
mum allowance. The new law is ex-
pected to lead to substantial savings
of around 100 million ECU per year.
No concrete expectations have been
formulated as to its effect on the la-
bour market reintegration of recipi-
ents.
Not actively looking for work or
not accepting suitable work or train-
ing are important reasons for sanc-
tions. Unemployed persons receiving
the minimum social allowance
(AB!V) can also be excluded from
this allowance if they refuse to ac-
cept an offer for a JWG job or re-
peatedly resign or are dismissed from
a JWG job. Also, a refusal of a job of-
fer from one of the job pools has to
be reported by the Employment
Service to the relevant social security
body.
Sanctions in the WAO (disability
benefit) apply not only to employ-
ees, but also to employers. If an em-
ployer refuses to enable the employ-
ee to perform suitable work without
a sound reason, the social security
body can claim the wage, including
contributions, that the (partially) dis-
abled employee would have earned
from the employer.
Employers are often reluctant to
(re-)employ disabled employees. For
this reason, partially disabled em-
ployees who receive an unemploy-
ment benefit in additon to their disa-
bility benefit are allowed to work
free of charge for an employer, while
keeping their benefits. This so-called
trial placing can last three months,
and the employer has no obligation
to hire the employee at the end of
the period. Seicondly, if it is unclear
whether an employee is really able
to resume work, she or he can
resume work without losing the ben-
efits or being given a lower degree of
disability for a maximum of three
years. Should this employee become
ill, the employer will have to contin-
ue payment just as for other employ-
ees. In order to reduce this risk in the
case of WAO beneficiaries resuming
work under normal circumstances,
these employees now qualify for
sickness benefit (ZW). Other incen-
tives for employers include a wage
dispensation if the performance of
the former disability-benefit recipi-
ent is clearly below normal for a cer-
tain function. Incentives also exist
for the disabled themselves, includ-
ing job-coaching and guarantee ar-
rangements for the older disabled
and those who experience a return of
their former health complaints.
The integration dimension
Given the fact that many long-term
unemployed are semi-skilled and un-
skilled, a specific policy to create
jobs at the bottom of the labour mar-
ket was launched. More generous re-
cruitment incentives and subsidised
employment are important instru-
ments that were introduced in addi-
tion to the existing measures and the
"regular" activities of the employ-
ment service.
In many collective agreements,
the lowest wage scale is above the
statutory minimum. The government
has therefore urged the social part-
ners to use this segment to create em-
ployment for semi- and unskilled
workers. Creating jobs on and just
above the minimum wage level is
also one of the big priorities of the
present cabinet. A law on the reduc-
tion of wage taxes and social security
contributions (WVA) passed int996
provides for a structural reduction in
the employers' labour costs for func-
tions at this level (up to 115% of the
minimum wage). There are several
layers. To give an example: employ-
ers receive a reduction in their social
security contributions of over ECU
900 for the creation of each job on or
just above the national minimum
wage. If they hire a long-term unem-
ployed person for a such function,
the exemption will be virtually com-
plete. Specific wage-cost subsidies
and guidance subsidies also exist for
employers hiring a disabled person.
Another target the cabinet set for
the present legislative period was the
creation of 40,000 additional jobs
through municipalities and care insti-
tutions. These so-called Melkert jobs
are completely subsidised and will
remain so. Since 7996, expenments
have also been taking place in the
private sector. Some 60 experiments
are currently under way in which
jobs are being created at or just
above the minimum wage level. The
aim of the experiments is to identify
potential employment areas. For
these experiments, benefits are con-
verted into wage-cost subsidies, i.e.
the unemployed continue to receive
benefits while working, for a maxi-
mum period of two years. The aim is
to create regular jobs by the tempo-
rary application/granting of benefits.
A rather innovative experiment
was conducted in L996 in the clean-
ing service sector. It is similar in aim
to the service cheques found in other
countries. It combines the reintegra-
tion of the long-term unemployed
with the stimulation of demand for
services they can perform, in this
case the demand by private house-
holds for cleaning services.
The organisational dimension
The effect of activation policies, es-
pecially when aimed at the long-term
unemployed, depends to a large ex-
tent on the way they are implement-
ed. Both the employment service and
the institutions responsible for the
administration of benefits have un-
dergone major changes, and the reor-
ganisation process continues. The
most recent changes and their key
objectives are outlined here.
Local authoities (minimum social
assistance)
Minimum social assistance is admin-
istered by the local authorities, who
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have increasingly been given greater
responsibilities for the reintegration
of the long-term unemployed. The
new law gives them more freedom in
determining additional or incidental
allowances, debasement of the al-
lowance and in ensuring reintegra-
tion. The new law also aims to fur-
ther increase their financial interest
in reducing the number of beneficiar-
ies. In \994, a so-called incentive
budget was introduced: 10% of the
value of any cut in spending
achieved is given to the local authori-
ty.
The administuation of the employee
insurances
In the Netherlands, the social part-
ners were until recently responsible
for both implementing and monitor-
ing the employee insurance schemes
(WW for unemployment, WAO for
disability and Ttl for sickness bene-
fits). In L993, a Parliamentary In-
quiry concluded that they were the
main culprits for the fact that the
number of disabled (WAO recipi-
ents) had risen so dramatically in the
past. One of the aims of the ensuing
revision was, therefore, to separate
the two tasks. In addition, monitor-
ing and coordination were brought
under the responsibility of separate
institutions. The Social Insurance
Monitoring College (CTSV) replaced
the Social Insurance Council (SVR)
on l January 1995. Another institute
was established for coordination, and
replaced again on 1 March 1-997 by
LISV, the National Institute for So-
cial Insurance.
The sectoral organisations then re-
sponsible for benefits under the em-
ployees' insurance (Bedrijfsoerenig-
ingen 
-BY,industrial insurance asso-
ciations) were ordered to pass on all
preparatory and executive activities
related to the collection of contribu-
tions and the delivery of benefits, in-
tegration activities, etc. to one priva-
tised executive institution (abbrevi-
ated UVI in Dutch). For many sec-
tors, the GAK administration office
already conducted the administra-
tion and this is now one of the four
UVIs already in existence. All mana-
gerial, legal and financial ties be-
tween BV and administration offices
had to be cut and an independent
and business relationship as custom-
er and contractor was to be intro-
duced. Competition between UVIs is
foreseen and in the year 2000 other
organisations will be allowed to com-
pete with them.
On 1 March the BVs were abol-
ished. They are being replaced by
sectoral councils who have to negoti-
ate their role and budget with the co-
ordinating institution, LISV.
The Employment Seruice
The Dutch Employment Service was
already deconcentrated, tripartised
and decentralised. Under a new law,
the efficiency and effectiveness of
the Employment Service is to be en-
hanced further. The government has
withdrawn from the Central Employ-
ment Board (CBA) in order to distin-
guish more clearly the responsibili-
ties of government and employment
service. In turn, the CBA will leave
more to the discretion of the central
directorate of the Employment Serv-
ice, which is responsible for day-to-
day management.
Government and the social part-
ners and, in particular, the employers
debated heavily on the key objec-
tives of the employment service. The
main point of disagreement was the
government's proposal to limit the
target group to the more difficult-to-
place unemployed. The compromise
finally reached included the setting
of targets for the somewhat and very
difficult-to-place, while the employ-
ment service is still allowed to medi-
ate other jobseekers. This means that
they can still use the so-called slip-
stream method: placing long-term
unemployed in the wake of easy-to-
place jobseekers.
The employment service receives
a so-called success bonus, which de-
pends on the fulfilment of criteria
such as the number of placements of
difficult-to-place unemployed. This
performanceJinked part of the budg-
et is a precursor of a system of "fi-
nancing by results" which is to be
gradually introduced. It is also a
means to further the reintegration of
difficult-to-place jobseekers: em-
ployment offices can offer them ex-
tra or more intensive services. In ad-
dition, local authorities and certain
social security bodies will receive
funds for bry-g services from the
employment offices for their diffi-
cult-to-place clients. The employ-
ment offices are also allowed to per-
form activities for which they charge
a fee, provided they keep separate
accounts for them.
Cooperation
Cooperation between employment
service and social security bodies al-
ready existed to some degree, but
has now been made compulsory. A
so-called Stage-group Cooperation
Work and Income (SWI) was estab-
lished last year. It is responsible for
the guidance of the cooperation
process.In October 1995, almost 100
SWI cooperation associations were
established, involving 500 munici-
palities. Generally, local or regional
services responsible for the adminis-
tration of benefits and for employ-
ment services will at least create a
joint "reception office", from which
clients are referred on to other offic-
ers in line with their specific needs.
Common intake and diagnosis, infor-
mation exchange and client monitor-
ing systems, as well as the exchange
of labour market and vacancy infor-
mation, occur in SWI associations.
The lmpact of Activation
At the macro level, the policies imple-
mented in the preceding years can be
seen as successful, but some impor-
tant concerns remain. Employment in
the Netherlands is growing, and at a
more rapid rate than in other Europe-
an countries. Many of the new jobs,
however, provide only part-time em-
ployment, and the number of jobs re-
quiring low-skilled labour is still de-
creasing. Unemployment and even
long-term unemployment decreased
for the first time n L996, but not at
the rate desired. It should also be not-
ed that the unemployed in employ-
ment measures, such as the job pools,
52 No.28.Summer 1997
t_"
---Ircqdt-:
are no longer included in the unem-
ployment statistics. The number of
occupationally disabled (WAO recip-
ients) has been steadily declining
from 805,000 in 7993 to some
740,000 benefit years in 1996. This is
the effect of the more stringent entry
procedures, but also of a large-scale
process of re-examination of current
beneficiaries. This trend is likely to
weaken, since the re-examinations of
beneficiaries follow an age-cohort ap-
proach and will increasingly affect
older beneficlaries.
It is hard to determine what exact-
ly produced these results. Of course,
economic recovery and macro poli-
cies in general were partly responsi-
ble for these developments. The re-
duction in indirect labour costs has
had an effect. Employment-related
taxes have fallen. Employers' social
security contributions on balance de-
creased, but only because the sick-
ness benefit scheme was privatised.
Contributions for disability benefirc
are paid entirely by employees. They
may in future be transferred to em-
ployers, accompanied by a levying
system that will discourage take-up
of disability benefits.
The contribution of policy inter-
ventions cannot be isolated from oth-
er developments, but some results of
evaluation studies of the changes in
social security regulations and inte-
gration measures are presented be-
low. They focus on the measures that
have existed long enough for evalua-
tions to have been conducted. Since
the organisational changes are sfill in
progress and since their effect by
their very nature requires some time
to occur, these are not discussed
here. It should be noted, though, that
several evaluations of measures have
ascertained that their effects differ
depending on the executive body
concerned and on the practical or-
ganisation of the work within execu-
tive organisations.
Regulatory reform
The tighter entry criteria and other
measures to reduce the number of
claims on benefits have been effec-
tive in reducing the volume of bene-
fits. However, a study called "In and
out of the WAO" found that only
22% of the disabled who, after a re-
examination in 1994, had been de-
clared (partly) fit for work actually
found a job. Interesting, but unex-
plained, was the phenomenon that
36Yo no longer claim any benefit at
all. It may be that they could apply
for means-tested benefits only, but
did not qualify.
The effects of stricter sanction pol-
icies are questionable. According to
one study 
- 
"Punishment or stimu-
lus" 
- 
sanctions for unemployment
benefit recipients had little impact on
reintegration and were primarily
used as a punishment. One year later
the CTSV published a study 
- 
"Do
sanctions work?" 
- 
that concluded
that sanctions did lead to a 
- 
some-
what 
- 
higher level of reintegration.
The latter study corrected for the ef-
fects of selective applications of sanc-
tions. This is important, because the
same factors determine a person's
chances of finding work and of being
selected for sanctions. The sanctions
seemed to be most effective in the
case of men, older beneficiaries and
people with a low benefit level. Both
studies agreed that if sanctions work,
this is due to the behavioural changes
produced by them.
Employment measures
Questions have been raised with re-
gard to the effectiveness of measures
such as work experience and subsi-
dised employment, since outflow to
regular jobs is minimal. Researchers
signalled in 1993 the danger that la-
bour-pool jobs develop into func-
tions with regular tasks without turn-
ing into regular jobs. The pools have
a very small outflow rate to regular
employment.
It is also difficult to avoid substitu-
tion effects. For the Youth Employ-
ment Guarantee Act (JWG), substi-
tution effects and distortion of com-
petition were to be reduced by a lim-
it on the number of JWG jobs al-
lowed per institution. But when find-
ing appropriate places proved to be
extremely difficult in 1994, this re-
striction had to be eased. As of 1995,
JWG jobs have also been allowed in
the private sector. The number of
non-additional places was markedly
higher there (25%) than in the public
sector (3%). The reason for the low-
er substitution effects in the latter is
probably the lack of funds in the
public sector to meet the demand for
additional staff.
For the job pools, no direct substi-
tution effects were found. Indirectly,
however, substitution took place in
various forms: filling jobs that had
been lost some time ago, the replace-
ment of sick employees, the filling up
of vacancies left after a reorganisa-
tion, and the deployment of labour-
pool participants in new policy areas.
In some cases, participants were per-
forming virtually the same work as
the other employees, but for a much
lower wage. These constituted super-
numerary rather than additional
jobs. The researchers estimated that
in some 75% of the jobs substitution,
competition or budget distortion
took place. Another 15% were esti-
mated to be supernumerary jobs.
These are, however, rough estimates
with a high degree of uncertainty.
Apart from unemployed people
occupying jobs that would otherwise
be performed by "regular" employ-
ees, in many cases itwas questionable
whether the unemployed would not
have found work on their own: so-
called deadweight or windfall effects.
When this effect is taken into account,
the net effect of measures can be de-
termined. For the JWG the gross ef-
fect was 25% of.participants. The net
effect amounted to some 18%. This
net effect, i.e. the difference made by
the measure, was higher for young
people with low education and those
from ethnic minorities.
This is particularly important, be-
cause the selection processes in-
volved in determining who may par-
ticipate in measures have a tendency
to favour the more "privileged" un-
employed. Substantial creaming of
this type occurred in the JWG at first.
But the degree to which the target
was reached rose considerably, from
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54 to 88% between February L992-
April L993 and mid-1993-Septem-
ber 7994.
For the job pools, the selection
process also improved with time. In
L993, thejob pools were reasonably
capable of reaching the intended tar-
get group during the selection phase.
Creaming occurred in particular due
to placement difficulties. The prob-
lem here, in contrast with the JWG,
was not to find enough jobs, but to
find suitable jobs, matching the qual-
ities and affinities of the unemployed
selected.
It is important to remember,
though, that jobs are not everything.
Boorsma at al. (7994) have argued
for a broader definition of the effecti-
ness of activation policies. A focus on
paid work only will consistently
show low results and thus endanger
the motivation of both staff and cli-
ents in this field. Given the current
labour market, the aim should, there-
fore, not only be to integrate the un-
employed into the labour market,
but into society. In the perspective of
social integration, a low outflow into
regular jobs from subsidised employ-
ment becomes less worrying. It also
points to other activities that prevent
isolation, such as voluntary work.
Conclusion
Activation is part of a larger "cultur-
al change" that has taken place in
the Netherlands. An ideology of in-
dividual responsibility and a with-
drawing state has permeated Dutch
society in recent years. In the mean-
time, the pressure on the activation
strategy to prove successful mounts.
If the reintegration of the currently
long-term unemployed does not suc-
ceed, the often predicted split in so-
ciety with a marginalised class of
minimum benefit recipients will be-
come reality.
Marjolein Peters
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Austna
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Austria
With spending on active labour mar-
ket policy accounting f.or 0.23%o of.
GDP (1994), Austria ranks last but
one by international comparison (see
OECD 1996).If this expenditure is
set in relation to the unemployment
rate, Austria moves up to the fourth-
last position.
During the 1990s, spending on ac-
tive labour market policy increased.
Until 1993, however, the funding
needs for passive policies rose to a
greater extent, while in 7994 and
1995 expenses for active LMP in-
creased more than funds for passive
measures. The reason was a reduc-
tion in the number of recipients of UI
benefits (unemployment benefit,
unemployment assistance) from
279,000 (1993) to 195,000 (1994).
ln 7996, the rise in unemployment
again caused a faster growth of
spending on passive than on active
labour market policy. The relation of
active to passive expenditures was
7:9 in1996.
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Table 1: LMP Spending (in millisn ATS)
7992 7993 1994 7995 7996
Staff and material expenses 1,816.5 7,975.9 2,252.7 2,9!7.8 3,235.0
Active labour market policy 3,549.6 4,105.0 4,938.4 5,323.7 5,702.7
Passive labour market policy 33,236.2 42,563.5 44,747.3 45,955.7 51,818.L
Total expenses I 38,602.3 48,644.4 57,937.8 54,791.2 60,75s.8
Ratio of active to passive
expenditure 7:9.4 '1,:70.4 7t9.7 1:8.6 7:9.7
Source: Employment Service documents; own estimates.
The main pillars of active labour
market policy are skills training, em-
ployment subsidies and the promo-
tion of counselling and guidance fa-
cilities. Both in terms of the number
of subsidised positions and in terms
of the level of funds used, active poli-
cy focuses on training. For instance,
in 7995, a total of almost 107,000
subsidised positions were registered
under training schemesl. These are
mostly short-term measures, where-
as employment subsidisation meas-
ures usually relate to a longer-term
employment (of one year). Job-crea-
tion prograrnmes covering around
8,000 people n 1996 mainly focus
on subsidies to employment in the
non-profit sector (non-profit sector
integration subsidy, socio-economic
enterprises) and subsidies to employ-
ment in the private sector (company
integration subsidy).
Of 1-995 expenditure on active
policies, 7L.6Y" were spent on subsi-
dised training, 23.6% on subsidised
employment and 4.8% on counsel-
ling.
Since the 1980s, the primary tar-
get groups of active LMP have been
the long-terrn unemployed, elderly
unemployed, women (especially la-
bour market re-entrants) and the dis-
abled. As the situation in the appren-
ticeship market has gradually wors-
ened, efforts have increasingly fo-
cused on young people. However, in
addition to encouraging the creation
of apprenticeships, the latter target
group requires a range of additional
innovative measures. With the im-
plementation of the measures under
Objective 3 of the ESF, the subsidy
volume has been markedly in-
creased, especially for the disabled.
Recent lnitiatives in
Activation
Concrete measures or prograrnmes
designed specifically to convert pas-
sive benefits into active labour mar-
ket policies have yet to be imple-
mented, although a number are cur-
rently in preparation or about to be
implemented.
Special integration subsidy
( Besondere Ei ng I iederu ngs-
beihilfe 
- 
BESEB)
This recently implemented scheme
constitutes Austria's only attempt to
date to transform passive benefits
into active subsidies. The target
group of the programme are claim-
ants of unemployment assistance
who have been out of work for at
least six months. If a person enters
employment with full mandatory so-
cial insurance contributions for at
least one month, transfer payments
will be changed into wage-cost subsi-
dies. The amount of the subsidy will
correspond to that of unemployment
assistance, including any family sup-
plements and health and pension in-
surance contributions which would
be payable over the subsidy period.
The subsidy will be granted for the
duration of employment up to a
maximum of one year. Administra-
tion of this tool of active labour mar-
ket policy has been simplified, e.g. it
is no longer an obligation for the em-
ployer to contact the employment
service prior to employing the long-
term unemployed person.
Activation by sanctions and
disincentives
Apart from the afore-mentioned gen-
uine activation tool, developments
since the 1990s have been dominat-
ed by an activation strategy based on
disincentives and benefit-related
sanctions. The major aspects of this
policy have been:
- 
greater obligation to seek ajob on
own initiative;
- 
increased sanctions for refusal to
accept job offers;
- 
broader interpretation of "suita-
ble work";
- 
tendency to reduce benefits
through new modes of computa-
tion.
The objective of these measures has
been to render access to insurance
benefits more difficult, reduce the
compensation rate as unemployment
duration increases, and lower the
wage expectations of unemployed
jobseekers by increasing economic
pressure. At the same time, sanctions
have been tightened for those declin-
ing job offers or participation in LMP
measures.
With the 1993 job-protection
amendment (Beschiiftigungssiche-
rungsnoaelle), the unemployed per-
son's own job-search initiative has
1 Developments can only be judged il terms
of number ofjobs subsidised, rather than in
terms of individuals, as any given partici-
pant may show up in the statistics under
several subsidy periods.
Table 2: Number of Jobs Subsidised by Active Labour Market Pro-
grammes
7990 !997 7993 t994 t995 79967992
Trainingmea*uDes 97,595 84,701 68,545 88,569 105,077 706,847 749,338
Employment
measures 78,247 79,076 8,776 72,791" 70,439 8,008 70,687
Source: Employment Service Austria.
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received greater emphasis in unem-
ployment insurance legislation. Evi-
dence of active job search is now re-
quired, e.g. copies of the posted let-
ters of application. If no such evi-
dence is produced, benefit-related
sanctions will be imposed.
This also applies to refusals to ac-
cept suitable job offers. A job is
deemed suitable whenever it does
not jeopardise subsequent return to
the ocanpation preaiously held. Such
occupational protection, however,
no longer applies to recipients of un-
employment assistance (which fol-
lows on exhaustion of unemploy-
ment benefit entitlements, usually
after 20, 30, 39 or 52 weeks, depend-
ing on the duration of previous em-
ployment). Even if it makes a return
to the previous career more difficult,
a job is deemed suitable for claimants
of unemployment assistance when-
ever there is no chance of finding a
suitable job within the near future.
What actually is suitable in each and
every case will be at the regional em-
ployment office counsellor's discre-
tion. In this context, there has been a
tendency to loosen suitability crite-
ria. This is also illustrated by recent
court rulings, which, for example,
have deemed a full-time job to be
suitable for women with child-care
duties. This signifies that women
seeking a part-time job in order to be
able to perform child-care duties and
refusing a full-time job may have
their benefits suspended as they are
not fully available for work.
For those unemployed that are un-
willing to work, or obstruct place-
ment by declining jobs that are
deemed suitable, or do not show up
for their scheduled sign-on visit at
the employment office, the minimum
period of benefit suspension has
been raised from four to six weeks.
In case of a repeat infringement with-
in one year, benefits will be can-
celled for eight weeks.
Apart from the "benefit suspen-
sion" sanction, other measures have
been taken, resulting in a reduction
of the benefit level:
- 
Since 7996 the level of unemploy-
ment benefit has been calculated
on the basis of the claimant's earn-
ings situation over the past 12
months, instead of six months as
previously.
- 
The period necessary for requali-
fying for benefits has been extend-
ed. A person re-entering the la-
bour market has to work for 28
weeks (i.e. two weeks more than
before) to requalify.
- 
The l-996 structural adjustment
legislation (Strukturanpassungs-
gesetz) includes new provisions on
entitlement to unemployment as-
sistance, linking it closely to the
insurance principle. The level of
unemployment assistance depends
on the prior duration of unem-
ployment benefit receipt. The
longer the period of unemploy-
ment benefit receipt, the higher
the unemployment assistance ben-
efit. Overall, however, the level of
unemployment assistance has
been markedly reduced, particu-
larly for higher income earners,
who now get considerably less un-
employment assistance.
No activation through iob-
start incentives
Austria hardly provides any incen-
tives for benefit recipients to take up
work. While drawing benefits, claim-
ants may earn additional income
only up to a low level (1997: ATS
3,740). Any income from work
above this limit removes all benefit
entitlement. There is no possibility of
reducing benefit in proportion to the
income earned. Hence, jobseekers
cannot be expected to gradually en-
ter employment via part-time jobs,
since the income from part-time
work of 20 hours a week and over
will exceed the earnings exemption.
Only auxiliary work of just a few (8-
10) hours a week is likely to remain
below the income ceiling.
Money earned on top of benefit
generates a slight improvement in so-
cial security in that it includes acci-
dent insurance cover. Health insur-
ance cover is provided under the UI
benefit scheme. Contributions to
pension insurance, however, are not
included in such auxiliary work.
If somebody is found to be in em-
ployment whilst on benefit, hisftrer
benefit will be suspended for a peri-
od of eight weeks. An additional
sanction is that the equivalent of two
weeks of benefit will have to be paid
back, resulting in an overall suspen-
sion period of ten weeks. Firms em-
ploying benefit claimants are also
sanctioned: payment of a special con-
tribution to the unemployment insur-
ance fund amounting to 12% of the
wage. The fines for infringing em-
ployer duties and for illegal claims to
UI benefits have also been considera-
bly increased.
Activation by initiating busi-
ness start-ups: the enterprise-
creation programme
(G r ii n d e r I n n e n p rog ra m m)
The self-employed make up a com-
paratively small proportion of the
Austrian labour force, and employ-
ment-creation potentials for the self-
employed, are seen particularly in
the service sector. With the establish-
ment of an enterprise-creation pro-
gramme in L993, the employment
service sought to encourage the es-
tablishment of new firms by the un-
employed. Under this programme,
individuals receive advice on their
options in this respect. In mid-1996,
job-creation pilot projects were initi-
ated to provide wider assistance.
These pilot projects include intensive
coaching for would-be entrepre-
neurs. During the lS-week introduc-
tory, basic and special programmes,
participants may draw subsistence al-
lowances (currently around ATS
6,500 per month).
So far unemployment benefit or
unemployment assistance claims
have not been converted into enter-
prise-creation grants. Nor is it possi-
ble to continue receiving unemploy-
ment benefit in the event of business
start-up because, it is argued, benefit
receipt is conditional on the availa-
bility for work. Currently, the crea-
tion of an appropriate legal frame-
work for introducing an activation
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model in the field of enterprise crea-
tion is under consideration, however.
Activation by special meas-
ures for the long-term unem-
ployed
Since 1995, the Federal Minister of
Labour and Social Affairs has given
special priority to the integration of
those benefit claimants who have
drawn unemployment assistance for
three years. ln line with this labour
market policy target, the employ-
ment service requested the providers
of employment measures to open up
new avenues of employment to this
group. If an employer hires members
of this target group, he/she will re-
ceive an employment subsidy. If such
job offers are refused by unemploy-
ment assistance recipients, their ben-
efit will be suspended.
Other activation trends within
active labour market policy
Apart from the traditional tool kit of
active labour market policy, i.e.
initial and further training, employ-
ment measures and a range of coun-
selling and guidance schemes, a
number of new policies have been in-
troduced in recent years: so-called
"active groups" and non-commercial
temporary employment agencies.
Active groups (Aktivgruppen)
This kind of measure is based on the
assumption that job search often fails
not for lack of vocational skills, but
rather for lack of adequate job-search
techniques. Many unemployed peo-
ple are unable to apply properly forjobs and highlight their particular
skills, or they are insufficiently in-
formed to choose the right occupa-
tion and consistently pursue in-
appropriate occupational objectives.
Active grourps focus on the specific
areas of failure in job-search activi-
ties and try to identifu the problems
that prevent participants from target-
ed job search. Hence such groups of-
fer, to a certain degree, the possibili-
ty to tailor the measure to the indi-
vidual needs of participants, to moti-
vate them and to enable participants
to take the necessary initiative them-
selves.
Non-commercial temporary
employment agencies (Gemein-
n titz i ge A rbeltsverlet hti rmen )
To encourage (re-)entry into paid
employment, Austria has increasing-
ly used the tool of hiring out work-
ers on a non-profit basis. For exam-
ple, the non-profit organisation "Es-
pora" in Upper Austria hires out
long-term unemployed workers to
companies. Experiences to date have
shown that for most of the workers
affected the temporary job is a step-
ping stone to permanent employ-
ment in the hiring enterprise. In
Lower Austria, the Initiatiae 50 was
founded, which mostly employs eld-
erly long-term unemployed and
hires them out for three to six
months to employers who refund
only two-thirds of the relevant wage
costs. If it is not possible to provide
the worker with a permanent job,
he/she will participate in an upgrad-
ing and training programme during
the time he/she is not hired out.
Evaluation
Owing to their recent implementa-
tion, there are only a few data availa-
ble on the impact of the various acti-
vation attempts. The most compre-
hensive data concern the employ-
ment effects of training and employ-
ment programmes and measures.
The effects of wider "suitable
work" criteria under the 1993 job-
protection amendment can be seen
from the increase in suspended un-
employment benefit and unemploy-
ment assistance. The number of sus-
pended benefits went up by 15% be-
tween L993 and 1994. This is mainly
due to increased sanctions on claim-
ants who fail to sign on regularly at
the employment office and refuse job
offers or training.
Under the enterprise-creation pro-
granrme, some 2,000 individuals
have been given extensive start-up
counselling. Around 700 people sub-
sequently established a new firm and
have created around 1,050 new jobs,
especially in the service sector. How-
ever, no data on the economic devel-
opment of these businesses are yet
available.
Employment measures have a sig-
nificant impact in terms of individual
careers and can be considered a suc-
cess even by international standards.
According to a study (Fehr-Duda et
aL.1996) of Aktion 8000 (now re-
placed by the "non-commercial in-
tegration subsidy" [Gemeinniltzige
Eingliederungsb eihilfel), 39 % of. the
subsidised workers were continuous-
ly employed in the year following the
end of the scheme, and another L4%
were employed for 10 months or
more. A longitudinal analysis of ca-
reers has shown that, over a period of
three to four years, 48% of. partici-
pants were employed for at least 80%
of the observation time following the
end of the scheme.
Socio-economic enterprises, too,
have a definite employment effect.
Half of the participants found a job
once their temporary subsidised em-
ployment had ended: approximately
one-third of them found full-time
jobs, the remainder part-time jobs,
temporary jobs or jobs under a work-
Table 3: Suspension of Benefit Receipt
Reason for suspension 7993 L994 7995
Refirsal to accept suitable job offers or training 8,!34 9,957 70,709
Quitting job voluntarily or losing job through
own fault 2L,687 22,797 23,363
Failing to sigrr on regularly 6,273 9,976 77,007
Total 36,094 4L,664 45,079
Change on previous year +\5.4% +8.2%
Source : Employment Service Austria.
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contracting scheme (Biffl et al.
Lee6).
Regarding recruitment subsidies
(cf. Fehr-Duda et al. 7997) in the pri-
vate sector, the available data show
that 38Y" of those subsidised under
the company-integration subsidy re-
main employed with the same em-
ployer for more than a year following
the end of the subsidised period.
Training schemes generally show
significant placement effects, but also
a considerable number of partici-
pants who do not succeed in entering
employment after finishing the
courses. Of the participants in cleri-
cal training courses in Lower Austria,
at least 54%o were able to enter em-
ployment within two months, but
24"/o did not succeed in finding a job
within one year after finishing the
course. Vocational orientation cours-
es usually have a lower integration
rate: within two months of the end of
the course 34Yo took up a job, while
24Y" were not able to enter emPloY-
ment (cf. Lechner etal.7994).
Case studies on the effects of ac-
tive groups have shown that if this
measure is geared to individual
needs, a high placement rate can be
achieved.
However, there is the problem
that especially those at risk of mar-
ginalisation and with pronounced in-
tegration handicaps are not suffi-
ciently covered by the measures.
This is partly due to the fact that ac-
tive labour market policy gives abso-
lute priority to placement in the reg-
ular labour market over schemes that
are designed to provide gradual sta-
bilisation and where integration in
the regular labour market is only a
medium-term goal.
Conclusions
Activation measures designed to con-
vert passive benefits directly into ac-
tive subsidies have been in operation
only in one single case, namely the
special integration subsidy. Due to
the comparatively low share of ac-
tive labour market expenditure and
growing problems in the labour mar-
ket, intensified active labour market
policy efforts are required within the
framework of a comprehensive em-
ployment policy.
Activation by means of positive in-
centives should be the main tool. Ac-
tivation through a combination of
benefit receipt and income from
work remains impossible in Austria
because of a number of legal barriers.
To encourage activation in terms of a
partial conversion of benefits into
employment subsidies or enterprise-
creation subsidies, there is a need to
change the legal framework, espe-
cially unemployment insurance legis-
lation, which still features a strict di-
viding line between unemployment
and employment and does not pro-
vide for any intermediate status.
Approaches to work-sharing, for
instance through job-rotation
schemes, have only been under dis-
cussion so far. In view of a labour
market tradition that still regards the
exercise of an occupation under reg-
ular employment conditions from job
start to retirement as the norln, a
change-over to a vocational career
characterised by constantly alternat-
ing situations of employment, paid
sabbatical, unpaid sabbatical and re-
entry into employment remains a
scenario for the future.
Ferdinand Lechner
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Portugal
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Portugal
Although it is often difficult to distin-
guish between passive or active
measures with the information avail-
able, and even more difficult to iden-
tify which ones are currently being
"activated", public spending clearly
focuses on passive measures.
Public spending on passive meas-
ures represented almost 70Y" of. to-
tal LMP spending in 1995, and this
proportion has been increasing
steadily since at least 1990. Thus, in
spending terms at least, and also for
the number of people involved, the
trend has been precisely the oppo-
site of an "activation" strategy. This
can be explained by: (a) the increase
in unemployment; (b) the improve-
ment in social protection (the pro-
portion of the unemployed receiving
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benefits is constantly rising, now
representing more than 60% of the
unemployed); together, the two fac-
tors meant that the number of unem-
ployed benefit recipients rose from
67,000 in 1990 to 180,000 in 1995.
But it also reflects the failure in dy-
namising economic growth and the
labour market.
Unemployment benefits are given
in the case of involuntary unemploy-
ment only (DL79-N89 and DL 418/
93), that is, in the case of unemploy-
ment caused by: (a) the employer's
unilateral decision; (b) expiry of em-
ployment contract; (c) termination
with just cause on the worker's initia-
tive and (d) termination by mutual
agreement in the context of a restruc-
turing project. So far, no "activa-
tion" of passive measures by reshic-
tive measures is foreseen; that is, no
tightening of job-search obligations
has been considered nor any cuts in
social benefitsl. Only the control pe-
riod has been reduced from two
months to one.
At present, unemployed persons
may not cumulate the receipt of un-
employment benefits with any other
form of income. One-third of the un-
employed in receipt of benefits are
drawing "social" benefit, that is, the
benefit which is given after entitle-
ment to the unemployment benefits
has expired.
Another strand of passive policies
consists of early retirement schemes.
Early retirement schemes have been
implemented since L989 and enable
older workers (over 60 years old) to
enter retirement before the normal
age;12,000 people were involved in
1996. Special schemes exist for civil
servants, fishermen, miners and dock
workers.
The overview on active and pas-
sive measures in Table 1 shows that:
- 
spending on and the number of
people involved in active meas-
ures have been decreasing in abso-
lute terms since 1993;
- 
spending on and the number of
people involved in passive meas-
ures are increasing, but the number
of people benefiting from early re-
tirement is stable (although spend-
ing is rising);
- 
spending on and the number of
people involved in vocational
training have been decreasing
since 1993;
- 
spending on and the number of
people involved in subsidised em-
ployment more than doubled from
1992to1995;
- 
spending on and the number of
people involved in specific group
measures (young, disabled, long-
term unemployed) have decreased
over the period;
- 
some very active measures such as
the individual assistance plan, job-
search assistance, employment-
training programs and occupation-
al programs for the unemployed
still have a very low priority in
employment policies.
Spending on employment training
and vocational training has been re-
duced from 55 to 36%" of total public
spending on employment in favour
of a more structural type of spending
(education, R&D, modernisation). In
a way, this might be a positive sign
because of the large-scale effect that
such national choices will have, but it
does not invalidate the trends that
we have described above.
Encouraging LTU to take up de-
pendent or self-employment is an im-
portant part of active labour market
policy in Portugal. The measures
consist of the following:
- 
Exemptions from compulsory so-
cial contributions for 36 months
are given to enterprises which pro-
mote the recruibnent of LTU (De-
cree no. 89195 and D.L. no. 34l
1 "Suitable work" is defined $y DL79-N89
and DL 418193) as: (a) functions or tasks
adapted to the physical abilities, education-
al qualifications and training and work ex-
perience of the worker; (b) observation of
collective agreements lggslding to national
and./or sectoral regulations; (c) the worker
or his family not being otherwise exempted
(for geographical reasons, for example).
Table 1: Labour Market Policy Measures (number of participants and financial resources in million PTE)
7992 7993 7994 !995^
No. of Financial No. of Financial
Persons resources persons resources
No. of Financial No. of Financial
persons resources persons resources
Vocational tralningb
Employment subsidy schemes (incl.
self-employment and occupational
programmes)
Specific measqres for young people
Specific measures for LTU
Specific measures for disabled persons
Job-search measures
54,997 79,346
12,949 4,275
81,650 33,020
777 7,067
9,398 5,747
105
64,012 23,047 59,054
20,064 77,224 34,027
72,275 29,707 64,990
852 933 725
7,956 6,800 6,724
105
22,925 40,713 tg,63L
6,44L 35,506 9,407
27,834 61,920 24,733
55s 87 83
7,4!7 7,970 7,249
135 96 740
Total Active Measures 759,765 62,449 765,099 77,8\6 !64,820 65,301 146,192 60,242
Unemployment benefits"
Early retirement
729,774 64,695 771,0L0 706,399
75,046 72,300 17,035 13,928
175,L44 127,388 176,389 L32,497
20,793 2L,849 7,599 29,549
Total Passive Measures 744,220 76,995 199,045 !20,327 795,937 749,236 192,368 762,030
Temporary values.
Cooperation contracts are excluded,
Job creation by unemployed receiving benefits are included.
a
b
c
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96). In the case of a fixed-term
contract, the contributions paya-
ble are reduced by 50%.
- 
An integration programme to
combat long-term unemployment
exists which integrates individual
vocational training schemes and
new forms of vocational integra-
tion (through in-formation sessions
and job-search methods).
The employment schemes for per-
sons in receipt of unemployment
benefits involved L2,000 people in
L996. the employment offices are
responsible for implementing the
schemes and pay 80% of the work-
er's monthly compensation (the re-
maining 20% is borne by regional
social security offices). The total
must not exceed the worker's previ-
ous wage. Another type of occupa-
tional scheme exists for the unem-
ployed in need (Decrees no.247195
and L92196), which cannot exceed
80% of the national minimum wage
and has a duration of up to one year
(extendable by an additional year
under certain circumstances). In
L996,6,700 people were involved.
Job Clubs have been created (De-
crees no. 295193 and247l95) to help
solve the training and employment
problems of the unemployed, along
with job-search assistance which
gives LTU who find employment for
at least three years a bonus equal to
three times the national minimum
wage (Decreeno.247l95). But these
measures involve very few people
(51 the former and L66 the latter in
7996).
What can be concluded from this
analysis is that tlte "activation" proc-
ess has been virtually non-existent
during the analysed period; the trend
has instead been towards an increase
in passive spending. The trend has
been more oriented towards the de-
mand side (rise in subsidised jobs, in
support for restructuring programs,
in R&D) than the supply side (de-
crease in spending on and the
number of people involved in train-
ing programmes and target group
measures).
Overall Strategies and
Recent Measures
Employment strategy
Portugal has recently stepped up the
struggle against unemployment and
social exclusion, thus following the
EU recommendations expressed in
particular in The European Pact of
Confidence and in the Tripartite
Conference on Growth and Employ-
ment. In this context, the Portuguese
state has developed two important
political tools, both with considera-
ble influence on employment: the
Multi-Annual Programme for Em-
ployment until 1999 (lvIQE 1996b),
and the Strategic Social Pact (CES
L996b), recently signed by the gov-
ernment and the social partners.
The Multi-Annual Programme for
Employment defined the conse-
quences for the labour market of the
macroeconomic trends till 1999. The
five Essen resolutions constitute the
heart of this Programme. It should be
noted, however, that no measure has
been taken which would lower the
costs of low-paid jobs for the employ-
ers. The principal objective is to.pro-
mote productivity and corporate re-
organisation rather than to reduce the
costs of employing the low-skilled.
The Strategic Social Pact, the first
agreement of this type ever signed in
Portugal, is based on six complemen-
tary fields of action: (a) economy and
enterprises; (b) productivity, work-
ing conditions and worker participa-
tion; (c) active employment policies,
education, training and the informa-
tion society; (d) reform of social pro-
tection; (e) reform of the fiscal sys-
tem and (f) modernisation and re-
structuring of the public administra-
tion.
Both documents recognise that the
present unemployment level "repre-
sents a threat to economic and social
cohesion" (CES 1996, p. 4L). Em-
ployment is considered as a national
priority and there is an explicit com-
mitrnent to creating 100,000 jobs by
L999.
The objective of the government
employment strategy is to encourage
cooperation between the various
strategies and actors: the employ-
ment service (which is being funda-
mentally restructured in order to be
an active partner instead of the man-
ager of funds it had become over
recent years), municipalities, local
firms, civil associations, etc. The aim
is to establish "Territorial Pacts for
Employment" that mobilise all the
actors concerned in the search for lo-
cal employment solutions. It thus
constitutes a very strong trend to-
wards activation, not just of the un-
employed. but also of all institutions
involved.
The reform of the ESF application
is an important activation tool. First
of all because it is the result of seri-
ous discussion with social partners,
and also because it tries to make
training serve employment while
grving workers (employed or not) the
appropriate skills for socioeconomic
change.
Recent measures
The most recent measures taken are:
creation of the Guaranteed Minint'm
Income (LawL9-N96) and of the So-
cial Labour Market (RCM 10al96);
European Social Fund reform (DR
L5196); and reduction of working
time to 40 hours, following the deci-
sions of the Short-Term Social
Agreement (CES 1996). However,
working-time reduction is imple-
mented in Portugal much more in an
efficiency-enhancing context than in
a work-sharing one. It is seen more as
a competitive measure than a way to
create employment.
The measures recently initiated,
together with the already existing
ones, constitute a substantial im-
provement in the legal framework in
the struggle against unemployment,
and particularly in the activation of
employment policies. Some of these
measures have considerable impor-
tance because of the number of un-
employed affected, but also because
of the strategic impact on the reduc-
tion of social exclusion associated
with long-term unemployment. It is
still too early to get a clear picture
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of the impact and the possible nega-
tive side-effects of these measures,
but a preliminary evaluation can be
given.
Quantitative Assess-
ment of Some Recent
Measures
Guaranteed minimum income
This is a new measure in Portugal,
still in the experimental application
phase, whose objective is the crea-
tion of a "social allocation and social
integration programme, in order to
guarantee to the individuals and
their families resources that satisfy
their basic needs and promote pro-
gressive social and ocupational inte-
gration" (Law79-N96, Art. No.1").
The financial benefit is payable for
one year but the period may be ex-
tended.
Although to a large extent a pas-
sive measure, it introduces an activa-
tion mechanism by obliging benefici-
aries to accept jobs, occupation,
training or education proposals (pro-
vided they respect suitable work
norms). So, it catr be seen as an "acti-
vation by incentives" measure.
In the current experimental phase,
the programme encompasses 15,000
people, but the objective is to reach
250,000 individurals by Jdy 1997.
Social labour market
Conceived as a "diversified set of so-
lutions for socio-occupational inte-
gration or reintegration of the unem-
ployed based on non-market socially
needed activities" (RCM 104/96),
this measure is an active one and re-
sults from the articulation of already
existing measures (occupational pro-
grammes, local employment initia-
tives, etc.) with innovative ones
(workshop schools, integration firms
and service-employment cheque).
The most statistically significant
measure within the Social Labour
Market (SLM) is the occupational ac-
tivity of workers who receive unem-
ployment benefits (Portaria 192196;
see also above).
SLM introduces a clear distinction
between paid employnent and occu-
pation and at present covers around
24,000 unemployed. It guarantees a
socially useful occupation in the ab-
sence of job or training alternatives
and a subsistance income equal to
the national minimum wage (plus
transport and food expenses).
Other SLM measures (local em-
ployment initiatives, protected em-
ployment units, workshop schools)
are still being studied or piloted and
no data is available.
Conclusions
At the beginning of the L990s, a
trend towards more passive policies
\ras apparent in Portugal, but since
1995 extensive measures have been
taken to reverse the process. Job cre-
ation seems to be the most significant
of public policies along with a wide-
spread activation of the labour mar-
ket institutions. New programmes
are also being implemented in order
to promote the social and vocational
integration of LTU and people in
need. So, v/e are at present observing
a shift from passive to active meas-
ures (covering both spending and
people involved).
It is unclear whether the recent ac-
tive employment policy can avoid
contributing to the "unemployment
ttap", as most wage-replacement
payments are close to the national
minimum wage, which is the wage
level of a substantial proportion of
the work force. The lack of "activa-
tion by sanctions" measures reinforc-
es this risk. Some forms of control
are thus conceivable that would bet-
ter support an "activation" ofthe un-
employed.
Helena Lopes
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Finland
Active and Passive
Labour Market Policies
in Finland
Historically, labour market policies
in Finland have always been de-
signed to sustain income and em-
ployment through active measures
rather than by passive income suP-
port. The dramatic rise in unemploy-
ment 
- 
from3.4Y" in 1990 to a peak
of L8.4% n L994 
- 
called this ap-
proach into question, however. In
!99O, active labour market PolicY(ALMP) measures accounted for
about 47"/" of total spending on la-
bour market programmes (active
measures plus income maintenance),
a figure substantially higher than the
EU14 average. ln the early 7990s,
there was a doubling of ALMP meas-
ures. During the past few Years,
abolt 5Y" of the labour force have
been in active programmes, on aver-
age: for about four months in labour
market training and five months in
zubsidised job placements. Thus, the
number of people starting these
schemes annually is about two and a
half times that of the average stock.
Despite this high level of active
measures, high unemployment led to
a decrease in the LMP activity rate,
which was only 28% n 1995. Given
the very high level of unemploy-
ment, however, it is obvious that anY
substantial increase in the volume of
active measures is difficult without
harmful or distortionary side-effects.
Total public expenditure on labour
market policy rose from 22% of.
GDP in !990 to 5.6% n 1995. When
adjusted for the rise in unemploy-
ment, however, both passive and ac-
tive expenditure declined relative to
GDP. The most striking feature of
unemployment dynamics has been
the lengthening of unemployment
periods; the average duration in-
creased from 15 weeks in 1990 to 48
weeks in 1996. The number of new
spells doubled, which was partly due
to an increase of recurrent unemploy-
ment spells among the same people.
The role of active progralnmes 
- 
ex-
cluding job placement 
- 
in terminat-
ing spells of unemployment has re-
mained quite stable during the 1990s,
at about 25o/" of total exits from un-
employment. Due to differences in
employment prospects in the normal
labour market and the priority given
to young and long-term unemploYed
people when targeting active meas-
ures, the importance of active meas-
ures varies markedly across different
groups of unemployed jobseekers
and across regions.
Within the ALMP measures, the
share of labour market training has
increased somewhat, accounting for
40% of. all measures (excluding em-
ployment-based public investment
schemes) n L996. Labour market
training is primarily vocational train-
ing that has been increasingly target-
ed at unemployed people and people
at risk of unemployment. Although
job-related training is chiefly the re-
sponsibility of employers, labour
market training may be purchased
jointly by local authorities and em-
ployers, in order to meet companies'
specific needs. The scope of training
has also been extended to help those
interested in entrepreneurship and
self-employment.
However, the majority of active
labour market programmes have tak-
en the form of selective employment
subsidies for employers. The basic
idea is to lower the employment
threshold for target groups by com-
pensating the employer for the ini-
tially lower productivity and the ex-
tra costs incurred by hiring a less-
qualified unemployed person. They
are not instruments for net job crea-
tion, but their main purpose is to
achieve greater equality of opportu-
nity in the labour market.
In the early 1990s, there were al-
most 20 different forms of employ-
ment subsidy.The strict and detailed
subsidy rules rendered the system in-
flexible and time-consuming. When
the problems inherent in the system
were aggravated by mass unemploY-
ment, the employment subsidY
schemes were changed. The statuto-
ry obligation on municipalities to ar-
range training or temporary work for
teenagers and the long-term unem-
ployed 
- 
as a measure of last resort 
-
was totally lifted from the beginning
of. L993 because of the tremendous
increase in unemploSnnent which 
- 
it
was feared 
- 
would lead to an un-
manageably large volume of ALMP.
Moreover, in April L995,the number
of subsidies was reduced to five, the
discretionary power and freedom of
action of the local employment offic-
es were increased and the conditions
for granting subsidies to enterprises
were tightened. A great majority of
the placements are in the public sec-
tor. Apart from employment subsidy
schemes, various training and other
programmes, which include practical
training in a job (often without an
employment relationship and pay),
have markedly increased. And, in
fact, the division between active and
passive measures has become less
clear-cut, along with the pro-active
changes in unemployment benefit
schemes.
Recent lnitiatives
Activation by sanctions
Unemployment benefit schemes
based on both insurance and assist-
ance principles as well as an unem-
ployment pension scheme are in op-
eration in Finland. The detailed pro-
visions of the schemes have been
changed countless times in the 1990s
- 
either to achieve savings in unem-
ployment expenditure generally or,
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more explicitly, to introduce coer-
cive qualifying conditions into the
schemes. The compgnsation rate of
the earnings-related benefits was
lowered from the beginning of L992.
The following iyear, amendments
were made to tlghten the qualifying
conditions. Thb lnitial waiting period
for the basic allowance for those en-
tering the labour market (except for
new graduates) was lengthened from
six weeks to three months, and the
disqualifying period for those who
had voluntarily quit their last job
was lengthened from six to eight
weeks. Legitimate reasons for refus-
ing job offers were also tightened
and students' benefits were
scrapped, even during summer vaca-
tions.
ln L994, the basic unemployment
allowance was changed to make it
more similar to unemployment insur-
ance by introducing a qualifying pe-
riod in employment and a maximum
duration of benefit payment (500
days) and by waiving means-testing.
A new labour market support was in-
troduced for tho$e who are not eligi-
ble for the benefits or whose benefits
have been exhausted. This labour
market support is usually means-test-
ed and equal in amount to the basic
unemployment allowance; first-time
entrants to the labour market who
live with their parents get 60% of
full benefit. The labour market sup-
port is always paid at the full rate and
without means-testing when the re-
cipient participates in ALMP meas-
ures. The new element was, howev-
er, that a person who receives labour
market support may participate in
apprenticeship training, labour mar-
ket training, rehabilitation or practi-
cal training in a job (without an em-
ployment relationship and pay). In
return for the support, he or she may
also be obliged to participate in such
measures. Despite the activating ten-
dency involved in labour market
support, most of the beneficiaries are
"passively" uneqployed. However,
among youths; tplacements with la-
bour market srlpfort account for a
majority of all mepsures under active
labour market folicv.
The entitlement to labour market
support was further restricted for
teenagers n 1996 and for young
adults under 25 years of age int997.
Young people without any vocation-
al or other training beyond compul-
sory education are now eligible for
the labour market support only when
participating in active measures. The
reform aims to improve the employ-
ment prospects of young people by
reducing the numbers leaving educa-
tion with few or no qualifications.
Alongside such coercive measures,
far more places in upper secondary
education have also been provided.
The other main pro-active amend-
ments, which were implemented in
L997 and, based on tightening the
benefit provisions, were as follows.
The qualifying period was prolonged
from six months (in the last eight
months) to ten months (in the last24
months). The reference pay used in
calculating the earnings-related un-
employment allowance is deter-
mined by the pay during this ten-
month period and never dates further
back, as previously. The aim was to
bring earnings-related benefits more
closely into line with potential chang-
es in the earnings capacity of the un-
employed people. Older people's en-
titlement to extra benefit days was
also restricted. Previously, those who
reached the age of 55 before the ex-
haustion of benefits were entitled to
extra days so that unemployment
benefits were payable till the age of
60, when the person qualified for an
unemployment pension. The age lim-
it has now been raised from 55 to 57
years. The pension that accrues from
the period of UI benefit was also re-
duced to 80% of the previous level.
Finally, the income thresholds below
which income is considered negligi-
ble in the means-tested labour mar-
ket support were lowered, for spous-
es from FIM 5,540 (ECU 953) to FIM
5,040 (ECU 867) and for single per-
sons from FIM 3,700 (ECU 636) to
FIM L,500 (ECU 258). For spouses,
however, the rate at which benefits
were cut was lowered from 75 to
50%, while for single persons this
rate remainedat7i%.
The qualiffig conditions for un-
employment pensions, too, were
tightened lrl,7994.
Activation by incentives
There has been great concern about
the problem of so-called "unemploy-
ment traps" in Finland. Besides high
compensation rates in some cases,
the problem can also be attributed to
structural defects in the social securi-
ty system. Very high effective tax
rates may arise from the combined
effects of means-tested income trans-
fers, income taxation and graded fees
for public services (like children's
day-care), preventing even those
with low unemployment benefits
from increasing their disposable in-
come by accepting precarious, low-
paid jobs. The measures for combat-
ing these problems have included al-
leviation of the tax burden on low
earnings, alleviation of means-test-
ing in unemployment benefits with
respect to earned income, as well as
changes in the schemes for support-
ing care for small children. To im-
prove indirect job-related benefits in
atypical employment, efforts have
also been made to identify and abol-
ish any remaining inequalities in en-
titlement to social security, depend-
ing on the form of employment.
Unemployed persons who have
accepted part-time or full-time work
lasting less than a month are entitled
to an adjusted unemployment allow-
ance. In cases of casual earnings, the
rate at which benefit is reduced was
lowered from 80 to 50% at the be-
ginning of L997. This rate is applied
to all monthly earnings, however,
whereas an income threshold of FIM
750 (ECU 129) used to apply. The
amendment actually decreased the
net gains from monthly earnings up
to FIM 2,000 (ECU 344), but in-
creased the gains from higher casual
earnings.
Besides youth training, great ef-
forts have also been made to give a
new impetus to adult training. Em-
ployees dismissed for economic or
production-related reasons are paid 
-
subject to certain qualifying condi-
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tions concerning age, duration of em-
ployment relationship and unem-
ployment 
- 
a lump-sum compensa-
tion. The scheme, administered by
the Education and Redundancy Pay-
ment Fund, has been gradually modi-
fied along the lines of an adult educa-
tion scheme by payrng supplements
for time spent in training and relax-
ing the eligibility criteria in the case
of training. This adult training sup-
plement is tax exempt and amounts
to FIM 1,000 per month (ECU 172).
In autumn L995, the government
decided to allocate a certain amount
of money for granting unemployed
people within the UI scheme the
right to income support equal to their
earnings-related benefit for periods
of vocational training. At present,
participation in labour market train-
ing entitles people to a similar train-
ing allowance. In optional training,
however, the person is entitled to an
adult study grant which is much low-
er than the UI benefit. The govern-
ment nominated two administrators,
who made their proposals for train-
ing allowances for optional training
in January L997.The government is
to submit its proposal for the training
allowance for the long-term unem-
ployed in April L997. Accolding to
the proposal, long-term unemployed
people with at least !2 years' em-
ployment are to be entitled to a
training allowance for a maximum of
two ybars. The allowance is equal in
amount to the unemployment bene-
fit and the time spent in training is
not included in the maximum period
of entitlement for unemployment
benefits.
There are three publicly funded
schemes in operation in Finland
whose aim is to encourage work-
sharing. The part-time pay supple-
ment scheme, first introduced in
March 1994, was established perma-
nenfly in 7997. As a compensation
for loss of earnings, pay supplement
can be allocated to a person who vol-
untarily changes from full-time to
part-time work. The replacement
rate is 50%, with a ceiling of about
FIM 4,300 per month (ECU 740).
The maximum duration of the pay
supplement is 12 months and the em-
ployee is entitled to return to full-
time work after the period. The ar-
rangement is based on a voluntary
agreement between the employee
and employer. The employer has to
recruit an unemployed jobseeker,
but not necessarily in the same job.
Experiments into reduced work-
ing-time schedules in the local gov-
ernment sector are also supported by
granting employment subsidies for
recruiting additional staff. The ex-
periment is to run from July L996 to
the end of December L998 in 20 mu-
nicipalities.
Besides encouraging work-shar-
ing, the job-rotation scheme 
- 
intro-
duced on a pilot basisn7996-1997 
-
also intends to broaden the scope for
individual career breaks and to bring
"young blood" into workplaces. It is
based on a voluntary agreement be-
tween a full-time employee and his
or her employer for the employee to
take leave for studies, training or per-
sonal reasons for a fixed period of
between three months and a year.
The person on job-rotation leave re-
ceives 60% of the unemployment
benefit allowance he or she would be
entitled to, up to a ceiling of FIM
4,500 per month (ECU 774).In the
case of vocational fpining, a training
supplement can also be granted. The
allowance is tax exempt and amounts
to FIM 1,000 per month @CU L72).
The employee is entitled to return to
the same job, and the employer is
obliged to recruit an unemployed
jobseeker for the same period, but
not necessarily for the same job.
The role played by the public em-
ployment service in the implementa-
tion of ALMP measures is critical.
Most active labour market policy
spending passes through the public
employment service. To qualify for
unemployment benefits, unem-
ployed people have to register at a
public employment office, which
per{orms the control function of as-
sessing the responsibility of claim-
ants to seek jobs. The public employ-
ment service also provides place-
ment, vocational guidance and infor-
mation services. Due to changes in
the composition of clients, there are
strong demands for diversified, indi-
vidually tailored packages of servic-
es. Staff resources at local employ-
ment offices have been scarce, how-
ever, restricting the adoption of Ia-
bour-intensive operational methods.
Evaluation
Finnish evaluation studies have
mostly dealt with the two measures 
-
employment subsidies and labour
market training 
- 
that make up the
great majority of all active measures.
In general, the findings have been
more favourable than public opinion
on the measures. Even though there
have been many follow-up studies on
ALMP measures, few of them have
made use of econometric methods to
control for the effects of individual
characteristics and to disentangle the
specific effects of policy measures. In
the face of oversupply on the labour
market, short-run outcomes in terms
of employment following the train-
ing or subsidised work have admit-
tedly been quite poor. Participation
in these schemes has contributed to
closer involvement in the labour
market, however. A widely held
view, though, is that subsidised jobs
have been concentrated too heavily
in the public sector, where the
number of permanent staff has been
cut and regular tasks are being circu-
lated among the temporary subsi-
dised workers. The critical challenge,
therefore, is to design schemes that
encourage private companies to pro-
vide subsidised job opportunities,
while avoiding deadweight effects as
well as distortion of competition be-
tween companies.
Due to insufficient staff resources,
the extensive ALMP measures have
exhibited little by way of individual
design and implementation. New ef-
forts have recently been launched for
screening elderly long-term unem-
ployed people to examine their indi-
vidual circumstances and needs for
training or rehabilitation. Making the
ALMP measures a part of an individ-
ual upgrading plan calls for greater
resources in the local employment
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offices, but could probably improve
the attainment of sustainable results.
In many remote regions, the very
limited job opportunities on the nor-
mal labour market necessarily dimin-
ish the benefits of ALMP measures.
In these circumstances, voluntary
work in citizens' organisations could
be developed 
- 
at the initiative of lo-
cal partners 
- 
to provide alternative
avenues for meaningful activities.
As to the activating measures,
many of them are quite new, so that
little evidence is available on their
performance. Take-up in the work-
sharing schemes has so far been rath-
er low (4,800 persons, on average,
were paid the part-time pay supple-
ment in L996, and the total number
of people starting on job-rotation
leave was 5,500). The great majority
of the users have been middle-aged
or elderly women working in the
public health and social welfare serv-
ices. The substifutes have been some-
what younger women, who had typi-
cally worked for the same employer
earlier and been unemployed for a
very short time before the place-
ment. Thus, the replacement obliga-
tion does not reach the target groups
of ALMP measures. ln general, there
seems to be a need for some incen-
tives for employers to implement
such schemes and to handle the extra
burden of hiring and familiarising the
unemployed with the work. Allow-
ing the payment of employment sub-
sidies even for the recruitment of
temporary substifutes could serve to
integrate work-sharing schemes with
selective ALMP measures.
Finally, the very extensive practi-
cal training schemes 
- 
involving
more than 30,000 people on average
- 
seem to exert distortionary effects
on the labour market. In the youth
labour market, practical training
alongside labour market support
constitutes a good example of this.
The popular option of employing
young people without pay risks dis-
places normal recruitment and
makes other alternatives like further
apprenticeship training a less attrac-
tive option. Besides young people,
those whose unemployment benefits
have been exhausted (after 500
days) make up another large group
on labour market support. ln 7996,
there were 170,000 unemployed
people, on average, on labour mar-
ket support, 90,000 of them because
of the exhaustion of unemployment
benefit allowances. Many of them
are 40-54 years of age with low edu-
cational qualifications and previous
work experience in the manufactur-
ing and construction sectors, or peo-
ple with a very fragmented work ca-
reer. This is the group at particular
risk of labour market exclusion. It is
obvious that any sustainable solution
will demand intensive measures that
should, in order to enhance motiva-
tion, acquire a reputation for offering
reasonable employment prospects
for the participants in the futurel.
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Sweden
Active and Passive Labour
Market Policies in Sweden
Labour market expenditure in Swe-
den corresponded to 55% of. GDP in
L995, of. which 3llo was spent on ac-
tive and 2.5% og passive measures.
In the fiscal year1993194, outlays on
passive measures were almost as
high as those on active measures for
the first time in decades, but by inter-
national standards Sweden is still the
country with the strongest emphasis
on active measures.
lndeed, over recent years the ex-
tent of active labour market pro-
gralnmes in Sweden has by far sur-
passed the levels of earlier reces-
sions. In L996, around 200,000 per-
sons participated in regular labour
market prograrnmes (excluding pro-
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grammes for the disabled, which in-
cluded an additional 86,000 people).
Around 4 to 5% of the labour
force participated in regular labour
market programmes in 19951. Com-
bining that figure with an unemploy-
ment rate of.8.L% implies that the
number of people who were either
unemployed or in progtalnmes cor-
responded to approximately t2-
L3% of. the labour force in L996.The
figures for the unemployment rate
and the percentage taking part in la-
bour market programmes have not
fluctuated markedly during the past
four years.
The active LMP programmes can
be grouped into demand-side and
supply-side measures. Taken togeth-
er, the demand-side programmes in-
volve far more people than the sup-
ply-side prograrnmes. However, in
many of the newer prograrnmes,
such as the work-experience scheme
(see next section), the border be-
tween the supply and demand side is
not as clear as in former pro-
grarnmes, because of their alleged
training content.
In Sweden, it is possible to com-
bine part-time work with different
types of part-time pensions, thus fa-
cilitating gradual withdrawal from
the labour force. The inllow into par-
tial retirement has varied with
changes in the regulations, the wage-
compensation rate and the business
cycle. The latest changes in regula-
tions imply more restrictions. From
L995, the maximum reduction in
working time compensated for is ten
hours per week.
New types of LMP measures
The structure of active labour market
policy in the early phase of the
present economic crisis, which start-
ed in the early 1990s, differed from
that of earlier economic slowdowns
(see, for example, Johannesson &
Wadensj<i 7995). Firstly, the govern-
ment waited longer to increase the
volume of labour market pro-
grammes. Secondly, employment
training was emphasised, as opposed
to temporary job-creation schemes
(remunerated at the going wage rate),
which had been the main labour mar-
ket programme used to stabilise the
business cycle in former recessions.
Thirdly, several new labour market
programmes were introduced. Some
of these prograrnmes have become
very extensive (see below).
From 1992 onwards, the policy
of giving priority to employment
training changed and temporary job-
creation schemes expanded again 
-
but these schemes now had a differ-
ent profile. ln L993, a new form of
temporary employment scheme was
introduced, the work-experience
scheme (arbetsliosutoecklingspro-jekt- ALU). Five new and important
characteristics of this progralnme are
that (a) only people who are eligible
for unemployment benefits may be
placed, (b) the compensation paid is
the same as the unemployment bene-
fit, (c) the work is supposed to have a
training component, (d) the work is
carried out not only in the public sec-
tor but also in the private sector, with
an emphasis on non-profit organisa-
tions, and (e) the work undertaken
wouldnothave been carried out with-
out the subsidy. This programme has
now become the most extensive de-
mand-side progralnme.
Another important and growing
programme, introduced in 1995, is
the workplace introduction scheme(arbetsplatsintroduktion API),
which is an amalgamation of earlier
separate work-experience pro-
grammes. The workplace introduc-
tion is in many respects similar to the
work-experience scheme. The most
important difference is that it is not
exclusively targeted towards unem-
ployment benefit recipients. In the
Spring Bill 7997, presented in mid-
April, the government has proposed
a relaxation of the rules permitting
participation periods beyond the
standard six months in ALU and API.
Just as during the downturn in the
early 1980s, special programmes for
young people were introduced in the
early 1990s. The three main differ-
ences compared to the programmes
of the early 1980s are that (a) em-
ployment is now subsidised mainly in
the private sector as opposed to
the public sector, (b) national pro-
grzunmes cover mainly persons aged
20-24 years, while municipalities are
responsible for those below 20, and
(c) the incentives for people under
the age of 20 years to take part in up-
per-secondary education, instead of
participating in different types of
regular work training, are heavily
emphasised. The lower age limit for
participation in a labour market pro-
grarnme is usually 20 years.
In late L996, a new labour market
prograrnme targeted towards people
who fulfil the following three condi-
tions was launched: (a) older than 55
years, (b) unemployed for more than
two years, and (c) eligible for unem-
ployment benefit. This measure is
called "public temporary jobs for the
elderly unemployed" (offenthga till-
fiilliga arbeten fdr iildre arbetskisa -
OTA), in which employment is ex-
pected to be long term (as compared
to most other measures where a
placement generally ends after a
maximum of six months). The partic-
ipants are given a smaller gxant on
top of the basic remuneration, which
is equal to the participant's unem-
ployment benefit. They are expected
to work 90% of. norrral hours and to
look for a regular job for the remain-
ing 10%. The programme only in-
volves the public sector and partici-
pants are explicitly supposed not to
perform regular work tasks. Up to
Apnl 1997, take-up has been rela-
tively low.
In July L997, a five-year pro-
grarnme to expand adult education
commences. Long-term unemployed
adults (25-55 years) with less than
three years of upper-secondary edu-
cation are given priority. People in
this group will have the opportunity
1 People who participate in some of the la-
bour market policy programmes introduced
during the 1990s are classified as outside ttre
labour force. Therefore, around 80% of the
participants in regular active LMP measures
are not included in the Labour Force Survey
definition. ln former recessions, people who
participated in progrrmmes, with tlte excep-
tion of employment training and employa-
bility institutes, were all included in the la-
bour force.
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to enrol in adult upper-secondary ed-
ucation schemes. A grant corre-
sponding to the unemployment ben-
efit will be given for a maximum pe-
riod of one year.
In the Spring Bill L997, the gov-
ernment has proposed "a more ac-
tive use of unemployment benefits".
Various, locally based activation
projects targeted to benefit recipients
are to be initiated over the period
from July !997 to December 1998.
Also in the Spring Bill L997, tem-
porary so-called "resource jobs"
within the public sector are pro-
posed. The jobs are targeted at bene-
fit recipients. This proposal is based
on the experience of the so-called
Kalmar project, a trial project in the
municipality of Kalmar in the south-
east of Sweden. In these resource
jobs, benefit recipients are supposed
to perform quality-improving 
- 
i.e.
not regular 
- 
work tasks during 90%
of normal hours and to look for a
regular job during the remaining
10%. The participants keep their
benefits during participation and the
employer may top this up to a maxi-
mum of 90% of. previous income (up
to an earnings ceiling). The maxi-
mum duration of participation is six
months.
In addition, the government pro-
poses that long-term unemployed
people aged60-64 years shall be giv-
en the option to withdraw from the
labour force while retaining unem-
ployment benefit up to the normal
age of retirement (65 years). Under
the proposal, this option remains in
force only from July to December
199V.In the Spring Bill L997, the
government has also announced a
plan whereby support will be provid-
ed in cases where feople aged 63-64
years retire and are offered sever-
ance payments and the employer in-
stead hires a youf,ger long-term un-
employed person.
Ghanges in the Unem-
ployment Beildfit System
The Swedist une{nloVment benefit
system consists of ]tfo parts: a vol-
untary unemployment insurance (ar-
betsliishetskassa or a-kassa), i.e. an
earnings-related compensation (up
to an earnings ceiling; both member-
ship and qualifying conditions are to
be fulfilled), and a flat-rate, compar-
atively low compensation (kontant
arbetsmarknadsstdd or KAS), with-
out membership obligation. The
compensation rate in the unemploy-
ment insurance system was 90% of
previous earnings prior to July 1993,
after which it was reduced to 80%
and then to 757" as from January
1996. T\e earnings ceiling n 7996
was around SEK 16,500 per month.
In the flat-rate benefit system, KAS,
the compensation was SEK 230 per
working day in 1996. lt has been
lowered by small amounts since
7993.
In recent years, some restrictions
on benefit eligibility have been intro-
duced. In late L995,the possibility of
obtaining unemployment benefit (of
any kind) on a part-time basis was re-
stricted to the initial unemployment
period if the benefit recipient held a
permanent part-time position at the
end of this first benefit period.
In mid-March 7997, the govern-
ment presented a major proposal un-
der which the unemployment insur-
ance and the flat-rate benefit sys-
tems are to be merged into one sys-
tem in 1998. Under the proposal,
the compensation rate in the unem-
ployment insurance system is to be
restored to 80% in September 1997,
and the KAS benefit is to increase
somewhat. The increase from 75 to
80% is, however, to be financed by
higher contributions to the unem-
ployment insurance funds corre-
sponding to around SEK 20-25
(around ECU 3) per member and
month. The benefit period for KAS
recipients is to be the same as for un-
employment insurance recipients,
which means a longer period com-
pared to the current situation. A
longer qualifying period is suggested
in the proposal.
ln addition, an upper limit for the
income from marginal employment
is proposed. There is currently no
such limit: if the marginal job is not
considered to prevent the jobseeker
from taking on a full-time job, there
is no ground for reducing benefit. To-
gether with this restriction, a loosen-
ing of the regulation concerning the
self-employed is proposed. Current-
ly, in order for a self-employed per-
son without work to receive unem-
ployment benefit, the activities in the
firm have to permanently cease. The
government now proposes that it will
suffice that activities be temporarily
suspended, although the suspension
must not be due to seasonal flucfua-
tions.
Programme participation 
-
a means to renew benefit
eligibility and a work test
In the Swedish unemployment bene-
fit system, labour market pro-
grarnmes are available as a means to
renew benefit eligibility. This right
to benefit renewal means that in
practice the benefit period is unlimit-
ed: at the same time, programme
participation may also be used as a
work test. If a benefit recipient
refuses to participate in a pro-
gramme suggested by the employ-
ment officer, he or she may lose the
right to benefits.
One of the main topics in the cur-
rent labour market policy debate is
the problem concerning the so-called
"measure-dominated employment
career". This system means that, al-
though long-term unemployment 
-
meaning long, unintemrpted spells of
unemployment 
- 
is not as prevalent
in Sweden as in many other Member
States, it is not unusual for those out
of work to alternate spells of unem-
ployment with spells of labour mar-
ket programme participation over an
2 This measure contrasts with the decision in
7997 to abolish retirement for labour mar-
ket reasons. Between 197'J, and 1991, a spe-
cial unemployment-related disabi.lity pen-
sion for older workers was in force. Exhaus-
tion of unemployment benefits entitled disa-
bled people aged at least 60 to this pension.
These pensions were frequently used as an
exit route from the labour market in cases of
Iay-offs. A large proportion of registered
unemployment among older workers was,
in practice, a form of early exit from the [a-
bour market.
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extended period. Recurrent unem-
ployment is also common3.
ln t996,the government proposed
that the period of unemployment
compensation combined with labour
market progralnme measures should
be limited to a maximum of three
years. A majority in the Riksdag vot-
ed for this proposal aud the new rules
were meant to come into force in
January L997. However, the deci-
sion was annulled during the fall of
1996 and no new rules were imple-
mented. The question of a time limit
on the receipt of unemployment ben-
efit is to be investigated again.
Evaluations
The question of whether, and if so
how, active labour market policies
can be used to combat persistently
high unemployment in Europe has
attracted growing interest. In this
context, Sweden, with its long tradi-
tion of emphasising firll employment
based on an active labour market
policy, has often been seen as a shin-
ing example. However, evaluations
of Swedish programmes indicate that
their effects have been less favoura-
ble in the present recession than in
earlier periodsa.
A common belief concerning la-
bour market progralnmes is that they
are too extensive to be effective and
that the beneficial effect for the indi-
vidual of switching between unem-
ployment and programme participa-
tion several times in order to renew
benefit eligibility is of doubtful value
at the macro level. Despite this, there
are conflicting views regarding the
effects (on unemployment and on the
income distribution) of the introduc-
tion of an "absolute time limit" in
the unemployment benefit system.
Some people claim that the positive
effects on unemploynent of in-
creased search effectiveness would
dominate. Others fear that, while the
costs for unemploynent benefits de-
crease, the main effect would be to
increase povefi and to merely
switch spending to social benefits.
One intrinsic problem with evalu-
ation studies is that in most cases
they do not incorporate the effects
that active labour market policies
may have on the behaviour of non-
participants. Such effects include
deadweight, substitution and dis-
placement effects. All these effects
lower the net employment results of
programmes. Sometimes these ef-
fects are desired, for example, when
a demand-side programme is used to
even out the employnent effects of
the business cycle or when a group of
people on subsidised jobs temporari-
ly crowd out persons who have rela-
tively better chances on the labour
market. Active labour market policy
measures may increase aggregate
wage pressure through lower search
intensity (while participating in a
programme) and if prograrnme par-
ticipation is seen as a "lesser evil"
than being unsmployed, thus in-
creasing reservation wages. This in
turn suggests that the extent of regu-
lar employment, through the in-
creased wage pressure, may be ad-
versely affected. Beneficial employ-
ment effects, on the other hand, may
occur if the unemployed, through
prograrnme participation, acquire
more competitive skills. Also, if the
competitive position of outsiders on
the labour market, e.g. long-term un-
employed and youth, is weak, target-
ing labour market programmes to-
wards these people need not imply
upward irressure on wages.
But there are risks connected with
targeting programmes exclusively to-
wards outsiders. Such a narrow tar-
geting may give programmes a bad
reputation and thus function as a
negative screening mechanism for
employers.
In the case of the work-experience
scheme (ALU), the workplace intro-
duction scheme (API) or the public
temporary jobs for the elderly unem-
ployed (OTA), it is explicitly stated
that no crowding-out should occur.
OTA and API are such recent meas-
ures that no evaluations have been
carried out so far, but some studies
have been conducted into ALU.
They indicate that undesired substi-
tution effects are present (see Fors-
hnd L997 ; Hallstrdm L99 5).
The following policy-related con-
clusions can be drawn from the stud-
ies of Swedish labour market pro-
Srarnmes:
- 
Active labour market policy was
used as a fairly efficient counter-
cyclical measure to stabilise the
business cycle over several dec-
ades. In the early 1990s, by con-
trast, implementation was poorly
timed: labour market programmes
were reduced at the same time as
unemployment grew.
- 
Most studies have been conducted
in the context of low unemploy-
ment. ln the present high unem-
ployment context, it has been sug-
gested that labour market policy
prograrnmes might be less effec-
tive.
- 
The effects of programmes on
wage determination are still un-
clear. Sfudies have produced con-
flicting results, often based on just
a few observations. Unsolved
methodological problems remain.
- 
There are indications that de-
mand-side measures have larger
undesired employment effects
than supply-side measures.
- 
Because of the existence of such
undesired effects, only marginal
positive net employment effects
have been acknowledged.
- 
Few real negative effects have
been found, although Regn6r
(7993) did find significant nega-
tive effects on average earnings
one year after participating in em-
ployment training (a supply-side
programme).
AnnaThowsie
3 Ackum Agell et al. (7995) find that most of
the unemployment periods during 1991-
\994 were rather short, but that 6O% ot
those who ended an unemployment spell by
programme participation were unemployed
again within six montls and as many as
85% were unemployed again within a year.
The corresponding figures for those who
found a job were 44 and 60%, respectively.
4 Calmfors (1994) presents the theoretical
background to and an overview of Swedish
and international evaluation studies. ln Jo-
hannesson & Wadensjii (1995), some evalu-
ations of Swedish labour market pro-
gra[rmes are presented. An extensive over-
view of recent Swedish evaluation studies is
found in Zetterberg (1996).
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United Kingdom
- 
OECD data on ALMP participants
do not cover initiatives delivered
through the Emplolmrent Service
@S), including job-search assist-
ance, counselling and similar sup-
port activities, although they are
included in the expenditure data.
The recent shift in the UK towards
such initiatives, involving lower
per capita costs than more "tradi-
tional" ALMP measures, means
that the static (and relatively low)
overall ALMP expenditure levels
conceal growing participation lev-
els, not fully reflected in the
OECD data.
Targeting by unemployment
duration
A key feature of UK ALMP is that
target groups are typically defined
by unemployment duration. Most ac-
tive measures cut in at six months of
unemployment or later. The assump-
tion behind this approach is that
there is no reliable method of identi-
fying those at risk of long-term un-
employment (LT[-I)1. Since most en-
trants to the unemployment register
flow off again within six months2,
early intervention would have a high
deadweight element. The short-term
unemployed are offered the job-bro-
king services of the ES, and some
counselling and advice, but the major
policy input is reserved for those
reaching six months unemployment,
and higher duration thresholds trig-
ger eligibility for further, more inten-
sive measures.
Classification of active
measures
We adopt a simple classification of
the main types of ALMP in the UK
(see Gregg 7990). The categories in
the classification overlap, but they
enable us to examine the main strate-
gic shifts in the UK approach. We dis-
tinguish, in particular, between:
1. recruitment subsidies;
2. direct job creation in the non-mar-
ket sector (including small-scale
1 See the discussion of the "early identifica-
tion" issue in Hasluck et al. (1996).
2 Of new claimants entering unemployment
in the period L994-95,52Y"lezve the regis-
ter within three months, and two-thirds
(67 %) leav e within six montls (Departuent
for Education and Employment L997,
P.31).
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local progralnmes generating jobs
in the "intermediate" labour mar-
ket);
3. labour-supply reduction, e.g. by
subsidising work-sharing or early
retirement;
4. vocational training for the unem-
ployed to increase their employa-
bility in the regular labour market;
5. other support or training aimed
at employability, including job-
search training and counselling
aimed at improving "motivation"
and work attitudes;
6. measures addressing market fail-
ure in recruitment; e.g. through
targeted job-matching services, or
subsidising employers to "try out"
the unemployed;
7. several of the above categories
incorporate "activation" through
sanctions; but activation is suffi-
ciently important in the UK to
identify separately. Two strands
can be distinguished: measures re-
ducing the reservation wage of the
unemployed by making it harder
(through benefit sanctions) to
refuse low-paying jobs; and meas-
ures based on a "workfare" mod-
el, whereby the unemployed are
required to work for their benefit;
8. measures involving "activation"
through incentives, tackling the
"unemployment trap" by making
it possible to retain benefits on en-
tering employment.
Evolution of UK ALMP strategy
Table 1 gives a simplified overview
of the recent evolution of UK ALMP.
The "ticks" represent the relative
importance (interpreted in terms of
expenditure and/or participant num-
bers) of the different policy types in
the overall portfolio.
In the late 1970s, the economic
crisis that followed the first oil shock
led to unprecedented mass unem-
ployment. Aggregate demand man-
agement remained important, and
ALMP focused on employer subsi-
dies, direct job creation and small-
scale measures reducing labour sup-
ply. Training measures were not
widespread and were focused on
youth.
The early 1980s brought a Con-
servative government, a deep reces-
sion, and a growing emphasis on sup-
ply-side policies, although this did
not feed through immediately into
ALMP. The main shift occurred in
the mid-1980s, when demand-side
measures were replaced on a massive
scale with training measures. The
dominant belief was that state inter-
vention was justified only in cases of
'market failure, which was seen to ap-
ply not only to training, but also to
job-search and job-matching meas-
ures delivered through the ES, which
also expanded rapidly. The first ele-
ments of compulsion appeared at this
time, with stricter behavioural tests
for benefit receipt, the removal of
benefit entitlement for some groups
refusing to participate in schemes,
and the introduction of schemes
aimed at reducing "reservation
wages".
In the 1990s, the supply-side
thrust continued, but accompanied
by a proliferation of schemes under
some of the traditional headings. Fur-
ther, the emphasis on training for the
adult LTU has lessened, under grow-
ing scepticism regarding its effective-
ness. In part, the balance has further
shifted to the lower-cost schemes of
job-search training, improving work
attitudes, and subsidising work place-
ments for the LTU. There has, at the
same time, been a re-emergence of
interest in job-creation measures and
recruitment subsidies, albeit on a
smaller scale and with more targeting
than before.
How can recent developments be
explained? In part, the new policy di-
versity reflects evaluation evidence
that many existing measures have
had little impact on the integration
of disadvantaged groups into the la-
bour market. Also, however, there is
growing recognition that no single
approach is effective for all groups,
and there has been a growth in small-
scale experimental and local policies.
The wheel has not come full circle,
however, and the current range of
measures remains very different
from that of the late 1970s, with
more emphasis on interventions de-
livered through the ES, incorporating
an increasing element of compulsion.
These measures are large in terms of
participant numbers, but have low
per capita costs, and even if they
have not had huge positive effects,
their negative effects (e.g. market-
distorting displacement and substitu-
tion) are also small.
Current Measures 
- 
The Grow-
ing Role of "Activation"
Table 2 summarises the main recent
active measures in the UK, highlight-
ing those involving a degree of "acti-
vation" (through incentives or sanc-
tions).
Activation through sanctions
The table shows that "activation"
measures are well established in the
UK's overall ALMP strategy. We
Table 1: Recent Evolution of UK Active Labour Market Policy
Period
Approach l970s 1980s: lst half 1980s:2nd half 1990s
Subsidies r'r'r' {{
Job creation r'r'r' r'r'
Supply reduction
Training 
- 
skills r'r'r'{{r'{
Job-search supporUcounselling, etc. r'r' r'r'r'
Improved job-matching r'r' r'r'
Activation through incentives/
sanctions
r'r'r'
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have already noted the growing
"compulsion" associated with many
active measures as one dimension of
the emphasis on "activating" the un-
employed. A trend towards a "strict-
er benefits regfure" has been in evi-
dence since the early 1980s3. The
process began ln 1982, when claim-
ants of unemployment benefit were
required to demonstrate that they
were available for work. The main
shift was in 1986, however, with the
introduction of compulsory "Re-
start" interviews (now every six
months), combining job-search as-
sistance with rigorous checking of
benefit eligibility and benefit penal-
ties for non-attendance. Also in
1986, the period for which unem-
ployment beneflt is disallowed for
those leaving employment "volun-
tarily" was extended from six to 13
weeks (and to 26 weeks in 1988). In
7988,L6-L7 year-olds lost their right
to unemployment-related benefits,
effectively making the Youth Train-
ing scheme compulsory for unem-
ployed young people. From 1988 all
new claimants were interviewed to
examine "availability for work",
from 1989 were required to show
that they were "actively seeking
work", and after 13 weeks of unem-
ployment were expected to widen
their job search beyond their normal
occupation and reduce their "reser-
vation wage".
This trend accelerated in the
1990s. Those lssshing 12 months of
unemployment are now required
(depending on their age) to partici-
pate in 72-7, Workwise or Jobplan
Workshops, all involving compulso-
ry job-search training or counselling,
with temporary loss of benefits for
non-attendance. Compulsory Restart
Courses for those unemployed for
two years similarly combine job-
search training and benefit sanctions.
Further intensification of the sanc-
tions approach is reflected in two
new initiatives:
- 
The first (from October L996) in-
volves a new appro4ch to benefit
payment, mergirtg Unemploy-
ment Benefit and lncome Support
into the lobseekers' Allowance
(JSA). This simultaneously reduc-
es the generosity of the benefit re-
gime and further tightens the eli-
gibility requirements. JSA is guar-
anteed for a period of only six
months (previously one year), af-
ter which it is means-tested. All
new claimants must sign a Job-
seekers' Agreement, specifying
their job-search activities, breach
of which may involve benefit
sanctions; they must attend an in-
terview with the ES after 13
weeks of unemployment to rein-
force the process of "widening"
their job search.
- 
The second is Project Work, pilot-
ed in two areas of the country in
1996 (with an expected 8,000
LTU participants), and expanded
to 29 other areas in early L997 (to
cover 100,000 participants). The
basic principle (with local varia-
tion) is that after two years'unem-
ployment benefit claimants must
undergo t3 weeks' job-search
training. After this, if they are still
unemployed, they must undertake
13 weeks' compulsory work expe-
rience. Refusal to participate leads
to loss of benefit.
Activation through incentives
A second strand of this strategy has
been an emphasis on o'activation
through incentives", via measures
tackling the disincentives posed by
the interaction between the benefits
system and wages at the lower end of
the labour market.
Key developments here are:
Family Credit (FC), introduced in
1988, aims to encourage unem-
ployed people to take low-paid
work, and consists of a regular
tax-free cash payment currently
averaging GBP 48 per week (with
around 600,000 recipients). To
qualify, claimants must have at
least one dependent child, work
more than 16 hours per week, and
have less than GBP 8,000 personal
capital.
Db ability Working Allow ance, in-
troduced in April L992,has a simi-
lar structure to FC, but aims to re-
duce the particular disincentives
to work facing disabled people, in
the light of their (relatively) high
levels of benefit, and the growing
numbers receiving disability bene-
fits since the mid-1980s. Take-up
of DWA is much lower than
planned, however, with fewer
than 10,000 recipients in April
L996, in contrast to the forecast
50,000.
The three-year lobmatch pilots,
introduced in April 1995 in four
areas, grant a weekly allowance of
GBP 50 per week for six months
to the long-term unemployed
(over two years on the register)
who take a part-time job (1G30
hours per week). Two further GBP
50 bonus payments are offered to
those still working at six and 12
weeks after the end of the initial
allowance period. Participants can
also receive training vouchers
worth up to GBP 300.
the Back to Work Bonus, intro-
duced in October 1996, alongside
the new Jobseekers' Allowance,
consists of a tax-free lump sum
payable to an unemployed person
moving into work. Related work
incentives associated with JSA are
a new rule enabling the partners of
unemployed claimants to work 24
hours a week before losing benefit
(the previous limit was 16 hours),
and a new threshold disregard en-
abling a couple to earn GBP 10
per week before benefit loss.
Earnings Top-Up (ETU) pilots,
also introduced in 1996 in eight lo-
cal areas (at a cost of GBP 75 mil-
lion over three years, with 20,000
recipients planned), are a major
innovation in UK in-work bene-
fits, which for over 20 years have
focused on families with children.
ETU is payable to single people,
the amount varying from GBP 47
to GBP 73 per week in the pilots,
3 A comprehensive account of the shift to-
wards "conditionality" in the receipt of un-
employment benefits can be found in House
of Commons Employment Committee
(7996,pp.2U23).
71No.28.Summer 1997
\IN
z
9
N)?(,J
3
B
oH
\o\o\
of Current and Recent Active Measures
Participants
(annu"l urless
otherrise indicated)
Year
introduced
Actio ation through incentfu es 
- 
in-w ork
benefit
People in low-paid employment
with dependent children
650,000 in
Nov.1995
11,683m
(7eeste6)
DisabilityWorking Actioation through incentioes 
- 
in-,work Disabled people in low-paid employment Total recipients 
- 
E 77m (7994195) L992
Allowance benefit 5,800 (April95); E75m(7995196)
9,400 (April96)
Back to Work Bonus Acthtation through incentioes 
- 
allows be- 3m unemployed Not known Not known L996
nefit claimant to undertake part-time work
Actioation through incentioes 
- 
in-work
benefit, for people without dependants
Pilot in 8 areas Total recipients in
pilot expected to be
20,000
I 75m over
3 years
7996 (3-year
pilots)
Parent Plus Pilots Acthtation through incentioes 
- 
stpport and Pilot in 72 arcas Up to 100,000 E 2Om
incentives for single parents to enter work
Replaces unemployment benefit and
income support
Actio ation through s anctions
Total claimants of
unemployment
benefit and income
support
2.1m (Nov. 1995)
Variant of
scheme since
7970s
Unemployed 16-17 year-olds 247,900(7996197) E7O7mYouth Training & Modern
Apprenticeships
Job-search counselling/advice 3m unemployed 66,200 (7994195)
6L,870 (L995196)
84.4m
€ 3.5m
Counselling/advice 3m unemployed 37,40O(L994195)
31,000 (\995196)
E2.2m(799419s) 7997
El.9m
Job-search Plus (replaces
Job Review Workshops
& Job-search Seminars)
3m unemployed, from 1996
(previously 4 weeks)
51,000 (L994195) f, 1.8m (7994195)
47,OOO(L995196) 81.7(L995196)
Travel to interview
scheme
3.3m interviews E37m(1994195) 7986
1993194
Restart Interviews Counselling/advice
Ac tio a tion thr ou gft s an ctions
Job Interview Guarantee Targeted job-broHng 6m unemployed (+ priority groups) 300,000 (7994195) I 1.0m (7994195) \989
243,300 (7995196)
Subsidised short-term placements 6m unemployed (+ priority groups) 20,000(L994195) E8m(7995196)
29,OOO(L995196) E6.4m(L996197)
Job-search supporUcounselling 6m unemployed (+ priority groups) 266,400 (L994195) E 42.7m (1994195) L984
243,3OO (!995196) E 4L.9 m (7995196)
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tthe Jobseekers' Allowance has yet to
be completed. Monitoring evidence
on both initiatives suggests, howev-
er, that they are both leading to sig-
nificant numbers "signing off" the
unemployment registet'. There is no
evidence, however, on the composi-
tion of these register effects, and it is
unclear how far they reflect genuine
movements (into jobs, other benefit
states or economic inactivity), and
how far they reflect the deterrence of
"fraudulent" benefit claims.
Evaluation of incentive-based
activation measures
Despite the long history of in-work
benefits in the UK, they have been
seen as part of social security policy
rather than of ALMP, there has been,
until recently, little evaluation of
their labour market impact, and the
evidence on this remains mixed.
An evaluation of Family Credit in
lggL showed that 35 % of those eligi-
ble did not claim FC, although take-
up has subsequently grown. There
has been no evaluation of its labour
market impact, although survey re-
search (Marsh & McKay 1993), con-
cluded that the benefit had helped
mainly single parents into low-paid
work, with little hard evidence of a
wider incentive effect. On the posi-
tive side, employer surveys suggest,
contrary to expectations, that FC has
not lowered wages (see Callender et
al.t994).It has been argued, howev-
er, that any impact on the unemploy-
ment trap is offset by the creation of
a "poverty trap" (see Robinson
7997), since as earnings rise, FC is
withdrawn at a rate of.70%. When
combined with income taxes, this im-
plies an effective marginal tax rate of
over 90Yo.
The evaluation of Disability Work-
ing Allowance (Rowlingson &
Berthoud 1996) casts further doubt
on the extent to which means-tested
in-work benefits provide an incentive
to work. The research indicates both
low awareness of the benefit among
the target group, and that "DWA has
had a very small impact in terms of
encotiraging people into work", giv-
en the many other barriers facing dis-
abled people, including their own low
expectations of work, reinforced by
employer discrimination.
There is no full evaluation of the
Jobmatch grants for part-time work,
but a monitoring studys of the first
scheme showed little impact in facili-
tating a transition to full-time em-
ployment, with only 4% of those
completing the scheme having in-
creased their working hours since the
start of the scheme.
No monitoring or evaluation has
been completed of the most recent
initiatives @ack to Work Bonus,
Earnings Top-Up), but it is important
to note that ETU is the first major so-
cial security benefit to be fully pilot-
ed, and a rigorous evaluation is un-
der way, examining the impact of
different benefit rates in different pi-
lot areas, the experiences of partici-
pants and non-participants, and the
impact on wage-setting and recruit-
ment behaviour. This will provide
the first comprehensive assessment
of the labour market impact of in-
work benefits in the UK.
Conclusions
Evaluation evidence suggests that
most active measures adopted in the
UK (including skills training, job-
search support, counselling, job-
matching and subsidies) have had
some (often small) positive impact
on employment outcomes. The main
exception is that there is little evi-
dence that direct job-creation pro-
grarnmes alone (such as Employment
Action and the Community Pro-
gramme) have had significant em-
ployment effects beyond the scheme
period (see Payne et al. 1996; Dis-
ney et al. L992). A further key eval-
uation finding is that mixed ap-
proaches may be the most effective.
For example, training progralnmes
which incorporate other elements
such as job-search support, or practi-
cal work placements with employ-
ers, may be more effective than
training alone.
The evaluation results providepri-
ma facie justification for the current
UK approach, which essentially con-
sists not of a shift from passive to ac-
tive measures, but rather of a reori-
entation in the balance of active
measures themselves towards a port-
folio consisting of:
- 
a wide range of measures;
- 
increased targeting of specific
measures at the most disadvan-
taged groups;
- 
growing emphasis on low-cost-
per-place schemes run through ES
(ob search, counselling, etc.);
- 
declining emphasis on skills train-
ing in favour of schemes offering
work experience, work trials, or
other means of bringing the LTU
in contact with employers; as well
as measures focusing on improv-
ing work attitudes and motivation.
As far as the other key aspect of re-
cent policy development is con-
cerned, namely measures involving
"activation" through sanctions and/
or incentives, there is little or no
evaluation evidence allowing us to
disentangle their impact. In the one
comprehensively evaluated initiative
(Restart), the overall short-run im-
pact is small but positive, although
this may be due as much to the
"sanctions" leading to participants
"signing off" the unemployment reg-
ister for short-term jobs (or leaving
the labour market altogether), as to
Restart's job-search assistance and
advice. Similarly, initial monitoring
evidence on the important new initi-
atives (Jobseekers' Allowance and
Project Work) suggests in both cases
that the "signing off" disincentive is
considerable. In the case of Project
Work, the low initial rate of post-
scheme entry into employment raises
questions about the benefit of com-
pulsory work schemes. Arguably, if
the benefits system itself is struc-
4 Recent evidence suggests that around half
of the fall in unemployment since October
l996has been due to the changes in benefit
eligibility associated with JSA (Working
Brief, March 7997,pp.,1-5), and that 20-
25%" more people are leaving the unem-
ployment register in Project Work pilot are-
as than in comparable areas (lVorking Brief,
November 1996, pp.,|-3).
5 Eoaluation of Jobmatch. London: The Sta-
tionery Office, 1996.
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tured to deter fraud, a training or
work-experience initiative for the
genuine unemployed will have little
need of compulsion. Indeed, given
the clear evidence of employers' con-
cerns about the motivation and work
attitudes of the (long-term) unem-
ployed (see Atkinson et aI. L996), it
is questionable whether participation
in a compulsory scheme will improve
employers' perception of this group,
and it may even stigmatise them fur-
ther.
Full evidence on the incentive-
based approach (in-work benefits),
awaits the evaluation of Earnings
Top-Up, but the existing evidence is
at best disappointing, suggesting rel-
atively low take-up of the benefits,
Iittle significant incentive effect, and
that any impact on the unemploy-
ment trap may be at the expense of
creating a poverty trap among the
lower paid.
Nigel Meager
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These are comprehensive national reports on all EU
member countries. They are updated every two years
and report on public labour market institutions
(ministries and employment services), the statutory
bases for labour, labour market and employment
policies and, in particular, 1'active", and 1l passive"
labour market policy measures; details of information
and research institutions dealing with employmentSYSDEM (System of Documentation, Evaluation and
Monitoring of Employment Policies) E and a new policy are also provided.
RESEARCH advisory grouP.
The main products of the networks, which consist
of members of the national labour market adminis- i
trations (MISEP) and i independent researchers
(SYSDEM, RESEARCH) and are"administered by a
common secretariat, are the following:
inforMlSEP Policies
This series reports four times a year on recent labour
market ipolicy developments in Member States.
Following a summary drawing on the five recommen- i
dations -for an integrated European employment {
strategy, the main section of "Policies" consists of the
national reports supplied by the correspondents.
Since 1993 "Policies" has also included a longer article
("Focus"), l which I is f tfre responsibility - of ,the
Secretariat; "Focus" discusses a labour market or
employment policy-related topic and often extends to
non-Member States.
Ta b I e a u d e bo rd l"-'*''""' ;E:Tl:ffii5:&$5r' **i='1
The "Tableau de bord" is a synoptic overview of the
labour market and employment policy measures
implemented by the Member States, classif ied accor-
ding to the f ive policy areas recommended at Essen.
This main product of the SYSDEM network appears
twice a year and provides a comparative and indepth
overview of selected policies and developments in the
labour markets of the Member States.
R E s E A R c H re p o rt S-m[i#g*"]*qtffi*ff4ffi. {*=eFF
An annual report is to be published by the RESEARCH
network in the form of a study of a selected labour
market or employment policy topi
Electronic Documentation System
Large i parts of . the Iinformation contained in the
publications are also available on CD-ROM, the ERSEP
(Electronic Retrieval System on Employment Policies)
|F-*
I rfre aim of the European Employment Observatory is
I to promote the multilateral exchange of information
I on labour markets'and labour market policies be-
I t*""n EU Member States and to produce and dissemi-
[ 
- -r .-^^^^.--L ^.^ -^t^,,^^* ,--,,^-Inate quality analyses and research on relevant issues
I for employment and labour market policy.
-* The European employment strategy adopted by the
I Erropeun Council in Essen in December 1994 imposed
I n"* demands on the Observatory. ln particular, rt is
[ - rr- ^L'...^r.. r^ rL^ +^-l- ^fI expected -to contribute. eff ectively to the task of
I monitoring the progress of labour market reforms
I ttrat are in line with the common strategic goals.
I following the changes introduced in 1996 to cope
I with these new challenges and tasks, the Observatory
I 
^^,^ri.^nci<+< nf -frnrn nofrnrnrk< * I\/llSFP (N,/l rrtrral, nowi consists of two etwor s "* MI E  (Mutu,,-
Ilnformation System on Employment Policies) and
1',, tiof ",",,'
Basic lnformation Reports
database, and ' are accessible 1 via l lnternet
